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Abstract 
In recent decades, the European postal industry has undergone profound reforms, which aim 
to promote competition while simultaneously maintaining a high level of universal services 
for consumers. It is often put forth that market opening and the emergence of competition will 
foster innovation in the postal sector. Indeed, increased direct competition with new market 
entrants and indirect competition with information technologies in the sector represent great 
challenges to the traditional business model of postal operators.  
In order to allow postal operators to cope with these challenges, regulatory institutions need to 
evolve coherently with developments in the market place and the society. One of the findings 
of this thesis is that in many cases, current regulatory institutions do not respond adequately 
and in a timely manner to changes in consumer preferences or technologies. The actual 
development in the British postal sector clearly demonstrates how the regulatory regime failed 
to adapt early enough and how the delay in the adaption of the regulatory institutions 
influenced the development of competition as well as the structure of the market.  
The main theoretical contribution of this thesis is the development of a framework of 
regulatory governance costs. The framework contains three different types of costs: static-
direct costs, static-indirect costs and dynamic costs. The static-direct costs of regulatory 
governance refer to the interaction and transactions between the involved actors in the short 
term, and only marginally concern the overall market. These costs are: 
- Monitoring Costs which arise on the regulatory institution’s side because of 
informational asymmetry in the relationships of principals with their agents. 
- Compliance Costs which are the costs that the industry faces in order to comply with 
regulatory requirements. 
- Coordination Costs which result from the fact that multiple actors are involved in 
regulation, which in turn have to be coordinated. 
The second type of regulatory governance costs, the static-indirect costs, pertains less to the 
individual actors than to the overall market. In addition to reducing security on investment in 
the short term, static-indirect regulatory governance costs are the costs related to: 
- Quantities and Prices: Actions of regulators (or policy makers) that have effects on the 
regulated industries and the consumers in terms of supply, demand and the 
development of prices. 
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- Capacity and Technology Choice: Regulation may prevent the regulated operators 
from aligning their supply with the effective demand and affect production 
technology.  
The third type of costs, the dynamic costs of regulatory governance, results in an inefficient 
level of product and process innovation. These costs occur mainly in combination with 
regulatory uncertainty ending in legal disputes or too rigid regulatory regimes that hinder the 
developments of markets. The dynamic costs reduce investment security in the long-term and 
encompass a more dynamic perspective than the static costs. The costs concern: 
- Product Innovation: regulation may prevent operators from introducing new 
products/services because excessive investment cost or limited gains from investment. 
It may also or result in a delay of time to market. 
- Process Innovation: regulation may result in suboptimal processes and prevent 
operators from optimizing existing processes or introduce process innovations.  
In summary, our approach to the appreciation of regulatory governance costs contributes to a 
better understanding of the consequences of regulation and the role of regulation regarding 
the development of markets. The insights about the costs and their impact on market 
evolution will be useful to analyze in the development of regulatory policies in the postal 
sector as well as in the network industries. The framework of regulatory governance costs is 
applied in three case studies in the postal market (Switzerland, Germany, Great Britain). The 
analysis of the cases provides insights into the impact of different institutional dimensions of 
the governance costs and the need for action in adapting current regulation. As a result, a set 
of policy recommendations is formulated in the conclusion. 
Keywords:  
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Zusammenfassung 
Der Europäische Postsektor durchläuft eine tiefgreifende und anhaltende Reform. Diese 
verfolgt zwei Ziele, die nicht immer im Einklang stehen: Einerseits soll in den Postmärkten 
der Wettbewerb eingeführt und gefördert werden. Andererseits soll ein hohes Niveau der 
postalischen Grundversorgung sichergestellt werden. Gleichzeitig verändert sich auch das 
Marktumfeld drastisch. Die Postunternehmen stehen vermehrt im direkten, teilweise globalen 
Wettbewerb mit anderen Postdienstleistern und im Zusammenhang mit der E-Substitution 
auch immer mehr im indirekten (intermodalen) Wettbewerb mit neuen 
Informationstechnologien. Diese Veränderungen im Markt fordern die bisherigen 
Geschäftsmodelle der Postunternehmen stark heraus. 
Damit die Postunternehmen angemessen und schnell auf die Herausforderungen im Markt 
und die Veränderung der Kundenbedürfnisse reagieren können, müssen auch regulatorische 
Rahmenbedingungen parallel und kohärent mit den Veränderungen im Markt angepasst 
werden. Eines der Untersuchungsergebnisse dieser Dissertation ist, dass regulatorische 
Institutionen häufig nicht rechtzeitig auf die Veränderung von Konsumentenpräferenzen 
reagieren bzw. angepasst werden. Das in dieser Dissertation beschriebene aktuelle Beispiel im 
Britischen Postmarkt zeigt deutlich, wie das vorherrschende regulatorische Regime zu spät 
angepasst wurde und wie sich die Verzögerung auf die Entwicklung des Wettbewerbs und die 
Markstruktur auswirkt.  
Der theoretische Beitrag der Dissertation ist die Entwicklung eines Frameworks zu Kosten 
der regulatorischen Governance. Das Framework beinhaltet drei unterschiedliche Arten von 
Kosten: statisch-direkte Kosten, statisch-indirekte Kosten und dynamische Kosten. Die 
statisch-direkten Kosten betreffen Interaktionen und Transaktionen zwischen den involvierten 
Akteuren aus kurzfristiger Sicht. Der Gesamtmarkt ist von diesen Kosten nur marginal 
betroffen. Die drei Arten der statisch-direkten Kosten sind im Folgenden kurz erklärt: 
- Monitoringkosten entstehen aufgrund von Informationsasymmetrien in den 
Beziehungen sowie im Informationsaustausch zwischen Regulatoren und den 
regulierten Unternehmen (Principals and Agents).    
- Compliance Kosten sind die Kosten der Industrie, weil sie die regulatorischen 
Vorgaben einerseits einhalten und die Einhaltung andererseits auch nachweisen 
müssen. 
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- Koordinationskosten entstehen, weil mehrere institutionelle Akteure in die 
Regulierung beziehungsweise Überwachung eines Sektors involviert sind und die 
Aktivitäten der Behörden koordiniert werden müssen.  
Die zweite Form, die statisch-indirekten Kosten der Regulierung, betrifft weniger die 
individuellen Akteure als den Gesamtmarkt. Zusätzlich zu der Tatsache, dass sie die 
Investitionssicherheit in Märkten beeinflussen, verursachen sie Kosten in Verbindung mit: 
- Mengen und Preisen: Aktivitäten von Regulatoren und politischen 
Entscheidungsträgern haben Effekte auf den regulierten Sektor und die Konsumenten 
in Bezug auf Angebot, Nachfrage und Preise. 
- Kapazitäten und Wahl der Technologie: Regulatorische Eingriffe können die 
Unternehmen davon abhalten, ihr Angebot mit der effektiven Nachfrage abzustimmen 
und auch die Wahl der eingesetzten Produktionstechnologie zu beeinflussen. 
Die dritte Art der Kosten, die dynamischen Kosten, treten einerseits in Verbindung mit 
unpräzisen regulatorischen Vorgaben auf, die in langwierigen juristischen Verfahren enden. 
Anderseits hängen diese von zu starren regulatorischen Rahmenbedingungen ab, die eine 
Weiterentwicklung des Marktes verhindern oder unvorhergesehene Folgen haben. Sie enden 
in verzerrten Innovations- und Investitionsanreizen und beeinflussen die Entwicklung der 
Märkte nicht nur kurz-, sondern auch langfristig entscheidend. Die dynamischen Kosten 
betreffen Produkt- und Prozessinnovation: 
- Die Produktinnovation ist betroffen, weil regulatorische Rahmenbedingungen 
Unternehmen davon abhalten können, neue Produkte und Dienstleistungen 
einzuführen, da hohe Investitionskosten nicht amortisiert werden können. 
Regulatorische Eingriffe bzw. Prozesse können auch die Markteinführung von 
Produkten zeitlich verzögern.  
- Regulierung kann Prozessinnovation dahingehend beeinflussen, als dass suboptimale 
Prozesse bestehen bleiben und Prozesse nicht optimiert oder erneuert werden. 
Zusammenfassend soll der Ansatz zur Bestimmung und Beurteilung der regulatorischen 
Kosten dazu beitragen, dass die Folgen von regulatorischen Eingriffen und auch deren 
Einfluss auf die Entwicklung von Märkten besser eingeschätzt werden können. Die 
Erkenntnisse über die Kosten und deren Einfluss auf die Marktentwicklung ist nützlich, um 
regulatorische Grundsätze im Postsektor und auch in andern Infrastruktursektoren zu 
analysieren und künftig weiterzuentwickeln. Im Rahmen der Dissertation kommt das 
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Framework der regulatorischen Governance Kosten im Schweizerischen, im Deutschen und 
im Britischen Postmarkt zur Anwendung. Die Analyse der Fallstudien zeigt auf, wie 
unterschiedliche institutionelle Ausprägungen und Dimensionen die regulatorischen Kosten 
beeinflussen und dass die bestehenden regulatorischen Rahmenbedingungen teilweise 
angepasst werden sollten. In der abschliessenden Würdigung der Dissertation werden daher 
acht Empfehlungen abgegeben, die abgeleitet von den Untersuchungsresultaten eine 
Reduktion der regulatorischen Kosten ermöglichen.  
Stichworte: 
Regulierung, Regulatorische Institutionen, Regulatorische Governance, Governance Kosten, 
Postmarkt, Netzindustrien, neue Institutionenökonomie, Wettbewerb  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, the European postal industry has been undergoing a profound reform, 
which aims to promote competition while simultaneously maintaining a high level of 
universal services for consumers. It is often put forth that market opening and the emergence 
of competition will foster innovation in the postal sector. Indeed, increased direct competition 
with new market entrants and indirect competition with information technologies in the sector 
represent great challenges to the traditional business model of postal operators.  
In order for postal operators to cope with these challenges, regulatory institutions need to 
evolve in parallel and coherently with developments in the market place. Crew et al. (2008) 
noted that finding an appropriate co-evolution of regulation and market development is one of 
the primary challenges of postal reform. Thus, it is periodically necessary to review 
regulatory regimes and their impact on both the development of the market and the involved 
actors.  
Regulation plays an important role in the implementation of sector reform, as regulatory 
institutions are intended to remedy market failure and reduce transaction costs in the 
regulatory regime. However, the net benefits of regulatory intervention to society can be 
achieved only if regulation provides benefits that are greater than its costs: indeed, regulatory 
intervention not only has positive consequences for the market and its development;1 it also 
causes “costs of regulatory governance.” These costs can result from consequences caused by 
the behavior of regulators and other involved actors, regulatory requirements as well as from 
the implementation of regulatory instruments. Regulatory governance costs also include the 
social costs resulting from dynamic inefficiencies due to distorted incentives, when 
regulations do not respond adequately to changes in consumer preferences and technologies. 
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, the research context is outlined, followed by the 
definition of the research questions and objectives. Then, we describe the methodology and 
give an overview of the content of the different chapters. 
  
                                                 
1 See Armstrong and Sappington (2006), section 6, about ‘Entry assistance and anti-competitive liberalization 
policies’. 
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1.1. Research Context 
In recent years, several books on liberalization and re-regulation have addressed the question 
of how to regulate infrastructures and have described the developments in several network 
industries.2 The topic of reregulation in infrastructure sectors is increasingly important, 
because liberalization occurs in all network industries and almost all countries in the world.3 
Liberalization in the postal sector (and in other network industries) is accompanied by new 
institutional arrangements with new actors, notably sector-specific regulators. Despite the 
strong trend toward independent, sector-specific regulatory authorities across sectors and 
countries, liberalization has not resulted in a unified European regulatory model. Most of the 
emerging institutional arrangements do indeed have at their core an independent sector 
specific regulator, but there are still significant differences among countries.4  
Each regulatory arrangement is reflected in a different set of institutions. The actors’ behavior 
and the relationships among the different actors are shaped by the particular institutional 
arrangement in a given country. Any regulatory framework has a significant cost, which is 
influenced by the various actors and the definition of institutions within an institutional 
framework. Furthermore, Coen (2005) observes that newly created regulatory authorities deal 
differently with various national institutional arrangements. The regulatory arrangements 
differ in the degree to which regulatory authorities are accountable to governments, active 
alongside or related to courts and other regulators, or related and responsible to operators and 
interest groups.  
The various actors in the network industries relate to each other within a broader institutional 
framework, that is, within formal and informal rules.5 The operation of such an institutional 
framework as well as its impact on all actors has costs.6 We call these kinds of costs ‘costs of 
regulatory governance’. These overall costs of regulatory governance are still largely 
underestimated or even ignored. Theorists, as well as practitioners do, so far, not pay 
sufficient attention to these particular costs of a regulatory system. Therefore, we assume that 
there are three different types of costs: static-direct costs, static-indirect costs and dynamic 
                                                 
2 E.g., Finger and Künneke (2011a), Crew et al. (2008), Ménard and Gerthman (2009) or Baldwin et al. (2010). 
3 See Finger and Künneke (2011b). 
4 See WIK (2009b). 
5 See Ménard and Shirley (2005). 
6 See Arrow (1969), Williamson (1975, 1985, 1991 and 1999), Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) and Estache and 
Martimort (1999). 
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costs.7 The overall assumption is that the same institutional characteristics or dimension can 
have various effects on different types of costs in the short-, mid- or long-term.  
The distinctions between these different regulatory governance costs are not always very 
clear-cut. While it is relatively easy to distinguish static-direct costs, static-indirect costs in 
most cases do not only lead to direct costs in the short-term but also to dynamic costs in the 
long-term. Static-indirect and dynamic costs might even appear as a consequence of static-
direct costs. Thus, there seems to be a causal link between the different types of regulatory 
costs. With reference to the three case studies in Switzerland, Great Britain and Germany we 
are able to illustrate that not all types of regulatory governance costs can be assessed in the 
same way in different regulatory regimes and that the causal interdependences of the costs 
might differ.8 Static costs and particularly static-direct costs can be observed and assessed in 
all the three postal markets. This is due to the fact that static-direct costs occur in relation with 
clear transactions between the different actors (e.g., information exchange). The identification 
and the clear distinction between static-indirect and dynamic costs is rather difficult, because 
they are rather an outcome of ruling or actions in a particular regulatory context and not 
connected to a single transaction between actors.  
For instance, the dynamic effects of regulation can hardly be assessed in Switzerland, since 
the implemented regulatory framework is very recent and the primary goal of the present 
regulatory framework is not the promotion of competition. But, still one of the indirect or 
dynamic effects is that practically no market entries take place. In contrast, dynamic costs and 
their effects in the markets of Germany and Great Britain can be observed relatively well. The 
effects can be best seen in Great Britain, due to the fact that it has been more than six years 
since the market opened and that very strong regulatory interventions have taken place. The 
British case illustrates clearly how the causality of the different types of costs works: the 
regime failed to adapt the regulatory intervention early enough and the delay in the adaptation 
of the regulatory institutions influenced the development of competition as well as the 
structure of the market. Therefore, we assume that there is a strong interdependency between 
the three different types of regulatory governance costs. It’s seems therefore plausible and 
necessary to put regulation into a broader context in order to better understand the causal 
interdependencies between regulatory intervention and it’s outcomes in the short- and the 
                                                 
7 See Chapter 5 for a detailed explanation. 
8 See Chapters 6 and 7. 
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long-term. Building a systematic approach to evaluating and analyzing regulatory governance 
is thus a relevant challenge.9  
1.2. Research Questions and Objectives 
We assume that governance costs are inherently present in any institutional arrangements and 
as such are determined (1) by the institutional design of the regulatory regime and (2) 
subsequently by the behavior of the various actors involved. The overall aim of this thesis is 
the definition of a generic analytical framework of the costs of regulation in the network 
industries and to apply it in the postal sector. Benham (2005) argues that a single static view 
on regulation is insufficient to understand the development of institutions. This thesis should 
help to explain how different regulatory approaches have affected and continue to affect 
governance costs within a regulatory framework. Moreover, it aims to give a definition of 
different regulatory governance costs that enables a qualitative analysis of governance costs in 
network industries. Different characteristics of institutional dimensions (e.g., the number of 
regulatory actors involved, the scope of the universal service or the characteristics of the 
access regime) have an impact on the degree of regulatory governance costs. Therefore, the 
thesis aims to find relevant institutional dimensions and to assess their impact on governance 
costs. Thus, we formulate two theoretical and one practical research questions: 
(1) What are the different costs of regulatory governance in regulated industries? 
(2) Which criteria and institutional dimensions are useful in assessing regulatory governance 
costs in institutional arrangements?  
(3) What are the regulatory governance costs in the postal sector, and how can they be 
minimized? 
The first two questions, answered in chapter 5, provide the basis for the third and main 
question, answered in chapter 7. Using the framework of regulatory governance costs, we 
conduct an analysis of the postal sector: the aim is to find the institutional dimensions that act 
                                                 
9 See Chapter 4. Ehrlich and Posner (1974) introduce a first framework on costs of regulation, Deighton-Smith 
(1997) did an analysis of regulatory impact and best practices and see Hopkins (1997) for an earlier 
contribution on indicators of regulatory costs. Den Butter et al. (2009) analyze costs and benefits of 
government regulation based on the transaction cost approach. Schatz et al. (2009) develop a regulatory cost 
model. Andres et al. (2009) introduce a framework on regulatory governance and sector performance and 
apply it in the electricity sector. 
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as drivers for regulatory governance costs and to derive a set of policy implications that can 
reduce the costs of regulation. 
It is not the goal of the thesis project to analyze the costs of regulation in a quantitative 
manner. Rather, by way of a qualitative approach, we investigate under which premises 
regulatory interventions impact the regulatory governance costs in the postal sector in 
particular and the network industries in general. The thesis makes the following contributions:  
The theoretical component of this thesis makes two main contributions: it (1) conceptualizes 
and clearly defines a framework of regulatory governance costs and (2) describes criteria and 
institutional dimensions in order to assess regulatory governance costs and their drivers.  
The practical contribution of this thesis is the first-time application of a framework of 
regulatory governance costs in the postal sector by conducting three case studies in the sector. 
The recommendations for policy makers and practitioners involved in the postal sector’s 
regulatory reform suggest how to develop and re-design regulatory regimes and instruments 
in the future. A better understanding of regulatory institutions and regulation’s possible 
negative outcomes is the first step to better institutional policies and improved allocation of 
rights and duties among different regulators in (re-)regulated network industries. 
1.3. Methodology 
This section describes the chosen methodology approach (case studies) used to conduct the 
empirical research and characterizes the field of research as well as the units of analysis.   
1.3.1.  The Empirical Study 
Considering the relative youth of the regulation field, both in network industries and the 
postal sector, case study research is useful in understanding the behavior of actors and the 
description of institutions in regulated industries. Case study research seems to be the 
appropriate approach to investigating the impact of different institutional dimensions and 
understanding the consequences for the evolution of regulatory regimes and the 
corresponding governance costs. As a research method, the case study approach is used in 
many situations, so as to contribute to our knowledge of individual, group, organizational, 
social, political, and related phenomena. Case studies have been a common research method 
in psychology, sociology, political science, anthropology, social work, business, education, 
nursing, and community planning. Case studies are also found in economics, in which the 
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structure of a given industry or the economy of a city or a region may be investigated. In all of 
these situations, the distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand 
complex social phenomena.10  
The case-study approach involves “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and it relies on multiple sources of evidence” 
(Yin, 1994, p. 13). This form of research investigates predefined phenomena but does not 
explicitly rely on control or manipulation of variables. The aim is to understand, in-depth, a 
phenomenon in its context.11 Case studies typically combine data collection techniques such 
as observation, interviews questionnaires and document analysis and are considered to be 
useful where research and theory are at a relatively early and formative stage.12 It is an 
adequate research strategy where a contemporary phenomenon is to be studied in its natural 
context. The overall focus of case study research is the understanding of the dynamics in 
present settings.13  
In brief, the case-study method allows researchers to gain insights into the holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of real-life events, such as individual lifecycles, small group 
behavior, organizational and managerial processes, neighborhood change, school 
performance, international relations, or the maturation of industries.14 
Since the goal of our research is to gain insights on regulatory institutions and their costs, we 
will use a multiple case study design. As in quantitative analysis, the dependability of 
qualitative research results tends to increase with sample size. The drawback is a parallel 
increase in the time and cost of collecting data. Consequently, the question of sample size is 
similar to quantitative samples: the goal is to determine the minimum size that will enable a 
satisfactory level of confidence in the results.15  
By taking a comparative case-study approach, we are able to show the variance of the 
different institutional dimensions in regulatory regimes and regulatory practice and the impact 
on the environment. Concerning comparative approaches in the analysis of institutions, Aoki 
                                                 
10 See Yin (2009). 
11 See Darke et al. (1998). 
12 See Benbasat et al. (1987, p. 396). 
13 See Yin (1994, p. 13) and Eisenhardt (1989, p. 534). 
14 See Yin (2009). 
15 See Royer & Zarlowski (2001). 
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(2001) states: “Institutional arrangements can be diverse across economies even if they are 
exposed to the same technological knowledge and are linked to the same technological 
knowledge and are linked through the same markets. Thus, we need to rely on comparative 
and historical information to understand why particular institutional arrangements have 
evolved in one economy but not in others” (3). Therefore, we use the case study approach to 
gain insights into how particular institutional regimes work and what the roles of institutional 
actors are. This finally helps to understand what the strengths and weaknesses of a regulatory 
regime are. 
A particularly important task is the selection of the cases.16 It seems plausible to increase the 
variance between the cases in order to achieve comparability. The diversity facilitates the 
analysis and comparison of the regulatory institutions and its evolution, as well as the 
different actors in the setting. The postal sectors in Switzerland, Germany and the UK will be 
analyzed, as they constitute particularly illustrative cases in terms of liberalization, 
institutional setting, and responsibility in the sector’s regulatory regime. 
1.3.2.  Research in the Postal Sector and the Units of Analysis 
In recent years, the development of network industries and the transformation of 
infrastructures have been emerging fields of research. Due to the importance of the network 
industries to the socio-economic development of countries, it is imperative to look at different 
infrastructures and to investigate what the results of regulatory interventions are. Many 
publications focus on specific sectors or countries.17 An interesting area for future research 
will be the comparison of regulatory arrangements across network industries in a more 
general way. Therefore, we would like to develop a general framework that allows for 
comparison and to start with the analysis in one single sector: the postal sector. 
Present postal research focuses on discrete topics such as the costs of universal services in 
more and more liberalized markets18, access pricing and the outcomes of access regulation19, 
and the evolution of the postal sector under full competition.20 Only in recent years has a 
                                                 
16 See Yin (2009). 
17 See Finger and Künnke (2011a). 
18 E.g., Panzar (2008a) or Bergum (2008). 
19 E.g., De Bijl et al. (2006) or Crew and Kleindorfer (2008). 
20 E.g., Crew and Kleindorfer (2010) or Finger (2006). 
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handful of researchers started to investigate how regulatory institutions might evolve in the 
future postal sector.21  
Relevant for a number of reasons are the comparison of different regulatory regimes; the 
analysis of the behavior of the involved actors; the analysis of regulatory institutions in the 
postal sector: 
- In many countries, the implementation of new regulatory arrangements (e.g., 
establishing sector-specific regulatory agencies) is a relatively young phenomenon, 
though already undergoing extensive reform.22 
- As markets and delivery volumes are shrinking, the sector faces the challenges of a 
full-market opening, e-substitution and safeguarding a sustainable universal service 
simultaneously.23  
- There is no general model for postal regulation in Europe. Regulatory regimes differ 
widely all over Europe (e.g., definitions of universal services, access regimes, price 
controls). 24  
- Policy makers need to find the balance between promoting competition and not 
putting the universal service and its financing at risk.25 
Therefore, the postal sector offers a stimulating empirical field to analyze regulatory 
arrangements, providing an excellent opportunity to investigate what the results of regulatory 
interventions are.. 
The units of analysis are the institutional frameworks (rules and actors) of regulation in 
different postal markets, namely Switzerland, Germany and the UK. The postal sectors in 
these three countries will be analyzed because they constitute particularly illustrative cases in 
terms of organization, institutional design, and responsibilities in the sector’s regulatory 
regime. Furthermore, they are in different stages of liberalization:  
- Switzerland: there is still a reserved area in Switzerland that includes addressed 
domestic letters up to 50 g in weight. The sector-specific regulator PostReg was set up 
in 2004. Organizationally attached to and funded by the Department of Environment, 
                                                 
21 E.g., Maegli et al. (2010a) and (2011) or Panzar (2012). 
22 Crew et al. (2008). 
23 See Maegli et al. (2010a) and (2011). 
24 See WIK (2009b). 
25 See Knieps et al. (2009), Finger (2006) and Henry (2011). 
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Transport Energy and Communication, PostReg is not yet independent from the 
government. A new law has been approved with anticipated enforcement as of the 
second half of 2012. A new regulatory framework, as well as changes in competences 
of regulatory agencies, will be established with the new law. The incumbent Swiss 
Post is wholly owned by the government and is highly diversified.  
- Germany: the postal market has been fully opened since January 2008. There is no 
designated universal service provider and Deutsche Post fulfils the universal service 
obligation on a voluntary basis. The Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, Post and Railway is a separate federal authority within the 
German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. The agency's task is to 
provide the further development of the German network industries. Competitors 
provide end-to-end competition and gained market shares of about 11 percent of 
Germany’s letter volume. The Deutsche Post DHL was privatized in 2000 and the 
Government still holds 30.5 percent of the shares. The company operates the largest 
logistic networks all over the world.  
- United Kingdom: the market has been fully liberalized since January 2006. 
Established in 2000, the British Postcomm is a very powerful regulatory body with a 
relatively large budget. Responsible for the postal sector only (unlike other countries), 
Postcomm is funded by the operators and not by the government. A new law has been 
in force since October 2011.The previous regulatory regime failed in both promoting 
competition and sustaining the universal service. The responsibilities for postal 
regulation are new in the responsibility of Ofcom as of October 2011. Despite the fact 
that the market has been opened since 2006, there is no end-to-end competition in the 
UK postal market. Privatization of Royal Mail has been planned with the new 
legislation. The incumbent operator faces serious financial troubles in the financing of 
the universal service and the funding of pension funds because of the former 
regulatory regime and a lack in modernization. A far-reaching modernization and 
transformation program for Royal Mail is under implementation.  
1.3.3. The Research Project 
The research project has been done in five different phases, outlined below, along with their 
corresponding tasks and methods. 
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Phase 1: Definition of Research Objectives and Literature Review 
In the first phase, the research context and the central objectives of the research were defined. 
Moreover, different workshops on research methodology, new institutional economics and 
regulation in network industries were absolved. The major task was the screening of the 
existing theories, namely new institutional economics, organizational behavior theory and 
different theories on regulation and regulatory governance.  
Phase 2: Conception of the Framework 
The second phase included the first theoretical conception and definition of the framework of 
regulatory governance costs. A research stay at the University Paris 11 was conducted. 
“Groupe Réseaux Jean Monnet” is a well-known research center for network industries and 
for its research competences in new institutional economics. Initial feedback on the 
framework was given. At this stage, we started to present the framework of regulatory 
governance costs at academic as well as on practice-oriented conferences and workshops.26 
Phase 3: Improving and Publishing the Framework 
In the third phase, the draft of the framework on regulatory governance costs was exposed to 
extensive feedback from practitioners and scientists during workshops and conferences. As a 
result of this improvement process, two contributions were submitted to academic journals for 
publication and passed through the journals’ peer-review process. The outcomes were the 
following two articles: 
- Maegli, M., Jaag, C., Finger, M. (2009) "Coûts de la régulation des industries de 
réseaux: enseignements du réseau postal," Revue d'économie industrielle, 127 (3): 47-
68. 
- Maegli, M., Jaag, C., Finger, M. (2010a) "Regulatory Governance Costs in Network 
Industries: Observations in Postal Regulation," Competition and Regulation in 
Network Industries, 11 (2): 207-237. 
Phase 4: Empirical Research 
Three cases on the postal sectors in Switzerland, Germany and the UK were constructed in the 
fourth phase. The multiple case studies are predominately based on secondary data sources 
like industry reports (e.g., official studies of the European Union, reports of national 
                                                 
26 For a list of conference contributions and workshop presentations see the CV in the appendix.  
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regulatory authorities, annual reports of operators or studies of consulting firms), sector case 
studies, historical documentation, legal texts, conference proceedings, academic articles, 
industry workshops and press releases. The report of the multiple cases covers each of the 
cases separately. Each case covers the historical development of the postal market, the major 
regulatory obligations, the institutional setting, the course of market opening and the 
development of markets as well as the recent developments and outlook. 
Moreover, semi-structured in-depth interviews with industry experts were conducted to get a 
final feedback on the framework of regulatory governance costs.27 The semi-structured 
interview approach, allowed the researcher to address a series of subject areas concerning 
various institutional dimensions and the framework defined in advance.28 This interview 
guide was completed during the course of the discussion, with the aid of some other 
questions.29 
Interview partners were the deputy secretary general of the Swiss Federal Department of the 
Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications, Post NL’s (former TNT) head of EU 
Affairs, the director of strategic and regulatory affairs of Belgium Post, and chairman of the 
European affairs committee of Posteurop as well as an economist of Belgium post. The first 
aim of the expert interviews was to get final, independent feedback on the framework of 
regulatory governance costs. Moreover, another goal was to evaluate the different institutional 
dimensions of regulatory regimes and to discuss their impact on the degree of the various 
governance costs. The semi-structured interviews were conducted before the final analysis, 
and the outcome of the interviews contributes to the analysis in chapter 7.  
Phase 5: Analysis of the Cases 
In this last phase, the analysis and the comparison of the three cases were done. In addition to 
the three individual case narratives, the thesis contains a chapter on cross-case analysis and 
results. The same set of criteria was repeated for every case; a comparative structure for cross-
case comparisons was applied. The analysis was done along the framework of regulatory 
governance costs. The purpose of this structure was to show the similarities and differences 
                                                 
27 Materials used to conduct the semi-structured interviews are included in the appendix. 
28 See Merton et al. (1990). 
29 See Ibert et al. (2001). 
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between the three cases30 in order to gain insights about the impact of different types of 
governance costs in combination with different institutional dimensions.  
This final phase aimed to evaluate the results. Furthermore, the policy recommendations and 
findings of the three case studies were derived and formulated.  
1.4. Outline of the Thesis 
This first introductory chapter provides a general introduction with the problem definition, the 
research objectives, the methodological approach and an outline of the thesis. Chapter 2 
introduces the theory and practice of postal regulation. The chapter discusses the different 
rationales for regulation in general and the postal sector in particular, before giving an 
overview on the development of regulation. The chapter then summarizes the properties of the 
postal sector and discusses different trends affecting regulation in order to elucidate the 
challenges in future postal regulation. 
Chapter 3 and 4 introduce the theoretical foundations for the development of the framework 
on regulatory governance costs. Chapter 3 offers an overview of New Institutional Economics 
and its main approaches with an emphasis on transaction cost and agency theory. 
Additionally, it introduces the dynamic perspective on the economics of institutions. Chapter 
4 examines different theoretical perspectives on regulatory governance and links regulatory 
governance with the transaction cost approach and agency theory.  
Chapter 5 then provides the theoretical contribution of the dissertation by introducing the 
definition of regulatory governance costs and by developing a corresponding framework. 
Before introducing and describing the different types of governance costs (static-direct, static-
indirect and dynamic costs), the chapter outlines the institutional dimensions that have an 
impact on different types of costs – and thus act as a cost driver in regulatory regimes.  
Chapter 6 includes three separate case studies on the postal markets in Switzerland, Germany 
and UK. The cases describe the history, the central regulatory obligations, the institutional 
setting, the course of market opening and the recent development. Each case ends with a 
summary of the characteristics of the institutional dimensions as introduced in chapter 5. 
Chapter 7 analyzes the three cases along the framework of regulatory governance costs. The 
different types of costs are discussed for all of the three cases in order to give an overview of 
                                                 
30 See Yin (2009). 
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where the costs occur in different regulatory regimes. Building on that, the different 
institutional dimensions are evaluated regarding their impact on regulatory costs. 
The overall conclusions and recommendations are formulated in chapter 8. This chapter 
summarizes the content of the thesis, discusses the limitations of our research and also offers 
a set of recommendations regarding future regulatory policies in post and future research. 
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2. THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POSTAL REGULATION 
This chapter covers theory and practice of postal regulation. It starts with an outline of the 
rationales for regulatory intervention from both an economic and a socio-political perspective. 
After offering a short overview on the characteristics of network industries and the need for 
regulation, the chapter emphasizes the rationales for regulation of the post and the recent 
development of the postal sector. An overview of the development of the European postal 
regulation policy then leads to a discussion on the current situation in postal regulation as well 
as on the most important future trends with impact on regulation in the sector. The chapter 
ends with a conclusion.  
2.1. Theory of Regulatory Interventions 
This section introduces the theoretical background on the properties and rationales of 
regulatory intervention. Furthermore, we introduce the characteristics of network industries 
and discuss the rationale for regulation in these industries.  
Regulatory interventions can have different reasons and goals. On the one hand, they may 
include purely economic, market-related goals (such as the functioning of competition or 
interoperability between suppliers). On the other hand, there are socio-political reasons (such 
as a high-quality public services for the entire society).31  
2.1.1.  Economic Rationales for Regulatory Intervention 
The rationales for regulation had been based on different sources of market failure.32 Before 
discussing the different sources of market failure, we present the main ways of introducing 
competitive forces in the market when competition is absent or poor. Basically, these are 
competition for the market, competition in the market and competition between markets:33 
1. Competition for the market: when elements of a market exhibit natural monopoly 
characteristics, e.g., due to a state monopoly, competition can be enforced through 
tendering for the market or for parts of it. The desired outcome is that the most 
efficient supplier provides services without realizing monopoly rents by bidding for a 
                                                 
31 See Alexiadis and Cave (2010). 
32 See Jaag and Trinkner (2011). Market failures as a starting point for economic regulations are proposed by 
many authors. E.g., Ogus (2002), Knieps (2007) or Baldwin and Cave (1999). The latter also summarize 
different theories of regulation: the positive theories of regulation, including public interest theories, interest 
group theories, and private interest theories. 
33 See Klein (1998) and Finger et al. (2009). 
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monopoly franchise. E.g., auctions for public transport lines or bandwidth 
frequencies. 
2. Competition in the market or direct competition: in liberalized markets competition 
arises between the operators and different existing networks, e.g., between different 
suppliers of telecommunication services and mobile networks. 
3. Competition between markets or indirect competition: indirect competition arises if 
there is substitution between networks or infrastructures. It is also known as 
intermodal competition between different technologies or platforms. There are 
conditions under which competition between different networks and bypass with 
other means within a network are desirable. E.g., rivalry between different 
communication platforms like landlines, mobile, Voice over internet protocol (VoIP) 
and e-mail. 
According to these three ways of introducing competition, regulation should only be 
implemented where unregulated markets fail to achieve the desired outcome. Following Ogus 
(2002) and Knieps (2007), the introduction of a regulatory instrument has to depend on the 
need and justification for the intervention. The main economic reasons for market failures 
are:34 
- natural monopolies35 or considerable obstacles for the development of competition, 
- imperfect or asymmetrical information that affect the relationships between firms and 
consumers, 
- externalities (or spillovers) resulting from suppliers’ activities with impact on third 
parties and their welfare that are not reflected in prices, 
- coordination problems, because the desired outcomes in principle could be realized by 
private provision, though the costs of coordination are so high that it is cheaper for the 
state to provide the desired outcome. 
Economic regulation is necessary if there is persistent market power from economies of scale, 
scope or density in combination with sunk costs.36 This allows an operator to set prices above 
the efficient level, resulting in an inefficient allocation. Regulation counteracts this inefficient 
                                                 
34 See Ogus (2002). 
35 A natural monopoly arises when the market is served best by a single firm, rather than by multiple competing 
suppliers. See Baldwin and Cave (1999). 
36 See Viscusi et al. (2005) and Knieps et al. (2009). 
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allocation by applying access regulation to those stable bottleneck facilities.37 Such regulation 
can include both antitrust laws and sector-specific regulatory approaches.38 
The need for regulation of market power might arise if the cost structure simultaneously 
exhibits cost subadditivity39 and irreversible costs. This theory of contestable markets has its 
origins in the work of Baumol et al. (1982). The presence of cost subadditivity and sunk costs 
are the defining characteristics of a “monopolistic bottleneck.” Such bottlenecks are called 
stable monopolistic bottlenecks if they cannot be duplicated or substituted by other means.40  
Infrastructures with monopolistic bottlenecks constitute natural market power for the owner 
of the facility. As a result, the owner of the bottleneck may be incentivized to charge very 
high access tariffs, which excludes potential entrants unable to enter the market. The 
economic rationale for regulation, therefore, is to prevent the abuse of market power and to 
ensure that new market players get timely, non-discriminatory access to stable bottleneck 
facilities at reasonable terms and conditions. Where competition law is not sufficient to ensure 
such access, sector-specific regulations are necessary. When applying sector-specific 
regulatory intervention, the property rights infringement inherent to access regulations should 
be kept to the minimum amount necessary.41 
The intervention can be minimized in two different ways: First, there are different regulatory 
instruments to ensure non-discriminatory access, such as ex-post or ex-ante regulation of 
access prices and vertical separation. The instruments range from light regulation to profound 
interventions like divestiture, depending on the characteristics of the infrastructure.42 Second, 
there are various options that are contingent on how precisely the bottleneck can be identified. 
Knieps (2000) argues for a disaggregate approach, where only the bottleneck network layers 
or processes with monopolistic characteristics are regulated, all other services remain outside 
the scope of access regulations. Each layer has a specific function in the network: some layers 
may be fully competitive while others constitute stable monopolistic bottlenecks. The first 
                                                 
37 For an explanation on stability of bottlenecks see below. 
38 See Viscusi et al. (2005). 
39 Subadditivity implies that the cost of producing a set of outputs as a whole are less than the costs of producing 
the same output divided in any combination of subsets. See Baumol (1977) and Baumol et al. (1982) for a 
definition. 
40 In US antitrust law this is referred to as an “essential facility.” 
41 See section 2.1.3. for a discussion on antitrust law vs. sector-specific regulation. 
42 See Jaag and Trinkner (2011) for a discussion of various models and a normative approach to assess the right 
regulatory remedy. 
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step of the disaggregate approach is to differentiate between those network layers or processes 
in which there is stable market power and those in which workable (actual and potential) 
competition is assured. The former can be expected in layers or processes that are 
monopolistic bottlenecks. In practice, regulatory intervention does not only occur based on 
economic principles but also include political arguments. After all, politics specifies the 
respective rules and regulatory process. The political approach to regulation is different from 
the purely economic approach. Therefore, the next paragraph explains the socio-political 
reasoning for regulation. 
2.1.2.  Socio-Political Rationales for Regulatory Intervention 
Some products or services are not provided under competition or the service does not result in 
the desired outcome: the unregulated market results in outcomes that do not correspond with 
what is perceived. Moreover, individuals are not trusted to act in accordance with what is in 
their own best interest or are not trusted to act in good faith. Therefore, the socio-political 
regulation deals with matters like health and safety, environmental protection and consumer 
protection. 43 Usually, socio-political arguments for regulatory intervention aim for supply 
goals or socially desirable results (e.g., universal service and default service regulation) and 
do not consider economic reasons. Universal service obligations usually require firms to 
provide certain services that they otherwise would not supply. Therefore, the socio-political 
regulation assures the ubiquitous availability of good-quality services at affordable prices–a 
service or product to which a consumer is entitled no matter where he lives. The universal 
service is generally defined from an individual consumer’s perspective in terms of access to 
the service, as well as its quality and affordability. This implies the provision of a service or 
good at a politically desired price. The question about the definition and the scope of the 
service is answered explicitly in a political decision making process. 
Among other things, the universal service regulation outlines obligations concerning the 
service level and financing. It mostly designates one or several operators responsible for 
providing these services in an economy. Traditionally, labor conditions are subject to socio-
political aims as well.  
                                                 
43 See Ogus (2002). 
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2.1.3.  Regulatory Approaches: Competition Regulation vs. Sector-Specific Regulation 
As mentioned in the section on the economic rationale for regulatory intervention, there are 
two different regulatory approaches: competition regulation and sector-specific regulation. 
Competition (or antitrust) regulation is an ex-post mode of regulatory intervention covering 
all sectors of an economy. Antitrust regulators observe the actions of market players, take 
corrective action and intervene when a violation of antitrust law has been detected. Hence, 
antitrust authorities are concerned with competition and efficiency considerations, rather than 
other market failures or social-political objectives. Competition authorities typically address 
problems concerning cartels, anti-competitive behavior or excessive pricing, as well as 
mergers (the latter in ex-ante manner).  
In sector-specific regulation, regulators act primarily on an ex-ante basis and the coverage of 
sectors is more limited. Traditionally, they have been concerned with market failures and 
socio-political objectives concerning distributive issues, security and quality of supply, 
consumer protection, monopoly pricing and finally the functioning of markets. They set up 
policies before the market participants take action. This may require tradeoffs in order to find 
the balance between more competition and socially desirable outcomes.44  
Furthermore, there is a distinction to be drawn between sector-specific regulators in recently 
liberalized network industries and regulators in markets where market failures otherwise 
occur. The former are installed in industries characterized by natural monopolies in some 
parts of the vertical production chain. Examples are fixed telecommunications, electricity, 
gas, and railways. Here, the main task of the regulators is to ensure a smooth transition from 
the former monopoly to sustainable competition. In other sectors, the sector-specific 
regulators may have other reasons for regulation: for instance, the financial sector with its 
systemic risks in absence of an obstacle for competition or the social objectives in healthcare 
services.45  
                                                 
44 See Panzar (2008b, p. 16). 
45 See Oxera (2004, p. 4). 
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2.2. Regulation of Network Industries 
Network industries differ in their characteristics and consequently in the extent of regulatory 
intervention. This section contains a comprehensive overview on the main characteristics of 
network industries, including a brief comparison of the characteristics, and their implications 
for regulation.  
2.2.1.  Rationales for Regulating Network Industries 
The infrastructure of network-based industries is usually a collection of nodes connected by 
transport links. In general, network industries are complex and dynamic. There can be various 
reasons for regulation in network industries depending on their specific characteristics. The 
main characteristics are46: 
- There are high, irreversible and indivisible risks in investments, which will pay off 
only in the long term. In summary, the capital investments are typically (1) 
considerable, (2) upfront, (3) fixed, and (4) irreversible. 
- There are always few players (oligopoly), and consequently there is always some form 
of market power or former natural monopoly. Economies of scale are often pervasive 
because of the relatively high investment costs to install the infrastructure, contrasting 
with the low operational costs to provide a service once the network is installed.  
- Technologies in the network industries are always interdependent in some way or 
other. 
- There is often a need for coordination and for standards in order to allow for 
interoperability between networks and operators. 
- For the above reasons (i.e., market power, risks, and technology complementarities), 
there exist barriers to market entry (and to exit for that matter).  
- There will always be asymmetry of information. 
- There are generally significant and varying network externalities and public good 
characteristics. 
In general, network industries face problems of market failure and also provide services of 
socio-political interest. As a result, they are subject to both economic and socio-political 
regulation.47 The characteristics of network industries imply for a third reasoning of 
                                                 
46 See Bergmann (1998) and Klein (1998). 
47 See Alexiadis and Cave (2010).  
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regulation:48 the technical regulation. The need for regulation of interconnection and 
interconnectivity can be explained by externalities between operators. This alludes to mutual 
termination and standards among operators. However, these are technical interconnection 
issues rather than stable monopolistic bottleneck facilities; they do not justify or furnish 
arguments for sector-specific ex-ante regulation.49  
2.2.2.  Comparison of Regulation in Different Network Industries 
Among others, seco (2005), Knieps (2007) and Swiss Economics (2009) have examined the 
need for regulation in the telecommunications, electricity, railway and postal markets. The 
authors agree that the different industries show monopolistic bottlenecks of varying stability 
and, in particular, intermodal competition of varying intensity (i.e. competition between 
carriers or networks).  
The most stable monopolistic bottlenecks are found in the electricity and railway markets 
(due to power distribution, railway networks, railway stations). Consequently, the most 
extensive regulatory interventions are advisable in these two sectors. In contrast to power 
transmission, which is hardly subject to substitution, the railway market is in intermodal 
competition with other transportation networks like roads, air transport and freight shipping. 
Thus, access regulation in electricity should be more extensive than in the railways. 
Historically, the “last mile” in the telecommunication sector is a monopolistic bottleneck. 
Today, parallel infrastructures covering the same markets or similar services exist due to 
technological convergence (cable suppliers vs. telecommunication suppliers). In addition, 
technological innovations lead to a high degree of dynamism (mobile technologies, optical 
fiber connections, etc.). Depending on the forecast regarding future dynamism, different 
conclusions can be drawn on the type of access regulation needed in this market. In the postal 
market no monopolistic bottlenecks are found.50 Table 1 compares the four different 
infrastructure sector from an economic perspective. The combination of the columns 
‘bottleneck facilities’ and ‘substitution of infrastructure’ results in the third row, the 
assessment of the need for regulating market power.   
                                                 
48 See section 2.1.1. on economic reasoning and section 2.1.2. on socio-political reasoning. 
49 See Fratini et al. (2010). 
50 See Jaag and Trinkner (2009, p. 8). 
Regulatory Institutions and Governance Costs: The Case of the Postal Sector 
22 
Table 1: A Comparison of Different Network Industries 
 Electricity Railways Telecommunication Post 
B
ot
tle
ne
ck
 F
ac
ili
tie
s Transmission 
networks as well as 
regional and local 
distribution networks 
are stable 
monopolistic 
bottlenecks. 
The railway network 
as well as freight- and 
passenger railway 
stations are stable 
monopolistic 
bottlenecks, with 
increasing costs for 
replacement 
investments.  
Partially the last mile 
shows subadditivity and 
irreversible costs, with 
the copper cable being 
increasingly replaced by 
optical fibers and the 
existing technology 
becoming obsolete.  
In spite of a subadditive 
cost function in 
delivery, no 
monopolistic bottleneck 
can be found in the 
postal market (it mainly 
consists of personnel 
costs). 
Su
bs
ti
tu
ti
on
 o
f 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 There are no 
substitutes for power 
transmission. At the 
same time consumers 
cannot replace 
electricity by other 
forms of energy. 
Therefore, there is no 
impact of 
infrastructure-or 
platform competition 
for the time being.  
 
Passenger traffic is in 
intermodal competition 
with other forms of 
passenger transport. 
They include road- and 
air-based public or 
private means of 
transport (bus, car, 
aircraft, bicycle). The 
same applies to freight 
traffic (air, road, 
water)  
Technological progress 
always produces wired, 
wireless and mobile 
substitutes.  
If a transmission 
technology is not 
attractive, it is replaced 
by a new one.  
Postal services are 
increasingly competing 
with alternative forms of 
written communication 
(E-Mail, SMS, internet 
platforms such as online 
banking). As a 
consequence traffic 
volumes are declining. 
Postal networks are also 
competing with other 
logistic networks. 
M
ar
ke
t P
ow
er
 R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
Disciplining of 
market power in the 
field of power 
transmission and 
distribution, 
safeguarding of non-
discriminating access 
to power suppliers, 
free selection of 
suppliers by 
consumers, 
safeguarding of 
system security. 
Disciplining of market 
power of owners of 
rail facilities and 
railway stations. Non-
discriminating award 
of time slots, 
safeguarding network 
effects and 
optimization of 
synchronized 
timetables.  
Disciplining of market 
power of owners of the 
last mile drawing to a 
close, promotion of 
platform competition by 
safeguarding investment 
security and equal 
treatment of different 
platforms  
No sector-specific 
market power regulation 
needed 
Source: Adopted from Finger et al. (2009, p. 70). 
2.3. Postal Regulation in Practice 
In this section we give an overview of the characteristics of the postal sector with regard to its 
properties and discuss the economic and socio-political rationales for regulation in post. 
Additionally, we describe the development of the European policy on the single postal market 
and discuss the current regulatory framework and future trends.   
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2.3.1.  Characteristics of the Postal Sector: 
In the postal sector, like in the other network industries, operators face high economies of 
scale and scope. Nevertheless, the postal network differs from other network industries: while 
utility networks are physically connected, the postal network is more likely to be a virtual 
network that is built from scratch daily.51 Moreover, several other characteristics, including 
technology, investment and employment, substitution and prices of postal services make the 
postal sector a unique network industry. These characteristics are briefly summarized below.  
Technology: The postal sector is less technology intensive than most network based 
industries. Technological innovations, which might help to address USO funding issues, are 
scarce in postal services. This does not imply that there is no innovation. Postal innovation is 
more related to processes such as sorting techniques or complementary services with respect 
to postal products. However, in spite of rapid technological change, the core services, 
transportation and delivery of postal items, remain largely the same. 
Investment and Employment: Traditionally, there was less technological innovation than in 
other industries (e.g., the telecom or the energy sector) and postal networks are very labor 
intensive. Accordingly, the installation of the postal infrastructure is not related to high 
investments and sunk costs. The costs are mostly variable and occur anew (about 55 percent) 
in the sub-process of daily delivery.52 Due to the decreasing average costs, postal markets can 
be characterized as natural monopolies, which are easily contestable because of the lack of 
long-term sunk costs and substitution with other communication means.53 
Substitution: Unlike most other network industries, the postal sector is shrinking rather than 
expanding. The demand for postal services is declining because of alternative means of 
communication and intermodal competition by telecommunication networks. Nevertheless, 
some segments of mail items, particularly advertising mail, have still been growing in recent 
years. Even if most national postal operators are publicly owned enterprises, the postal 
networks have almost always competed with other logistic networks and will continue to do 
so.  
                                                 
51 Crew and Kleindorfer (2000). 
52 In this respect, they sink every single day anew. See Cremer (2004, p. 8) on direct costs of the sub-process 
distribution.  
53 See Panzar and Willig (1977) and Panzar (2008b). 
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Prices of Postal Services: Receivers of postal services do not have to pay in order to have 
access to the service. In almost every case, postal rates are paid by the sender. This is 
noteworthy insofar as not only the paying sender but also the receiver may be interested in the 
communication.54 
2.3.2.  The Evolution of the Postal Sector 
Postal services are an important industry for both the economic and the social development of 
countries. Postal networks provide for the comprehensive collection and delivery of postal 
items (and sometimes payment services), thus including remote regions. Economic 
development is supported as far as postal services provide for the exchange of information 
and goods at affordable prices. Furthermore, the postal sector is a major industry in terms of 
sales and employment: Around 90 billion Euros, or 1 percent of the European GDP EU, are 
realized in the sector and around 1.6 million workers are directly employed by the postal 
operators.55 Another aspect is that there has been considerable involvement of governments, 
because most postal services are or were state owned monopolies. Postal operators were (and 
are, in most European countries) traditionally state-owned enterprises, providing consolidated 
postal and telecommunication services. In the wake of the liberalization of telecommunication 
markets, the two (completely different) networks were separated and converted into 
autonomous companies. Liberalization in the postal sector (and in the other network 
industries) is accompanied by new institutional arrangements with sector-specific regulators. 
Historically, the governments have mainly been involved in the reform or modernization of 
incumbent operators, rather than with the structuring of the postal sector. But with the 
ongoing liberalization process, this has changed. The postal sector has been going through 
different stages of change: The first stage is driven by the separation of the traditionally state-
owned postal operator from the telecommunications operator. This started in the 1980s with a 
peak in the 1990s in Europe. In general, this is accompanied by setting up a new postal 
legislation. The second stage is characterized by the conversion of the postal operator’s legal 
status into public companies, separated from the state. Simultaneously, public companies 
started internal restructuring processes in order to separate the business units along the 
different activities: mail, logistics, express and/or financial services. At this stage, 
                                                 
54 See Jaag and Trinkner (2008). 
55 See WIK (2006) and Ecorys (2008a). 
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governments generally introduce an initial regulatory framework. Stage three concerns the 
partial privatization resulting from the government’s decision to privatize the business after 
the restructuring action taken during stage two. Most of the operators are still owned by the 
governments. Furthermore, stage three is accompanied by the establishment of sector-specific 
and independent regulators, as well as the implementation of an exhaustive regulatory 
framework. The fourth stage then brings about full privatization and the stock listing of the 
incumbent, starting in the 1990s.56 The status of the transformation process varies widely 
across different countries. Only few countries have reached stage four (e.g., the Netherlands 
and Germany), while the majority of European countries is at stage two or three. In spite of 
the high diversity in the structure of postal markets across different countries, postal markets 
in industrialized countries nevertheless share some market-related institutional 
characteristics:57 
- The incumbent postal operator is (or was formerly) a state-owned enterprise. 
- The incumbent is monitored by a sector-specific regulator. 
- The incumbent post is the dominant operator (at least in the letter market). 
- The dominant incumbent is also subject to the competition authority, particularly 
concerning charges of abuse of the dominant position in the market as well as mergers 
and acquisitions. 
- The incumbent is subject to a form of price regulation (at least in the dominant or the 
reserved area). 
- Despite the increasing competition the incumbent faces an obligation to provide the 
universal service.  
- In spite of the dominant position the incumbent faces direct and indirect competition 
in some market segments. 
These characteristics cannot be observed clearly in all postal markets and of course there are 
exceptions. Nevertheless they show how postal markets are structured and how they evolve in 
the wake of liberalization from a regulatory point of view.   
                                                 
56 See UPU (2004, p. 8ff). 
57 See Panzar (2008b). 
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2.3.3. The Rationales for Regulation 
Postal markets (postal operators respectively) were historically isolated from anti-trust laws 
and regulatory intervention. They were not only state-owned but also integrated in ministries 
and therefore flush with regulatory bodies. This has changed radically with the conversion in 
public enterprises and the corporate share of postal operators. They are nowadays subject to 
sector-specific as well as competition regulation. On one hand this occurs due to ongoing 
liberalization and on the other hand due to the privatization of the operators in some countries. 
In this context, the regulation of postal markets is subject to different sets of questions: 
- Economic Regulation: Is the delivery of postal items a natural monopoly? What are 
the costs of the universal service? How do different regulatory models and instruments 
affect the market? Other economic or rather technical questions arise in connection 
with the postal infrastructure: Are postal sorting facilities or the network of postal 
outlets monopolistic bottlenecks? Do postal operators have a dominant position in 
combination with the abuse of market power in some market segments, which should 
be disciplined by the anti-trust authority? 
- Socio Political Regulation: The achievement of socio-political goals is concerned with 
questions related to the provision of universal services: What is the definition of 
universal service? Who fulfils the universal service and what is its price? Who bears 
its costs? 
Against the background of the different problem areas (socio-political or economic), sector-
specific regulatory bodies in postal markets are principally concerned with tasks related to the 
supervision of the universal service, the extent of monopoly and reserved services, the quality 
and the accessibility of services, consumer complaints, issuing of licenses and concessions, 
access to the established postal infrastructure and finally price regulation.  
Concerning the functioning of markets and the financing of the universal service, license- and 
concession-regimes become increasingly important in more liberalized postal markets. The 
background of such a system is an authorization to operate in a particular market. The reasons 
for the granting of licenses are that (1) the market should be regulated, (2) the political 
mandate of the provision of the universal service needs to be assigned to a particular operator 
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and (3) money needs to be leveraged and redistributed among the market players in order to 
finance the universal service.58 
Economic Regulation in Posts: Are there Monopolistic Bottlenecks? 
The issues concerning economic regulation are monopolistic bottlenecks and the discussion of 
whether this type of facility exists in postal markets. From a strictly economic perspective, the 
existence of bottleneck facilities would legitimate government intervention in the form of 
access regulation for some elements of the existing postal infrastructure. Government 
regulation of access is not justified in the other parts of the network and regulation would 
interfere with efficient negotiations between the parties involved.59 It becomes evident that 
there are different opinions and interests, particularly in connection with access regulation 
regarding the economic nature of postal markets. The possibility of having access to the 
established postal network facilitates market entrance for potential new competitors. From an 
incumbent’s perspective, negotiated access could bring advantages as well as drawbacks: 
individual parts of the infrastructure or processes could be used to better plan and use the 
capacities, but this results in the (new) opportunity of a selective market entrance with the 
corresponding risk of cherry picking by competitors.60 Knieps (2002) argues that there are no 
monopolistic bottleneck facilities in the primary processes (clearing, sorting and delivering 
mail items).61 The European jurisdiction supports this proposition with its court ruling:62 The 
European commission finally came to the same conclusion, since there is no mandatory 
access regulation in the Postal Directive 2008/06/EC.63  
Even though there are no bottleneck facilities, the daily delivery of mail items constitutes a 
natural monopoly. However, the necessary resources are not related to significant sunk costs 
(fixed costs respectively); rather, they are scalable variable costs (such as labor costs) or 
disposable assets (e.g., vehicles or immovables).64 The very labor-intensive sub-process of 
                                                 
58 See UPU (2004). 
59 See Knieps (2002).  
60 Cherry picking concerns the conveyance of cost-efficient mail items of business customers (bulk mail) in 
urban and dense regions. See Maegli (2010). 
61This view is also supported by several European studies, e.g., Ecorys (2005).  
62The existence of monopolistic bottleneck facilities is in the early-morning newspaper delivery is negated in 
1998 in the so called ‘Bronner’-case. See Plaut Economics (2007) and Knieps (2007, p. 166). 
63 See European Commission (2008). 
64 See Knieps (2007, p. 166). 
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delivery represents approximately 55 percent of the costs of mail conveyance.65 Thus, the 
postal monopoly is a contestable monopoly and was successfully attacked in (partly) 
liberalized postal markets, notably Sweden’s, Finland’s, and Germany’s. As mentioned 
above, physical postal products are further subject to potential substitutions through electronic 
communication and media (intermodal competition). In spite of the absence of monopolistic 
bottlenecks and the contestability of the monopoly, a sector-specific access regulation is not 
necessary in postal markets from a purely economic perspective.66 
The only two impediments to competition are (1) access to P.O. boxes and (2) information on 
change of address. It is generally agreed in the literature that to foster competition in the 
sector, entrants should be allowed to access P.O. boxes and incumbents should make address 
change data (which historically only the incumbent operator had) available for interchange. 
However, these are technical interconnection issues rather than stable monopolistic bottleneck 
facilities, and they do not justify or furnish arguments for sector-specific ex-post regulation.67   
Socio-Political Regulation: The Universal Postal Service 
Universal service obligations usually require firms to provide certain services that they would 
not supply otherwise. The traditional definition of the universal service in the postal sector 
implies ubiquitous delivery at a uniform price at least for letter mail but in many cases also 
for parcels. Because of the characteristics of their networks, providers of postal universal 
services can even be obliged to provide services that go beyond postal services. These can 
include public missions such as the nationwide delivery of daily newspapers before a specific 
hour or the provision of financial services. The provision of universal services and its 
financing in the future with respect to public interests are related to the following dimensions 
of postal universal service: 
- The accessibility of postal services to customers in terms of distance,  
- affordable prices,  
- collection and delivery points,  
- density of postal outlets and collecting points,  
- delivery and collection standards in terms of frequency in rural and urban areas and  
                                                 
65 See NERA (2004). 
66 See de Bijl et al. (2006) for a discussion on access regulation in the postal sector. They conclude: “Our finding 
that there are no monopolistic bottlenecks in the delivery chain implies that the essential facility doctrine 
cannot be used to impose downstream access obligations upon the dominant postal operator” (169). 
67 See Fratini et al. (2010). 
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- the definition of the different categories of postal items (letters and parcels) in terms of 
size and weight that are covered by universal service.   
Customers in sparsely populated and non-central areas are especially less attractive from a 
supplier’s point of view, and less likely to receive attractive competitive offers. Second, they 
are also the most vulnerable with respect to price increases. The universal service was 
originally financed by the reserved area. But, as already mentioned above, markets are 
nowadays expected to be more and more liberalized in order to avoid monopolistic market 
structures. Under a reserved area the rural (decentralized) areas are cross-subsidized by urban 
(centralized) areas. Furthermore, in contrast to other network industries, the receivers do not 
pay for the services they consume. Mail to rural areas is not only subsidized by urban areas, 
but also by large business customers with high volumes. These volumes are mostly pre-sorted 
and centrally collected. As a result, the uniform prices of postal items for private customers 
do not necessarily reflect the actual cost of delivery.  
Price Waterhouse Coopers (2006) states that it is the source of “obligation” in the discussion 
about universal services which leads to a number of problems. In liberalized markets, this 
type of cross-subsidization as a general way of funding universal services is no longer 
feasible, because there is no reserved area and bulk-mail is mostly excluded from universal 
services. The customers who have large volumes of mail sent to low-cost areas will be most 
attractive to entrants. New competitors that are not expected to provide full universal services 
would penetrate into the more profitable segments in which incumbents still offer higher 
prices to cross-subsidize the non-profitable segments, which they are obligated to serve. At 
worst, the funding of universal services is no longer guaranteed. Therefore, the operator(s) 
fulfilling the obligation must at least be compensated for the cost of the universal service; 
otherwise, they might be economically forced to set higher uniform tariffs to compensate 
market share losses in rural areas. Hence, the centralized ex-ante regulation of postal 
universal services and the monitoring of its development is a means to ensure the provision of 
all customers at affordable prices–no matter which financing mechanism is chosen and how 
competition evolves.  
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2.3.4. Postal Regulation in the European Union 
Regulation in the European postal markets has evolved over a period of more than twenty 
years, starting in 1988: At this time, the Commission decided to conduct an expansive review 
of the postal sector with respect to the development of a unified single market for goods and 
services. The first Green Paper on this development was published in 1992.68 After a period 
of five years of public consultation, the first Postal Directive was adopted in 1997. The 
original purpose of the Community Policy in the postal sector and its regulation is “to 
complete the internal market for postal services and to ensure that efficient, reliable and good-
quality postal services are available throughout the European Union to all its citizens at 
affordable prices. The importance of postal services both for the economic prosperity and 
social well-being and cohesion of the EU make this a priority area for Community action.”69 
To achieve this purpose, the Commission identified eleven specific objectives for action at 
Community level:70 
- To define a universal postal service at community level. It was conceived as a right of 
access to postal services for users, encompassing a minimum range of services of 
specified quality which must be provided in all member states at affordable prices for 
the benefit of all users, irrespective of their geographical location 
- To set a common maximum limit to the extent of the postal reserved areas, which each 
member state may grant to its provider(s) of the universal service, in order to ensure 
the economic and financial viability of the provision of the universal service 
- To develop a process of gradual and controlled market opening to competition while 
giving the member states means to ensure that the provision of universal service is 
guaranteed on a lasting basis 
- To improve the quality of postal services by setting, at Community level, common 
quality of service standards for intra-Community cross-border mail and ensuring that 
standards for national mail are set and publicized (in line with those intra-Community 
standards) and that performance results are published 
                                                 
68 See WIK (2010, p. 12ff) for a detailed overview on the evolution of the European Postal Directives. 
69 Adopted from: European Commission (2012). 
70 See European Commission (2012). 
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- To establish the principle that tariffs should be related to costs and to ensure that the 
financing of the provision of universal service is carried out in a transparent manner 
compatible with community law 
- To encourage harmonization of technical standards, taking users’ interests into 
account 
- To ensure that fair conditions of competition exist outside the reserved sector 
- To encourage and assist the postal sector to adapt rapidly and effectively to 
technological progress and changes in demand 
- To ensure that the needs of users, the interests of employees and the general 
importance of the postal sector for the economic, cultural and social development and 
cohesion of the community (including the special difficulties encountered by remote 
regions) are taken into account when regulating the sector 
- To co-ordinate the development of postal policy with other Community policies and to 
ensure a consistent approach to overlapping issues 
- To adopt an approach to international postal traffic (in particular in relation to the 
EFTA countries and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in the 
light of the EU enlargement), which is consistent with the above objectives and 
reflects the same priorities, in co-operation with third countries and international 
bodies 
With respect to the reserved areas, the adoption of the Directive 2008/6/EC implies that in 
general full market opening of the postal markets has to be provided by 31 December 2010. 
Some countries (mainly new EU member states) are allowed to postpone the full market 
opening till 31 December 2012. Table 2 summarizes the evolution of the Postal Directives 
and the successive reduction of the reserved area towards a fully liberalized postal market. 
Regarding access regulation, the EU, in its latest Postal Directive 2008/6/EG, clearly contrasts 
the telecommunication, electricity and railway markets, and does not postulate a mandatory 
regulation of access. Instead, the Directive provides general principles concerning non-
discrimination and transparency, and in the field of access to P.O. boxes and address data 
states the necessary prerequisites.  
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Table 2: Legislative and Regulatory Timetable of the European Union 
Year: Postal Directives: 
1992 Green Paper on the development of the single market for postal services (COM/91/476). 
1994 Council Resolution of 7 February 1994 on the development of Community postal services 
(COM/93/247). 
1997 1st Postal Directive (97/67/EC).  
1998 Notice from the Commission on the application of the competition rules the postal sector and 
on the assessment of certain State measures relating to postal services (98/C39/02). 
1999 1st reduction of the “reserved area” to 350g 
2002 2nd Postal Directive (2002/39/EC).  
1st Commission Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of the 
Postal Directive (COM/2002/632). 
2003 2nd reduction of the “reserved area” down to 100g 
2004 2nd Commission Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of the 
Postal Directive (COM/2005/102). 
2006 3rd reduction of the “reserved area” down to 50g 
2006 Commission Prospective study on the impact on universal service of the full accomplishment 
of the postal internal market in 2009. 
2006 3rd Commission Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of the 
Postal Directive. 
2006 Proposal of the 3rd Postal Directive (COM/2006/594 final). This proposal is accompanied by 
the Commission’s prospective study in the impact of full market opening (COM/2006/596 
final), an Impact assessment and the third Report on the Application of the postal Directive 
(COM/2006/595 final). 
2008 3rd Postal Directive (2008/06/EC) 
2008 4th Commission Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of the 
Postal Directive. 
2010 Full market opening for 16 Member States, which represent 95% of the internal postal 
market. 
  Commission decision establishing the European Regulators Group for Postal Services, ERGP 
(2010/C 217/07). 
2012 Full market opening for remaining Member States that may use the possibility of transitional 
period. 
Source: European Commission (2012). 
Not all postal services are universal services. Under Article 3 of the Postal Directive, a 
universal service is a postal service that is ensured and regulated by the Member State and 
complies with minimum requirements laid down by the Postal Directive. The Directive 
describes the minimum requirements of the universal services, which include clearance and 
delivery (at least 5 days per week) and the scope of products in the universal service (clearing, 
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sorting, transport and distribution of postal items/parcels up to 2/10kg).71 Article 12 of the 
Postal Directive outlines how to regulate prices of universal services. Prices for each one of 
the universal services should be “geared to costs,” “transparent and non-discriminatory” and 
“affordable.” According to Article 12, “special or individual tariffs” for large mailers and 
consolidators72 are allowed, but they must correspond to the same principles as other services 
of the universal service.  
With the definition of the universal service, the Directive makes clear that express services 
and services for heavy weight parcels are not universal services. Consequently, the two main 
universal service categories are basic letter post services and basic parcel post services. Four 
member states (Belgium, Denmark, Portugal and the United Kingdom) treat bulk parcel 
services as a universal service. One third to one half of the member states treat services for 
bulk letters and direct mail as a universal service. Belgium and Portugal even ensure and 
regulate all services as universal services.73 Switzerland is not a member of the EU and 
therefore not obliged to implement the European Directive. But in order to illustrate how 
different the universal Service definitions are, it is worth mentioning that the Swiss incumbent 
is the only supplier that is obliged to provide financial services within the postal retail 
network. This illustrates that definitions and the scope of the Universal services differ widely 
across European countries. 
Another aspect of the scope of universal service is the accessibility of postal services or 
outlets. Member states typically allow the incumbents to convert a post office into a postal 
agency without approval of the regulatory agency, but most member states require approval 
before ultimately closing postal outlets. Concerning the access to postal outlet networks, the 
Postal Directive requires that member states maintain a minimum density of postal outlets 
(post offices or postal agencies) and public collection boxes, but requirements vary 
substantially among member states.  
Table 3 illustrates by way of examples the diversification of the definitions in European 
countries concerning the delivery of items and the access to post offices. 
                                                 
71 See European Commission (2008). 
72 Consolidators are intermediaries that take advantage of price differences offered by postal operators to 
business customers. In general, they do not directly generate mail volumes. 
73 See WIK (2010, p. 21). 
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Furthermore, the Third Postal Directive specifies that designated postal operators can ask for 
compensation if the net costs of the universal service represent an unfair burden and result in 
a financial loss. The Directive defines these costs as the difference between the net costs of 
the universal service provider with and without the universal service obligation.74 
 
 
                                                 
74 See European Commission (2008): “The net cost of universal service obligations is to be calculated, as the 
difference between the net cost for a designated universal service provider of operating with the universal 
service obligations and the same postal service provider operating without the universal service obligations. 
The calculation shall take into account all other relevant elements, including any intangible and market 
benefits which accrue to a postal service provider designated to provide universal service, the entitlement to a 
reasonable profit and incentives for cost efficiency” European Commission (2008). 
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Article 22 of the Third Postal Directive provides that “the national regulatory authorities shall 
have as a particular task ensuring compliance with the obligations arising from this 
Directive.”77 This implies that a minimum range of regulatory functions must be 
commissioned to an independent regulator. The Postal Directive does not state which 
functions must be commissioned to the regulatory authority.78 In principle, the allocation of 
regulatory authority over postal affairs should serve the overall objectives of the Directive. So 
far, all European member states have some sort of regulatory authority, which appears to be 
formally independent from postal operators, but in some cases the incumbent postal operator 
and the regulatory authority are still under the control of a ministry. Ecorys (2008a) notices 
that “both the regulatory frameworks and the mandate and resources of the regulatory 
authorities differ considerably from country to country, making it difficult to identify best 
practices…. The developments in the regulatory (legal) framework have not always been 
driven by the regulatory authority in isolation, and may involve legal changes instigated by 
the state, and competition authorities” (87).79 Therefore, there are considerable difficulties to 
identify best practices for postal regulation. 
2.4. Theory and Practice in Postal Regulation: Where Do We Stand? 
The original goal of the European postal market reform was the complete liberalization of the 
sector while maintaining a high-quality universal service. In the following, we briefly assess 
the various aspects of regulation and record today’s status. The section aims to provide an 
overview on various aspects like (1) market opening and the development of competition, (2) 
universal service definition and its financing, (3) the role of regulators and (4) on the 
importance of labor conditions in the sector.  
2.4.1.  Market Opening and Development of Competition 
The goal of market opening should be achieved by 2013. So far hardly any competition has 
developed among the providers. For instance, Copenhagen Economics (2010a) states in the 
study on the ‘Main Developments in the Postal Sector 2008-2010’: “Our main conclusion is 
that competition in the postal sector remains challenged. National operators maintain 
dominance in a number of segments, a number of important entry barriers are outstanding and 
                                                 
77 See European Commission (2008). 
78 See WIK (2010, p. 39). 
79 See Ecorys (2008a). 
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a number of competition issues are reported… Competition is stronger outside the letter post 
segment, especially in express and parcels and to a lesser extent in cross-border mail, direct 
mail and publications”(80).80 
Dietl and Waller (2002) identify several potential business models for new entrants: local 
mail services, networked local mail services, document exchange, mass mail provider, spot 
operator, consolidator, the provision and the national full service provider. In addition, de Bas 
and van der Lijn (2008) describe the niche provider as a further entry model. Market entrants 
can be former customers of postal operators (like publishers or letter shops), existing local 
works for unaddressed mail, incumbent postal operators from abroad or completely new 
players.  
Generally, we can say that today competition takes place mainly in the sector bulk mail, time-
critical items and non-addressed items. In addition, market entrants do not have to comply 
with delivery directives such as five- or six-day delivery frequency. They often operate with 
two to three delivery days and focus on a specified delivery day (e.g., mail delivery on Friday 
or Saturday to ensure the attention of the receivers during the weekend).  
So far, the debate on liberalization and more competition in the postal market has primarily 
focused on the establishment of the complete single European market and the integration of 
postal services in connection with other communication markets. It has to be said that in the 
meantime other forms of communication (telecom, mobile telecom and internet) have been 
subject to considerable technological progress, with a great influence on postal services. The 
big technological competition to the letter and the substitutes put the current business model 
of postal enterprises under pressure, since in most national postal markets the letter volumes 
are declining. The decline in volume is particularly high in Northern European countries. At 
the same time customer needs are changing together with customer behavior in connection 
with new technological possibilities such as e-commerce, e-governance and the new options 
of mobile devices. 
The study Copenhagen Economics (2010a) concludes that the current development of 
competition is below the degree to be expected for the status of market opening attained so 
                                                 
80 See Copenhagen Economics (2010a). 
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far. Even in the postal markets in Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden or the United 
Kingdom liberalized at an early stage there is hardly any end-to-end competition. 81 
Conclusion: The development of competition makes very slow progress. Competition 
originates less from market entrances, than from new technologies and changed 
communication behavior. 
2.4.2.  Universal Service Definition and Adequate Financing Mechanisms 
With respect to regulation the universal service remains an important topic. The market 
developments are in contrast with a definition of the universal service, which was developed 
in the 90s and became part of the Postal Market Directive. So far, developments like changed 
communication behavior and decreasing letter volumes have not been taken into account. As 
Table 4 shows, the definition of the universal service strongly varies from country to country. 
Still, the Directives (e.g., delivery frequency) are adhered to and the traditional definition of 
the universal service is applied. From 2012 various postal operators, such as Post NL or the 
Danish Post, will introduce new delivery models, which rely on lower delivery frequencies in 
the bulk mail business without affecting the universal service. The Finnish postal operator 
Itella played a role in the future development of the universal service. For the first time, field 
tests with combinations of electronic and physical delivery were performed in 2010.82 This 
development shows that discussions on the scope of the universal service will continue to be 
important. Also, the behavior of sender- and addressee customers will have to be observed in 
the future, so that the further development is not only based on the aspects considered so far 
and takes into account the situation in the communication markets. 
In 2011, the European Commission commissioned a first study dealing with consumer 
preferences regarding the postal universal service.83 Moreover, the Commission 
communicated at the end of 2011 that in 2012 a study on the determination of net costs and 
financing of the universal service would be conducted. With the full liberalization, the 
monopoly as the original financing mechanism for the universal service is omitted. Since the 
forecasts for the development of mail volumes and competition are, based on past experience, 
rather skeptical, it is important that this topic continues to be dealt with.  
                                                 
81 See Copenhagen Economics (2010a). 
82 See the next section for a deeper discussion on developments in physical and electronic delivery. 
83 Results are not yet available. 
Regulatory Institutions and Governance Costs: The Case of the Postal Sector 
40 
There is practically no experience regarding the practice of financing the universal service.84 
Therefore, an important question remains: Which is the appropriate and efficient mechanism 
to finance the universal service? Accordingly, Copenhagen Economics (2010a) state: 
“Regarding the financing aspects of the USO, the most frequently cited problem concerned 
the lack of legal certainty surrounding the possible mechanisms of financing that can be 
deployed under the conditions that the USO makes a loss – as well as the possible extent of 
contributions to be paid by private firms” (114). As a consequence, there is only little 
experience in Europe on how the different funding solutions affect the development of the 
mail market in general and the universal service in particular. 
Until now, this issue has mainly been dealt with in an academic and economic context. The 
sketched funds solutions, according to which all providers are to contribute to financing the 
universal service, were hardly ever put into practice. At the same time there is no consensus 
or broad-based method on the definition and calculation of net costs for the universal service 
obligation. 
Conclusion: The definition of the universal service is and will continue to be an important 
issue in postal markets. However, the question arises of whether the definition should be 
revised, so that in the future the universal service would correspond to technological 
developments and the changed communication behavior in today’s society. Financing aspects 
must be discussed, and approaches for compensating the costs of the universal service in case 
of a deficit must be found. 
2.4.3.  Regulatory Approaches and the Role of Regulators 
Traditionally, the responsibility for the national postal services has been assumed by the 
competent ministry, which on one hand directs the postal enterprises and formulates the 
public policy. After lengthy public debates, it has been generally agreed that the role of policy 
advice and the operative and administrative control must be separated. In lieu of the previous 
postal ministries, various authorities with different roles have established themselves. Even if 
                                                 
84 Deutsche Post DHL, for example, provides the universal service although they are not legally obliged to 
render it. In France La Poste is obligated by law to provide the universal service and it is fully financed by the 
reserved area. In the case of a full liberalization of the French postal market, a kind of fund solution is planned, 
but its concrete design has not been defined yet. Today, La Poste gets compensated for the operation of the 
nationwide post office network. See Oxera (2007) for a detailed description of different financing mechanisms 
for the postal universal service. 
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the countries’ regulation systems differ strongly in their institutional organization, it can be 
said that the following actors are typically present in today’s postal sectors: 
- A ministry responsible for the postal policy. 
- A national regulation authority performing tasks pertaining to the sector-specific 
control 
- A national competition regulator with trans-sectoral tasks. 
- A public postal operator wholly or partially state-owned or a designated universal 
service provider85 
At present, practically all European countries have an appointed independent regulation 
authority dealing with sector-specific issues.86 However, these authorities strongly differ with 
respect to their institutional organization and to their independence.87 Together with the 
sector-specific regulation, the competition authorities in the postal sector have gained in 
importance in past series. The postal enterprises were confronted with a great number of 
claims and complaints with respect to competition law. Last but not least these proceedings 
also influence the further development of postal markets, just as in case of sector-specific 
regulation. According to Copenhagen Economics (2010a), there were 26 competition cases in 
EU countries between 2007 and 2010.88 Most of these cases concerned predatory pricing, 
cross-subsidization, illegal rebates and anti-competitive agreements and therefore violated the 
rules of competition of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).89 Most 
of these cases concerned the market for unaddressed items and direct marketing. Presumably, 
the antitrust law will gain in importance. In other network industries, the application of the 
antitrust policy has increased with growing liberalization.90 The division of roles and work 
between sector-specific regulation authorities and the competition regulators in the postal 
sector is not entirely clear: there are uncertainties with respect to the application of antitrust 
law in postal practice.91 
                                                 
85 See WIK (2009a, p. 35). 
86 See WIK (2009a) for a detailed description of the role of sector-specific regulators in the postal sector.  
87 A detailed overview on institutional trends is given in the next section. 
88 See Copenhagen Economics (2010a, p. 92ff) and WIK (2009a, p. 117ff) for a more detailed overview on 
competition cases in the postal sector. 
89 See European Union (2007): Article 101 (prohibits anti-competitive agreements) and Article 102 (prohibits 
abuse of dominant position). 
90 See WIK (2009a, p. 199), Garzanti (2009, p. 67). 
91 See Copenhagen Economics (2010a, p. 26). 
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Chapter 2.1 on economic regulation in the postal market states that there are no monopolistic 
bottlenecks in the postal sector and that the monopoly is contestable. This implies that the 
economic basis for the sector-specific regulation of the partial performance access is missing. 
Consequently, the Postal Directive provides no regulation in this sector. If discrimination 
charges are brought forward during access negotiations between providers, the competition 
authorities can assess and rectify the situation. As mentioned above, sector-specific regulation 
is an important instrument during the transition phase in network industries. In the long run, 
the question arises what role the sector-specific regulation should assume after the complete 
reform resulting in an open postal market. As far as socio-political goals are concerned, the 
authorities would still control the basic services and the compliance with labor conditions. 
Conclusion: In most countries sector-specific and competition regulators exist in the postal 
market. It is expected that the antitrust law will gain in importance. The relationship between 
antitrust and sector-specific regulation has not been clarified yet. The discussion on the future 
role of sector-specific regulation authorities must be conducted, and if need be, a “phasing 
out” of this form of regulation in the postal sector has to be considered. 
2.4.4.  Labor Conditions 
Despite the fact that letter volumes are declining/have declined, the postal sector is still one of 
the largest employers in Europe. And as explained above, the delivery of postal items is very 
labor-intensive and represents 55 percent of the whole process overhead. But the 
technological change and the increasing substitution of physical mail will necessarily have an 
impact on production processes and thus on the structure of employment in the sector.  
Furthermore, market entrants usually develop low-cost business models because they are not 
able to realize economies of scale in the niche markets. The business models often imply that 
a less educated workforce is hired on a part-time contract basis. Traditionally, employees in 
the postal sector have received higher wages compared to other sectors.92 As it were, they 
received a kind of a wage premium, which will be under pressure towards a marked-based 
level after liberalization. The liberalization process, in combination with the new business 
models of entrants, has created a fear of worsening employment conditions (e.g., wage 
dumping). There are discussions about whether minimum wages are a reasonable solution to 
solve the problem. On one hand, the public operators and the labor unions are in favor of 
                                                 
92 See Maegli (2010). 
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setting minimum wages close to today’s wages. On the other hand, a sector-wide wage that 
fixed above market wages would raise the cost of competitors while leaving the costs of the 
incumbent less affected. This might act as an important entry barrier. 
Copenhagen Economics (2010a) concludes that competition and liberalization have not been 
the major drivers for changes in employment in the sector. Technological development 
through automation and e-substitution seems to be a more important factor driving the 
employment in the sector. However, employment conditions remain an important topic in the 
postal reform and the discussions on the further development of the postal market. 
Conclusion: The structure of employment will change in the future. It seems that the main 
driver of the structural change of employment is technological change rather than 
liberalization. The topic will remain important in debates on the future reform of the sector.   
2.5. Beyond Liberalization: Future Trends in Postal Regulation 
After summarizing the current status of regulation in the sector, this section goes beyond the 
present situation to give an outlook on the future of the sector. Therefore, the most important 
current trends and the corresponding challenges for the sector are discussed. The explanations 
cover the trends and its implications for the sector in society (changing behavior), institutions 
(independent cross-sectoral regulators), industry (intermodal competition) as well as 
technology (technology neutral universal services). 
2.5.1.  Trends in Society: Digitization, Globalization and Sustainability 
The social trends briefly sketched below will shape the further development of postal markets 
in the future. The three most important trends challenging the postal sector concern 
digitalization, globalization and sustainability. 93 
Digitalization: In many areas, the traditional physical post- and payment transaction services 
are replaced by new electronic alternatives such as E-Mail, SMS, E-Banking or Social Media. 
In this context the digitization of everyday life will be pushed on further by the exponential 
development of technologies (processor- and memory capacities, bandwidths, contactless 
transmission, mobile equipment). This continuously lowers the inhibition threshold for the 
substitution of physical information carriers.    
                                                 
93 See Swiss Post (2011d, p.3). 
Regulatory Institutions and Governance Costs: The Case of the Postal Sector 
44 
Globalization: The globalization of competition increases the pressure on postal enterprises to 
position themselves across national boundaries and to neutralize disadvantages with respect to 
size or geographical range through specific co-operations. 
Sustainability: The scarcity of natural resources increases the sensibility of customers, 
investors and lawmakers about sustainability and the corporate policy of the post. 
Accordingly, the demand for “green” products is on the rise. For the enterprises, an optimal 
mix of energy efficiency and renewable energies becomes a strategic factor. On one hand, an 
improved efficiency in the use of resources in the medium term leads to an economic 
advantage and, on the other hand, provides the enterprises with a new competitive edge.        
Impact on Regulation: From these trends, a change in customer needs can be expected: 
customer demand for simple and integrated solution continues to increase. In addition, a trend 
toward classical values such as quality, reliability and security can be observed. More and 
more, “Digital Natives” shape business models, communication channels and performance 
characteristics that the postal enterprises offer.  
2.5.2.  Institutional Trend: The Emergence of Independent Regulators in Europe 
The European trend of establishing regulatory institutions has lead to integrated regulatory 
bodies. Most agencies are responsible for more than one sector: in fact, the majority of the EU 
members combine postal and electronic communications in one regulatory agency. In some 
member states, the postal regulator is also involved in other network industries like gas, 
electricity, rail and even road safety.94 Below, we describe institutional solutions of cross-
sector or integrated regulatory bodies, namely in Germany, France, Netherlands, UK and 
Switzerland. 
The Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, 
Post and Railway is autonomous higher federal authority within the German Federal Ministry 
of Economics and Technology. In 2005, the regulatory authority for telecommunications and 
postal services, which had replaced the Federal Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications 
and the Federal Office for Posts and Telecommunications, was renamed the Federal Network 
Agency. The agency also acts as the root certification authority as provided by the German 
Electronic Signatures Act. The Federal Network Agency's task is to provide, by liberalization 
and deregulation, the further development of the German network industries. For the purpose 
                                                 
94 See WIK (2009a, p. 49). 
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of implementing the regulation goals, the agency has effective procedures and instruments at 
its disposal, including rights of information and investigation as well as the right to impose 
graded sanctions.95 In practice, the various branches of the sector-specific regulators in the 
Federal Net Agency have only little to do with one another and function as separate sector-
specific regulators. 
The ART (Autorité de Regulation des Telecommunications) was created by the law of 1996 
to regulate the telecommunications sector. In 2005, the Parliament decided to assign the 
responsibility of postal service regulation to the authority. Therefore, ART was renamed 
ARCEP: Autorité de Régulation des Communications Electroniques et des Postes. The former 
telecommunications regulator is charged by the legislature with the additional responsibility 
of overseeing the opening and operation of postal markets as well as the financing and 
safeguarding of the universal service. The new French postal law of 2005 reorganized the 
statutory and regulatory governance of the postal sector. The French postal law (Code des 
Postes et des Communications Electroniques) covers postal services as well as the electronic 
communications.96 
The Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority of the Netherlands (OPTA) was 
established in the Netherlands in 1997. OPTA is allowed and required to set out the 
Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority Act, the Postal Act and the 
Telecommunications Act. On its website, the regulator states: “The domains of telephony, 
post, internet and television are changing every day. New businesses are starting up and 
services are developing in a flash. There is a growing wave of new opportunities and 
subscriptions. OPTA ensures that there is competition and confidence in the communications 
sector in the interests of consumers. This mission revolves around two key points: the 
promotion of competition and the protection of consumers.”97 Moreover, they conclude that 
today’s electronic communications will already be obsolete tomorrow. The integration of 
telecom and postal regulation seems to be motivated by technological reasons rather than by 
efficiency gains. 
Established as a regulatory body by the Office of Communications Act 2002, Ofcom is the 
regulator for the UK communications industries, with responsibilities across television, radio, 
                                                 
95 See Federal Network Agency (2012). 
96 See ARCEP (2012). 
97 See OPTA (2009). 
Regulatory Institutions and Governance Costs: The Case of the Postal Sector 
46 
telecommunications and wireless communications services.98 The “Hooper Report” (2008) 
shed light on various risks and uncertainties concerning the future of UK’s postal services. 
With respect to the shape of the sector-specific regulator Postcomm and the regulatory 
regime, the report proposes: “A new regulatory regime is needed to place postal regulation 
within the broader context of the communications market” (15).99 The Hooper Report 
mentions several arguments for transferring responsibility of postal regulation from 
Postcomm to Ofcom: Postal services (1) are facing competition from digital media and 
Ofcom has a deep understanding of the entire communications sector as well as (2) 
experience with the regulation of markets facing fast technological change. Furthermore, the 
telecommunication regulator is (3) supposed to have experience with the creation of a 
regulatory framework for British Telecom while faced with the challenge of modernization 
and liberalization. Nevertheless, Ofcom is (4) a large organization and has economies of scale 
and has (5) a deep understanding in market analysis and competition law. 
A unique combination of responsibility is implemented in Switzerland. The Federal 
Communications Commission (ComCom) is the regulatory authority for the 
telecommunications market. The commission is not subject to any federal council or 
department directives. Organizationally and legally, it is independent from the administrative 
authorities.100 The Postal Services Regulation Authority (PostReg) is the regulatory authority 
for the postal market, which is not fully independent from the Federal Department of the 
Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications. The peculiarity of the Swiss solution 
is the governance structure: currently, the two regulators are organizationally separated, but 
share a single chairman. The institutional setting of actors is subject to change according to a 
new postal legislation.101  
Most European countries have already merged the postal and telecom regulators 
organizationally in order to realize economies of scale and concentrate expertise as well as 
experience. However, even if several countries cover the regulation of the two markets in the 
same bill, the responsibilities are still separated institutionally, because the responsibilities for 
the two markets are typically completely separated in different departments of the regulatory 
                                                 
98 See Ofcom (2012). 
99 See Hooper et al. (2008). 
100 See Comcom (2012). 
101 See the case on the Swiss postal market in chapter 6 for a detailed explanation of future changes. 
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authority. The transformation of regulatory institutions argued for here suggests the need for a 
more unified and coordinated approach across postal and telecommunications, not only from 
an organizational but also from a regulatory point of view. This is so because the historically 
separately regulated services are becoming increasingly interdependent: (1) Telecom 
infrastructures are likely to substitute last mile mail delivery, and (2) consumers are likely to 
demand a secure combination of electronic and physical mail.  
Impact on Regulation: In the course of the increased substitutability of physical mail by 
electronic communication, it is not obvious how regulation in general and regulatory 
institutions in particular should co-evolve. However, it is clear that there are increasing 
interdependencies between these two sectors, suggesting that a coordinated regulatory 
strategy for sector-specific regulation and antitrust policy for the two sectors will be required. 
2.5.3.  Industrial Trend: Converging Communication Markets 
In liberalizing postal markets, the concern for cost efficiency arises both for the universal 
service provider (USP) and the regulatory authority, since the monopoly as the traditional 
financing mechanism falls apart. The costs of some elements of the postal universal service 
are presumably high; therefore, USPs seek ways to abate them. As a result, an increasing 
number of postal operators have started to invest in digital solutions to combine them with 
traditional physical postal services (e.g., Maegli et al. (2007)). Current pilot projects include 
virtual mailboxes (e.g., Belgian Post, Post Denmark, and Canada Post), electronic billing and 
e-government efforts. Incumbent operators increasingly aim at installing secure digital 
identities and provide complementary services based on the telecommunications network. The 
relevant questions are whether the universal service will be the same in the future and whether 
the evolving technologies and customer needs are changing the definition and role of the 
universal service. Even though postal universal services might be considered as a fairly 
constant business during the past few centuries, a slow but constant change occurred during 
long history. From Victorian London, where mail delivery routes went up to twelve times per 
day, delivery frequency has been reduced over the years to five or six times per week. Today, 
rapid and data-intensive communications are secured by electronic means rather than by 
physical delivery of letter mail. During the coming decade, technological innovation will 
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further expand communication possibilities and as market liberalization impacts postal 
operators, the operators’ historical and social role is likely to change further. 102 
Hybrid solutions could herald a new era in postal universal services. For example, Swiss Post 
introduced “Swiss Post Box”: a hybrid alternative and complement to the last mile delivery to 
households. Itella recently started a similar pilot project testing alternative delivery solutions, 
where physical mail is delivered twice a week. Arriving mail is stored in a P.O. box at the 
local postal office and receivers are informed via SMS. At the same time, the letters are 
opened and scanned in order to send them electronically to the receiver by means of a special 
system. Other examples including telecommunication solutions to meet consumer needs and 
facilitate delivery are Swiss Post’s PickPost-Solution and Austrian Post’s PickupPaket. In the 
latter case, the addressee is alerted instantaneously when a parcel is delivered at a designated 
shop defined by the receiver.103 
These solutions have something in common: Components of the telecommunication 
infrastructure partially complement and substitute the traditional last mile delivery (e.g., safe 
electronic mailboxes). At the service level, new services have the potential to substitute 
traditional universal services (e.g., secured mail). Therefore, distinct universal service 
regulations across the two sectors are becoming more and more blurred. Going ahead, a key 
question will be: Is it necessary and efficient to have letter mail delivered every day? What 
are the alternatives?104 
Electronic communication infrastructures and services allow for a nationwide use of 
telecommunication services at relatively low rates as well as for more flexibility in use than in 
physical communication. At the same time, national postal providers are mandated by law to 
provide cost-intensive postal services to every household nationwide due to the universal 
service obligation. The European definition of universal service in telecommunication 
services does not include explicit services and applications but requires the physical 
connection between households at affordable prices. Table 5 briefly summarizes various 
aspects of convergence in the telecommunications and postal markets concerning electronic 
communication. As mentioned in this table, the two markets are converging in different areas. 
The main driver of convergence is the evolution of consumer needs towards fast and secure 
                                                 
102 See Maegli et al. (2010b) and (2011). 
103 See Maegli et al. (2010b) and (2011). 
104 ibidem. 
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access to messages (see CIFS (2009)). The telecommunication network allows for 
acceleration of delivery at low costs while physical mail is more reliable but more costly. The 
convergence therefore relies on a combination of the strengths of both means to overcome 
their weaknesses.  
Impact on Regulation: The increasing convergence between postal products and telecom 
applications is a new phenomenon, which needs a corresponding co-evolution of regulation in 
order to exploit synergies and find proper universal service definitions in tune with changing 
customer needs.  
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2.5.4.  Technological Trend: The Concept of Technological Neutrality 
The concept of technological neutrality is also applicable to the telecommunication and the 
postal sector. For example, Japan chose to regulate access to the last mile to the consumers 
independently of the technology applied (copper or new fiber wires). Similarly, universal 
services are often defined in technologically-neutral terms. Consumer needs may also be 
technologically neutral.  For example, the main needs of recipients concerning postal services 
are physical and timely delivery. Generally recipients do not care about how these needs are 
satisfied as long they are satisfied; that is, the technology that the operator uses to fulfill these 
needs does not primarily concern the receiver. In other words, if the delivery of a particular 
type of correspondence serves the needs of the recipient, independently of different 
technologies, its delivery is technologically neutral. However, it is important to ask: do such 
technologies exist to assure that the delivery of letters and other items of correspondence can 
be accomplished in a technologically-neutral manner?  
Hybrid services like Swiss Post Box, the secure electronic complement to the physical 
letterbox, improve physical delivery. It guarantees worldwide, twenty-four-seven access to 
physical mail by scanning and emailing it in a secure unit as soon as it arrives at the sorting 
center. Moreover, customers can then decide to have the mail physically delivered, archived 
or shredded. Managing physical mail during a temporary absence becomes as easy as 
handling electronic messaging. As a prerequisite, broadband and mobile penetrations have to 
reach a critical mass. Thus, countries and governments that strategically push forward their 
digital communication infrastructure will gain a substantial and long-lasting competitive 
advantage. In the cases where mail delivery can occur either physically or via hybrid services, 
universal services become a technologically neutral multi-channel concept. Technological 
convergence establishes the technology of the two markets into closer substitutes than they 
were in the past, functioning therefore as the cutting-edge process of a technologically-neutral 
universal service.105 
Impact on Regulation: The concept of technology neutrality in post is a consequence of the 
convergence of telecommunication and postal services. A technologically neutral universal 
service has an all-encompassing meaning in the communication sector and could also be 
referred to as “communication universal service,” and the corresponding obligation as the 
                                                 
105 See Maegli et al. (2010b) and (2011). 
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“communication universal service obligation.” A combination of the two universal service 
definitions would have an impact on sector-specific regulation in the postal sector as well as 
in the telecom sector.  
2.6. Conclusion 
The present chapter identified the main characteristics of the postal market and rationales for 
regulatory intervention. The distinction between economic and socio-political reasons for 
regulation is particularly important in the postal sector. Socio-political regulation, the 
questions in connection with universal postal services respectively, plays an important role in 
the sector. In contrast to other network industries, technological change has played a rather 
secondary role. However, changing communication behavior within society and increasing e-
substitution demonstrate a considerable impact on the sector and an increase in the pressure 
on labor conditions and the necessity for process optimizations.  
The current approach to postal universal services is based on European Directives from the 
90s. The number of delivery days and the access conditions to the postal basic services are 
largely defined. Nevertheless, postal enterprises begin to deal with alternative delivery forms 
and new universal service models. But in many cases, political authorities are not prepared for 
this type of discussion, since a transitional phase from former state monopolies to a fully 
liberalized postal market is taking place at the moment. At the same time, the further 
development of full competition in post is debatable. Competition is developing in the express 
delivery and logistic sectors, but much less in the collection and delivery of letters. 
The discussion concerning sector-specific and antitrust regulation clearly shows that there is 
need for further clarification, and that there is no clear division of roles. The comparative 
analysis with other network industries confirms that from an economic point of view no 
sector-specific regulation is needed in the postal sector. Moreover, the increasing number of 
antitrust cases in the postal sector leads to the conclusion that the competition law will 
continue to increase in importance, as will the convergence of communication channels and 
markets.
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3. LITERATURE IN NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
In this chapter, we outline the theoretical foundations of new institutional economics. The 
content of the chapter sets the theoretical cornerstones for the framework of regulatory 
governance costs that will be presented in chapter 5. Before introducing transaction costs, 
agency theory and property rights, the first section points to the general background and the 
origins of New Institutional Economics. 
3.1. New Institutional Economics and Economics of Institutions  
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) links different approaches to explain economic 
activities and economic behavior. NIE builds on, modifies, and extends neoclassical theory. It 
retains and utilizes the fundamental assumption of scarcity and hence competition. The 
approach has developed as a movement within the social sciences, especially economics and 
political science, unifying theoretical and empirical research, and exploring the role of 
institutions in facilitating or hampering economic growth. An initial paper was written by 
Ronald Coase in 1937 called “The Nature of the Firm.”106 Most scholars name the work of 
Ronald Coase as the foundational work in the field of new institutional economics.107  
The field of NIE experienced a productive evolution in recent decades. Nowadays, new 
institutional economics has two main branches. One is dominated by the focus on the 
institutional environment; the other focuses on contractual relationships and on different 
modes of governance. Ménard (2005) points out that NIE-Theory includes work in transaction 
costs economics, property rights theory, agency theory and a mix of resource-based and 
evolutionary-view as the leading approaches. The growing importance of NIE is underlined 
by the awarding of three Nobel Prizes to the following scholars:  
- Ronald Coase in 1991 for the discovery and clarification of the significance of 
transaction costs and property rights related to the institutional structure and 
functioning of the economy. 
- Douglas C. North and Robert W. Fogel in 1994, for having renewed research in 
economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order to 
explain economic and institutional change. 
                                                 
106 See Coase (1937). 
107 E.g., North (1991). 
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- Elinor Ostrom and Oliver Williamson in 2009, for the analysis of economic 
governance, especially the commons (Ostrom) and the boundaries of the firm 
(Williamson). 
Matthews (1986) implies two central propositions of the NIE-approach: “institutions (1) do 
matter and (2) are susceptible to analysis by the tools of economic theory” (903). Concerning 
the first proposition, institutional economists, new and old alike, agree on the fact that 
institutions matter. Williamson (2000) indicates that the second of these two propositions is 
what distinguishes NIE from neoclassical economic theory: NIE disputes the standard 
neoclassical assumption that an individual has perfect information and unbounded rationality 
and that transactions are costless and instantaneous. The institutional environment is affected 
by imperfect actors and individuals with a limited rationality. North (2005) states that 
neoclassical economics was not designed to explain processes of economic, political or social 
change. The aim of institutionalists is to understand changes by understanding human 
incentives, intentions and beliefs as well as the norms and rules they create to reach their 
goals. Commons (1931) notes that “since institutional economics is behavioristic, and the 
behavior in question is none other than the behavior of individuals while participating in 
transactions, institutional economics must make an analysis of the behavior of individuals” 
(654). NIE studies institutions and how institutions cooperate with organizational 
arrangements. From the perspective of institutional economics, institutions are formed to 
reduce uncertainty in human exchange108 or rather to reduce risk and transaction costs109. 
In the analysis of institutions (e.g., the analysis of a certain regulatory regime) and its 
evolvement, it is important to anticipate their development over time. To that end, Williamson 
(1998b) develops a framework of four levels of social analysis (Figure 1). The solid arrows 
connect higher with lower levels and imply that the higher level imposes limitations on the 
subsequent level. The reversed and dashed arrows signal feedback to the upper levels.  
                                                 
108 See North (1991, p. 29). 
109 The construct of transaction costs will be discussed later in the text. 
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Figure 1: Four Levels of Social Analysis: Economics of Institutions 
 
Source: Williamson (1998b, p. 26). 
Level 1 
The first level (L1) is the social embeddedness, where norms, informal rules, customs, 
tradition religion, etc. develop. Level 1 is a given for most economists. At the level of 
embeddedness, institutions change very slowly.  
Level 2 
The second level (L2) represents the institutional environment. The structures observed in L2 
are the outcome of political processes, and provide the rules of the game and how economic 
activities are organized. The important outcome of L2 is the definition of laws according to 
property rights. Much of the economics of property rights110 and the building of institutions 
are integral parts of level 2. 111 North (1991) describes institutions as “humanly devised 
constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions” (97). Ménard and Shirley 
                                                 
110 The main ideas of property rights theory are discussed later in this review.  
111 See Williamson (2000, p. 598). 
Level Frequency
(Years)
Purpose
Embeddedness:
informal institutions,customs,
tradition, norms,religion
Institutional environment:
Formal rules of the game, 
esp property
(polity, judicicary, bureaucracy)
Governance:
Play of the game –esp. Contract
(alining governance structures with
transactions)
Resource allocation
and employment:
(Prices and quantities, 
incentive alignment)
100-1000
10-100
1-10
continuous
Often noncalculative
Get the institutional
environment right
1st order economizing
Get the governance
structure right
2nd order economizing
Get the marginal 
conditions right
3rd order economizing
L1
L2
L3
L4
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(2005) define institutions as “the written and unwritten norms, rules and constraints that 
humans devise to reduce uncertainty and control the environment” (1). These imply  
- written rules and arrangements that govern contractual relations and corporate 
governance, 
- constitutions, laws and rules that govern politics, government, finance and society 
- as well as unwritten codes of conduct, norms of behavior and beliefs. 
North (1994; 2005) denotes institutions as the rules of the game, not only the formal but also 
the informal norms and the characteristics of enforcement. Following these details, the 
informal constraints are located on level 1; the formal rules, like polity, judiciary and 
bureaucracy, are located on level 2. The purpose of this first order economizing level is to 
“get the institutional environment right.”112  
Level 3 
Institutions of governance are located on level 3 (L3). On L3 the governance of contractual 
relations becomes the focus of analysis. Moreover, Transaction costs economics become an 
important role for level 3. By taking the rules of the game introduced at the second level, L3 
addresses the play (contracts) of the game. The players of the game are organizations. The 
organizations consist of groups of individuals with some common objectives. Williamson 
(1998b) distinguishes economic, political and educational organizations. Economic 
organizations are firms, trade unions, cooperatives, etc.; political organizations are parties, 
legislatures and regulatory bodies; and universities and schools are defined as educational 
organizations.113 Every issue that can be reformulated as a contractual matter can be regarded 
as advantageous in a transaction cost economizing term. Williamson (2000) asserts that a 
“huge number of phenomena turn out to be contractual variations on a common theme” (599). 
Therefore, second order economizing schedules the setting of the right government structures 
(markets, firms or bureaus) in order to align those structures with transactions. 
Level 4 
On level 4 (L4), the analysis moves from a structural to a marginal one. This level is 
embedded in neoclassical economics and, in recent decades, agency theory. The neoclassical 
economics decision variables are price and output. Agency theory, which stresses ex-ante 
                                                 
112 See Williamson (1998b, p. 27). 
113 See North (1994) and (2005). 
Chapter 3 - Literature in New Institutional Economics 
57 
incentive alignment rather than ex-post governance, still makes provisions for non-
neoclassical complications of which multi-tasking is one.114 The third order economizing 
achieves the aim of getting the marginal conditions right. 
The next section offers an overview of NIE’s three main approaches, which were introduced 
in Williamson’s framework of social analysis and the economics of institutions. 
3.2. Main Approaches of New Institutional Economics 
As explained above, there are three main areas of NIE: “transaction cost theory,” “property 
rights theory,” and “agency theory.” This section introduces the main ideas and assumptions 
of the three branches. The focus of transaction costs is on the explication of the existence of 
alternative modes of organization and some underlying tradeoffs. The core of agency theory is 
the observation of incentives or, in other words, how principals act to influence the behavior 
of agents in their particular interest. The property rights approach deals basically with the idea 
of ownership and the allocation of decision rights as an element to describe relationship-
specific investments. The transaction cost approach and the agency theory are the basic 
concepts behind the development of the regulatory governance costs framework presented in 
chapter 4. The property rights approach is less substantial for the development of the 
framework. However, since property rights theory is one of the foundations of agency theory, 
it is included in the review in order to give a complete overview on the NIE.  
3.2.1.  Transaction Costs 
A specific characteristic of the NIE is the emphasis on the costs of transactions. The 
beginning of transaction cost theory is related to Coase (1937) especially to the “make or 
buy” decision introduced in this context. Arrow (1969) defines transaction costs as the “costs 
of running the economic system” (48). It seems to be obvious that the existence of institutions 
(or organizations) is based on available resources used to create and operate institutions and to 
secure the implementation of institutional rules. In other words: Building and maintaining 
institutions results in costs. These costs are referred to as transaction costs. Commons (1932) 
prefigured the idea of transaction costs with his observation that “the ultimate unit of 
activity…must contain in itself the three principles of conflict, mutuality and order. This unit 
is a transaction” (4). 
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Williamson (2005) describes transaction cost economics as an effort to better understand 
sophisticated economic organizations by alternatively linking economics, law and 
organization theory. He defines the scope of transaction cost economics as an approach that 
allocates economic activity across various modes of organizations, adopts structural analysis, 
and characterizes the firm as a governance structure. This definition sets it apart from 
neoclassical economics, which mainly highlights price and output and describes the firm as a 
production function. Transaction cost economics describes the problem of economic 
organization as a problem of contracting.  
Williamson (1985) indicates two types of transaction costs that can occur in processes of 
contracting. Ex-ante costs occur before and ex-post costs occur after the contractual 
relationship has been established. Ex-ante costs are costs of drafting, negotiating and 
safeguarding an agreement. Ex-post costs of contracting may appear in several forms: These 
include bargaining or renegotiation costs to correct ex-post misalignments, set up and running 
costs associated with the governance structures and the bonding costs of effecting secure 
commitments.  
Williamson (1971) recognizes that influencing factors like institutional and technological 
changes need to be considered in a transactional analysis. He then (1981) points out that some 
transactions are simple and easy to mediate, but others seem to be complex and require more 
attention. In order to analyze organizational design and coordination in a transactional way, 
Williamson asks: “Can we identify the factors that permit transactions to be classified as one 
kind or another? Can we identify the alternative governance structures within which 
transactions can be organized? And can we match governance structures with transactions in a 
discriminating (transaction-cost-economizing) way?” (553). 115  
The preoccupation with these questions led him to the design of the “organizational failures 
framework.” In this particular framework, the transaction costs consist of search costs, 
contracting costs, monitoring costs, and enforcement costs. Furthermore, this market and 
hierarchies approach tries to identify a set of environmental factors (uncertainty, asset 
specificity and frequency), which, together with a related set of human factors (opportunism 
                                                 
115 See Williamson (1981). 
Chapter 3 - Literature in New Institutional Economics 
59 
and bounded rationality), explain the conditions under which complex contingent claims 
contracts will be costly to write, execute and enforce.116  
- Human Factors: The two behavioral assumptions referring to transaction cost are (1) 
human agents are subject to bounded rationality and (2) that at least some agents 
behave opportunistic.117 Bounded rationality refers to rate and storage limits on the 
capacity of individuals to receive, store, retrieve and process information without 
error. Opportunism is taking advantage of others (e.g., business partners) through a 
lack of truthfulness or honesty in transactions. The most common opportunistic 
behavior is purposely, asymmetrically distributed information by individuals to raise 
individual gains.118 
- Environmental Factors: They are defined as uncertainty, asset specificity and the 
frequency of transactions. The specificity of assets is described as the value of 
investments that would be lost in an alternative use. Highly specific assets create 
mutual dependence, which allows for the threat of a “hold up” that results from the 
incompleteness of a contract and an appropriation of economic rent by one or some 
partners.119 Another significant type of cost in terms of transactions is the cost of 
uncertainty. These costs originate from agents’ behavior, organizational deficiencies, 
inadequate institution or the state of nature. The third, most difficult parameter of 
transaction costs is the frequency of transactions. Williamson (1985) indicates the 
frequency as important, because the more often it is performed, “the more widely 
spread are the fixed costs of establishing a non-market government system” (76).  
In 1991, Williamson conducted a study in which he combined institutional economics with 
aspects of contract law and organization theory to identify and interpret the differences that 
distinguish the three generic forms of organization: market, hybrid and hierarchy. One 
outcome was the awareness about governance costs as a function of the above-introduced 
concept of asset specificity.120 Figure 2 shows that the more specific and the higher the costs 
of a transaction, the more hierarchical (vertical integrated) the form of organization. Low 
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costs and low specificity imply a more market-oriented organization. These findings indicate 
that there is an intuitive trade-off between transactions and institutional environment. 
Figure 2: Governance Costs as a Function of Asset Specificity 
 
Source: Williamson (1991, p. 184). 
The variables of transaction costs are difficult to measure, and the majority of scientists 
refrains from any attempts at measuring transaction costs directly, using instead a reduced 
form model (like Williamson (1991)) in which transaction costs are assumed to be minimized. 
Ménard (2005) states that the more complex a transaction is, the more costly and difficult it is 
to determine its characteristics and the value of its components. 
3.2.2.  Agency Theory 
In an economic environment, there are many situations in which an economic actor delegates 
to an agent the authority to act on its behalf. A reason to delegate this authority is that an 
agent has an advantage regarding expertise or information. The advantage in expertise and the 
information asymmetry cause a problem for the one who delegates – the principal.121 The 
                                                 
121 See Miller (2005). 
Chapter 3 - Literature in New Institutional Economics 
61 
elementary questions in agency problems are: How can the principal be sure that the agent 
acts in the best interest? And is it possible to define incentives in a contract, which gives the 
principal the certainty that the agent will take the same actions the principal would take?  
An initial paper in the field of agency theory was written by Jensen and Meckling (1976). In 
their article “The theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownerships 
structure,” they draw a blueprint by combining property rights, the theory of agency and 
financial aspects to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, the concept of 
agency costs respectively. They focus on the behavioral implications of the property rights 
specified in the contracts between the owners and managers of the firm.122 The theory of 
agency relationships has been developed independently from the property rights literature. 
The questions addressed in both branches are similar, and the two approaches are in fact 
highly complementary to each other. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship “as a contract under which one or 
more persons (the principals) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on 
their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent” (5). 
Agency costs are defined as the sum of (1) the monitoring expenditures of the principal, (2) 
the bonding expenditures of the agent, and (3) a residual loss.123 
The principal agent theory is based on studies in information asymmetries. The behavioral 
assumptions in the principal agent approach are nearly the same as in transaction cost 
economics. The construct of bounded rationality should express the inability of economic 
actors to obtain perfect information. Principal agent theory picks out the affinity of 
individuals to take a risk as a central point, which is a further development of the transaction 
cost theory. It studies the arrangement of risk sharing in terms of efficient risk allocation. 
There are three environmental conditions according to information problems: Adverse 
selection, moral hazard and hold up. All of them are subject to problems of coordination and 
motivation. Adverse selection bears the risk of principals selecting the wrong contractual 
partner. Moral hazard contains the risk that a party not enter into a contract in good faith 
(opportunistic behavior), while hold up problems cause the purposely, asymmetrically 
distributed information by individuals to raise individual gains. The instruments used to avoid 
these risks are signaling, screening, self-selection and negotiation in an ex-ante situation. In 
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an ex-post situation, the principal has the choice of monitoring, renegotiating, and setting 
incentives. The overall purpose is to minimize the gap in information among principals and 
agents.124 
The relevant questions of agency theory in a new institutional perspective are: How to prevent 
employees from shirking? And how to keep managers aligned with the interests of property 
right holders?125 The focus of NIE linked to agency theory is on incentive issues while trying 
to find contractual solutions (e.g., regulation). In the context of this dissertation, these 
contractual solutions are the rules (and actors) implemented in a regulatory regime. 
3.2.3.  Property Rights 
Demsetz (1967) illustrates that in the world of Robinson Crusoe property rights do not play a 
role. However, Ronald Coase provides a fundamental insight into the role of property rights 
and its importance. In his seminal paper “The Problem of Social Costs” (1960), Coase 
demonstrates that in a hypothetical world in which it is free to measure and monitor goods, to 
ascertain ownership, and to transfer goods, initial ownership would have no effect on the 
efficient allocation of goods. Coase (1988) then states that the world we live in is not a world 
with zero costs: measuring, monitoring, enforcing, ascertaining ownership, trading, and 
obtaining information is costly. In the real world, transaction costs determine property rights, 
ownership, the extent of trade, specialization, and productivity.  
The main proposition of the property rights literature emphasizes that ownership matters. An 
extensive definition of property rights is given by Barzel (1997). There are two distinct 
meanings: economic property rights and legal property rights. The legal property rights are 
those recognized and enforced by the government. The economic property rights of an 
individual over a commodity or an asset are the individual's ability, in expected terms, to 
consume the good or the services of the asset directly or to consume it indirectly through 
exchange. These include126  
- the right to use an asset in any manner a user wishes, 
- the right to exclude others from the use of the same asset,  
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- the right to earn income from an asset and contract over the terms with other 
individuals, and  
- the right to transfer ownership rights permanently to another party. 
The ownership of property rights provides the consent of others to act in a certain way. 
Furthermore, the owner expects the community to keep others from interfering with his 
actions, provided that these actions are not prohibited in the specifications of his rights. 127 
Coase (2005) remarks that these rights, with their duties and privileges, will determine the 
law. Therefore, the legal system in his view has a profound effect on the economic system and 
should indeed control it. He further concludes that these rights should be assigned to those 
who can use them most productively and with incentives to do so. Through clarity in the law 
and by making the legal standard for such transfers less burdensome, the costs for the holders 
of the rights should be low. A set of property rights, which allows sales, improves the 
allocation of resources in two ways: First, allowing sales supports signal scarcity value. 
Second, markets provide those who value the asset most with the ability to purchase it.128 
It is understandable that the fundamental idea of property rights tends to influence incentives 
and behavior. Furubuton and Pejovich (1972) describe the predominant system of property 
rights as a set of economic and social relations which defines the position of each individual 
with respect to the utilization of scarce resources. 
Williamson (2005) points out that the important lesson of transaction costs, of bounded 
rationality respectively, for the study of contract is that “all contracts are unavoidably 
incomplete” (46). A completely perfect contractual formulation of all property rights involves 
perfect knowledge and information about the behavior of actors and the present and 
prospective development of technological and institutional changes. Due to the behavioral 
assumptions of institutional economics, it is assumed that the access to these sets of 
information would not be free of charge. Rather, the acquisition of perfect information to 
formulate perfect property rights tends to generate extraordinarily high economic transaction 
costs. The integration of the construct of transaction costs in property rights theory has lead to 
the concept of incomplete contracts. Hodgson (1988) implies that every contract contains an 
element of uncertainty and that although the contractual elements are dominant, the non-
contractual components are necessary attributes of the contract as a whole. Incomplete 
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contract theory as a relatively young discipline in NIE and a combination of transaction costs 
and property rights has its roots in the late 1980s. 
The insights into the system of property rights in the words of Alston and Mueller (2005) lead 
to the following conclusion: First, property rights determine the incentives for the use of 
resources. Second, property rights consist of a set of formal and informal rights to use and 
transform resources.  
3.3. Conclusion 
The NIE-approach provides a useful framework for the analysis of state regulation. Libecap 
(2005) explains that the consideration of transaction costs supports the analysis of how 
property rights and sets of regulation take the form they do. Luis-Manso and Felisberto (2006) 
further state that there are two other approaches to regulation in institutional theories. One 
focuses on Williamson’s transaction costs approach; the other focuses on how regulatory 
strategies are affected and constrained by the institutional environment. 
There are many questions in connection with the perspectives of new institutional economics 
concerning regulated industries like infrastructures. Sappington (1991) offers an illustrative 
example of principal-agent relationship among regulatory authorities and the regulated firms: 
“In regulated industries the regulator might act as a principal, designing an incentive scheme 
for the firm (agent) whose activities being regulated” (46). It seems possible to draw a 
blueprint of structures of regulated industries with regard to principal-agent relationships. 
Concerning the field of regulated industries, it is important to understand how the processes 
of building and changing regulatory conditions work. In particular, the transaction cost and 
agency theory, or combinations thereof, provide insight into how institutions influence and 
act upon developments in regulated industries. A starting point from an NIE perspective are 
Williamson’s four different types of transactions costs: search costs, contracting costs, 
monitoring costs, and enforcement costs. 
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4. REGULATORY GOVERNANCE AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
ECONOMICS 
The main contribution of Chapter 4 is to give an overview of regulatory governance, by 
linking it to new institutional economics. The two approaches of transaction cost and agency 
theory are discussed in combination with regulatory governance.  
4.1. What is Regulatory Governance? 
In their article called “Governance as a bridge between disciplines,” van Keersbergen and van 
Waarden (2004) state that classical economics assumes markets to be spontaneous social 
orders that work best in the absence of intervention, while new institutional economics, 
economic sociology and comparative political economy start from the opposite assumption: 
These theories emphasize that markets are not spontaneous social orders, but need to be 
created and maintained by institutions. Institutions are the instruments used to monitor and 
enforce rules of the game, to ensure property rights and decision rights, and to reduce 
information asymmetries, risk and uncertainties. 
Ruiter (2005) describes governance as a wide and ambiguous term that refers within the 
public sphere to institutional arrangements serving public interests. He compares government 
approaches and governance approaches: Governance approaches rely on the assumption that 
even though some objectives may be realizable by direct government action, various other 
public objectives can be efficiently realized through the agency of individuals or by private 
organizations pursuing their own interests.129  
In their seminal article on institutional foundations of regulatory commitment, Levy and 
Spiller (1994) emphasize that there are multiple regulatory regimes which are consistent with 
good performance. They define regulatory governance from an institutional perspective as 
“the mechanisms that societies use to constrain regulatory discretion and to resolve conflicts 
that arise in relation to these constraints” (205). Following Levy and Spiller (1994), regulation 
is an implicit relational contract between regulated firms and the government. This contract is 
characterized by opportunistic behavior, commitment, specific investment and governance. 
They see regulatory design as a set of two components: regulatory governance and regulatory 
incentives. Furthermore, Levy and Spiller argue that regulatory incentives only become 
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important if an effective regulatory governance regime has been established.130 They conclude 
that the credibility and effectiveness of a regulatory governance framework vary with the 
political and social institutions of a country.  
Dassler (2006) defines regulatory governance more accurately as the “way the regulatory 
office acts under the aegis of the government, in the form of legislative acts and other forms 
by which control can be maintained over the regulated sector” (33). Majone (1996) discusses 
traditional forms of regulation and control (regulatory governance structures) in Europe,  
including public ownership, the assignment of regulatory functions to departments of 
governments under direct control of political executives, and various self-regulatory 
arrangements. These modes of regulation have been gradually displaced, as regulatory 
policies are nowadays rarely implemented by politicians themselves. Following Majone 
(1996) in European regulatory regimes, governments tend to delegate regulatory 
competencies to specialized authorities.  
The implementation of regulatory regimes or systems involves a number of tasks to be 
performed. Bauer (2005) defines administrative burdens in a regulatory context as factors to 
(1) sustain competitive but fair markets, (2) set incentives for involved actors to provide a 
certain level of public service, judged politically desirable and (3) coordinate public 
authorities related to (1) and (2). In his article on regulatory institutions, Ogus (2002) 
examines different parts of regulatory processes. As part of the policy-making procedure, the 
goals of the regime must be established and transformed into the principles and rules, which 
control behavior. Furthermore, there must be reliable procedures for explicating and enforcing 
those principles and rules and for adjudicating the disputes that arise from them. Important 
structural decisions concern the determination of how these tasks are allocated to different 
institutions and actors. Ogus (2002) states that this allocation has a vertical (the degree of 
control over these institutional actors) as well as a horizontal (the extent to which authority 
should be conferred to institutional actors other than the legislature or executive) dimension.  
According to Minouge (2002) and Ogus (2002), a proper regulatory governance system 
specifies: 
- what the institutions of rule-making are,  
- who the rule makers are, 
                                                 
130 See Levy and Spiller (1994) and Veljanovski (2010).   
Chapter 4 - Regulatory Governance and the New Institutional Economics 
67 
- how and by whom the rules are implemented 
- what forms compliance and accountability of the actors take. 
In the following, we explain different approaches regarding economic analysis of governance 
taken so far and explain the need to link regulatory governance and NIE.  
4.2. The Need for a Link: Regulatory Governance and New Institutional 
 Economics 
Various attempts at analyzing different regulatory approaches, impacts of regulation and 
explaining modes of regulation have been made.131 For instance, Baldwin and Cave (1999) 
summarize different theories of regulation: the positive theories of regulation, including 
public interest theories, interest group theories, and private interest theories. Critical 
contributions on the analysis of regulation and the outcomes were formulated as well. 
Willman et al. (2003) criticize the purely economic approach to regulation: the economic 
approach to the design of institutions tends to focus on outcomes, rather than on the analysis 
of the process, and does not therefore adopt a dynamic perspective on institutional change. It 
is prescriptive rather than analytical, focusing on the properties of institutions rather than 
taking the regulatory relationship as a unit of analysis. Concerning the theory of regulatory 
economics, Laffont and Tirole (1993) state critically that economic theory ignores incentive 
issues to a large extent, and the theory does not consider the standards of the newly developed 
principal-agent theory. They further argue that the simplified economic models, which 
ignored the presence of imperfect information, were unrealistic because they implied policy 
recommendations that require information, which is not available to regulatory authorities in 
practice. Thus, Laffont and Tirole (2000) abandon the standard economic assumption which 
defines regulators as well-informed and benevolent actors whose mission it is to perfect an 
imperfect market and to achieve the best results for society. They argue that regulators, like 
other economic actors, are self-interested: “They, like anybody, must be provided with 
incentives to become (economic and technological) experts, to think hard about specific 
regulatory issues and to shun putting their career concerns or the stakes of their favored  
interest groups or causes first” (274). But, so far only a handful of researchers and academics 
have addressed the particular costs of regulatory governance. The most important 
contributions are discussed in the following. 
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A first attempt of analyzing costs of regulation was done by Ehrlich and Posner (1974). They 
point out, that in legislative bodies the costs of production (e.g., for rule-making) are 
extremely high. They outline a theory on “the legal process according to which the desire to 
minimize costs is a dominant consideration in the choice between precision and generality in 
the formulation of legal rules and standards” (257). In their seminal article “An economic 
Analysis of Legal Rule-Making,” Ehrlich and Posner (1974) defined a first set of regulatory 
cost categories. They come up with four different types of costs:132 
- rule-making costs: the fixed costs of designing and implementing legal standards 
- enforcement costs: the costs of enforcing the standards 
- compliance costs: the costs that the standards impose on the regulated industry  
- harm costs: the social costs imposed by regulatory offences 
Veljanovski (2010) later added a fifth category –“error costs”– to the costs of Ehrlich and 
Posner. Error costs are those that occur because regulators (and judges) are not error proof. 
They may set up legal rules that do not encourage efficient behavior and lead to type one or 
type two errors. Type one errors arise when regulators find infringements or irregularities 
where there is none. The type two errors occur in the opposite case: the regulator finds no 
infringement when in fact there is one.133 
As introduced in the previous section, the work of Williamson and his colleagues describes 
transaction cost economics and agency theory. The first applications of transaction cost 
economics in regulation and antitrust were in the field of industrial organization.134 Regarding 
regulation and deregulation in regulated sectors, Williamson (2005) states that transaction 
cost economics are still underused with regard to its potential. Concerning the analysis of 
public policies, Dixit (1996) points out critically: “Economists studying business and 
industrial organization have long recognized the inadequacy of the neoclassical view of the 
firm and have developed richer paradigms and models based on the concept of various kinds 
of transaction costs. Policy analysis also stands to benefit from such an approach, opening the 
black box and examining the actual workings of the mechanisms inside” (9). Through the lens 
of transaction cost economics as well as agency theory, different modes of regulation can be 
described as alternative modes of governance, which are well-suited for some objectives but 
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poorly suited for others. Williamson (2005) states that whether the chosen governance mode 
works well or poorly depends on the nature of a transaction and the particulars of governance. 
Estache and Martimort (1999) further argue that in the analysis transaction costs have to be 
isolated in order to draw policy relevant lessons from transaction cost economics. Considering 
regulated industries, such a view with emphasis on transaction costs is related to the principal 
agent framework: heterogeneous parties, politicians, bureaucrats and courts, will act with 
limited or asymmetric information in bargaining processes.  
To summarize, the protagonists in new institutional economics reach the conclusion that 
regulation has a cost which can be of course minimized, but which nevertheless will be 
unevenly distributed among the actors of the broader institutional framework. According to 
new institutional economics, these regulatory costs depend on the formal and informal rules 
among the involved actors, upon the allocation of property rights among these actors, as well 
as upon the various principal-agent or more generally contractual relationships among these 
actors. As these costs are not easy to quantify, we ask how to concretize the definition costs of 
regulatory governance. 
One potential path towards establishing such a definition can be found in another small and 
practically oriented body of literature on the cost of regulation: the consultancy firm Oxera 
(2004) conducted a study for the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs on “costs and benefits 
of market regulation.” In this report, Oxera distinguishes (1) direct costs of the market 
regulator, (2) direct cost of regulated firms, (3) economic costs, (4) indirect costs, and (5) 
social cost of regulation.  
However, theorists as well as practitioners have not yet paid sufficient attention to these costs 
of a regulatory system. Building a systematic approach with emphasis on regulation in order 
to evaluate and analyze regulatory governance and its impact on the developments of markets, 
infrastructures as well as on society is an essential challenge. A crucial question to be asked is 
what governance costs in infrastructure regulation are made of and which theoretical 
approaches help to identify and analyze the relevant costs.  
An attempt to distinguish between different sorts of costs caused by regulation, including a 
dynamic perspective, and their impact on regulatory institutions has not done yet been done in 
academia. The development of the major branches of new institutional economics took place 
with the intention of applying more institutional realism to neoclassical economics. The 
overall aim of this extension is to better explain and predict the behavior of utility maximizing 
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individuals and profit maximizing firms in market relationships. We assume that the 
implications of new institutional economics on regulation theory and practice are enormous, 
though still largely unexplored. We would therefore like to combine the insights on regulatory 
governance with the transaction cost approach and agency theory in the following section. 
4.2.1.  Regulatory Governance and the Transaction Cost Approach 
Dollery (2001) explains that bounded rationality unambiguously implies that complexities of 
actual economic exchange cannot be fully captured by hierarchical contracts or market 
mechanisms. Since bounded rationality prevents the construction of complete contracts 
between agents and principals, there is room for economic agents to behave opportunistically 
by hiding their preferences and actions from contractual partners.135 Indeed, it is because of 
real-world phenomena, such as bounded rationality and incomplete contracts that economic 
activities have to be conducted in an environment characterized by asymmetric information 
and costly transactions.  
As already mentioned above, Arrow (1969) defines transaction costs as the “costs of running 
the economic system” (48). Williamson (1998b) briefly sketches the transaction cost 
economic perspective of the public bureau. He describes the public bureau as an alternative 
mode of governance that is, as mentioned above, well suited for some purpose but poorly 
suited for others as well. Williamson (1998b) summarizes that “there is no one, all-purpose, 
superior form of organization. Transactions vary in their attributes; governance structures 
vary in their costs and competencies, efficient alignment is where the predictive action 
resides. The unchanging lesson of transaction cost for all feasible forms of organization, of 
which the public bureau is one, is this: a place needs to be made for each generic form, but 
each generic form needs to be kept in its place” (46). 
In the article “Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective,” 
Williamson (1999) then characterizes three different forms of public governance: (1) full 
privatization, (2) regulation, and (3) the public agency which are briefly described below: 
1. Full privatization is described as a relational contract, which establishes an enduring 
exchange between firms and the state that regulates transactions related to goods or 
services that the firms supply. 
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2. Regulation denotes a complex governance structure which includes a long-term 
contractual exchange regime between a firm and the state that regulates transactions 
concerning the goods and services the firm supplies. Firstly, it is an authority regime 
between the state and an organ that regulates the supervision of the firm. Secondly, it 
implies an enduring supervision regime between the authority and the firm that is 
based on a relational contract between the firm and the state. 
3. The public agency relies on an enduring authority regime between the state and an 
organ, which regulates the organ’s provision of goods and services to which the state 
is authorized.    
Furubotn and Richter (1992) describe the transaction cost approach as “most easily 
understood as embracing all those costs that are connected with (i) the creation or change of 
an institution or organization and (ii) the use of the institution and organization” (8). To 
summarize: to establish and to maintain institutions results in costs. Epstein and O’Halloran 
(1999) describe transaction costs economics as an approach for comparative institutional 
analysis where a given set of transactions may be characterized by its variety of costs; and 
different modes of governance might affect the level of these costs. In their perspective, the 
task of the transaction cost approach is to predict how optimal governance structures change 
as the formation of transaction costs changes. We suggest that these two ways of looking at 
transaction costs are the most likely approaches to be applied to regulatory governance. 
Estache and Martimort (1999) identify two types of transaction costs related to regulatory 
institutions. The first type of transaction costs depends on the degree of informational 
problems faced by the government and on the limitations in the scope of governments when 
they implement regulatory responsibilities. The second type of transactions costs is related to 
the difficulties in establishing fully contingent contracts. Because these sorts of contracts 
often cover a limited period of time, it is not compulsory for future generations or 
governments; this often leads to renegotiations.  
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4.2.2.  Regulatory Governance and Agency Theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), in their seminal contribution, applied the agency theory 
exclusively to the firm. But already at this early stage, they mention the generality of the 
theory: “The problem of introducing an agent to behave as he (or she) were maximizing the 
‘principal’s’ welfare is quite general. It exists in all organizations and in all co-operative 
efforts – at every level of management in firms, in universities, in mutual companies, in co-
operatives, in governmental authorities and bureaus, in unions and in relationships normally 
classified as agency relationships such as are common in the performing arts and the market 
for real estate” (309). 
Gilardi (2001) states that although principal-agent models have been widely used by 
American political scientists for more than twenty years, their application to the European 
system of regulation is much more recent. The debate in the European context has been 
launched in a special issue of the European Journal of Political Research (37/3, 2000), where 
parliamentary systems have been analyzed as a chain of delegation. The major steps of 
delegation have been considered from a principal-agent perspective: delegation from citizens 
to their representatives in parliament, from the parliament to the government, from the 
government as a whole to single ministers, and finally from the government to the 
bureaucracy. 
The governmental actors and the political principals, create the agencies and define their legal 
shape, formal objectives and decision-making procedures, appoint the key personnel and later 
monitor the regulators’ activities. According to Majone (1999) and Horn (1995), agency 
theory suggests that the following variables are critical when political principals structure the 
relationships (to the independent regulator) in a manner such that the outcomes of the agent’s 
efforts comply with democratic accountability:136 
1. The extent to which decisions are delegated to an independent agent rather than 
taken by the principle himself, with the choice ranging from “no delegation” to “full 
delegation.” 
2. The governance structure, which includes both organizational forms–single headed 
agency, multi-headed commission, self- regulatory organization, and so on–and 
methods of appointment of key personnel. The nature of the governance structure to 
                                                 
136 See Majone (1999, p. 13-14). 
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a large extent determines the agency’s degree of independence from the political 
process. 
3. The rules that specify the procedures to be followed in agency decision-making. 
Examples are substantive legitimacy, as well as rules defining the right of various 
groups to participate directly in the decision-making process. 
4. The procedures to be followed when principals wish to overrule agency decisions. 
5. The allocation of resources, particularly the agents’ employment conditions, and the 
extent to which the agency is financed by government or by the sale of its services. 
6. The extent of ex-post monitoring through ongoing legislative and executive 
oversight, the budgetary process, judicial review, citizens’ complaints and peer 
review.  
Following and summarizing Majone (1999), the key findings of agency theory for regulatory 
governance are that the control of agents is to a large extent a question of good institutional 
design. The following section concludes by summarizing the main findings of chapter 4 in 
combination with chapter 3.  
4.3. Conclusion 
We assume that the implications of transaction costs and agency theory on regulation theory 
in general and regulatory governance in particular are relevant, but remain (save for a few 
exceptions mentioned in the review above) widely unexplored. It therefore seems appropriate 
to briefly recapitulate before developing the framework of regulatory governance costs. The 
most important findings from chapter 3 and 4 regarding the development of the framework in 
the next chapter are the following:  
- Arrow’s (1969) definition of transaction costs: The “costs of running the economic 
system” (48).  
- Ehrlich and Posner (1974) define four categories of regulatory costs: rule making 
costs, enforcement costs, compliance costs, harm costs. 
- Veljanovski (2010) adds a fifth category: error costs. 
- Williamson (1981) introduces four different types of transaction costs: search costs, 
contracting costs, monitoring costs, and enforcement costs. 
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- According to new institutional economics, these costs depend on the formal and 
informal rules, the allocation of property rights, and the various principal-agent 
relationships among these actors.  
- At the most general level, new institutional economics concludes that regulation has 
its cost, which can of course be minimized, but which nevertheless will be unevenly 
distributed among the actors of the broader institutional framework.  
- Through the lens of transaction cost economics as well as agency theory, different 
modes of regulation can be described as alternative modes of governance, which are 
well suited for some objectives but poorly suited for others.  
- The transaction cost approach interprets governance as organizing transactions in 
order to economize on transactions.  
- Williamson (1998b) describes the public bureau as an alternative mode of governance, 
which is well suited for some purpose but poorly suited for others.  
The following chapter is concerned with proposing a framework of regulatory governance 
costs by which regulatory regimes can be appreciated and compared in a uniform way.  
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5. THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION: A FRAMEWORK OF 
REGULATORY GOVERNANCE COSTS 
Chapter 5 synthesizes the previous two chapters. As a result of the discussion on regulatory 
governance and New Institutional Economics, we come up with the framework of regulatory 
governance costs. The section is organized as follows: First, a definition of regulatory 
governance costs is given. In a second part, we outline a set of different institutional 
dimensions that potentially have an impact on regulatory governance costs. This is followed 
by the introduction of the concepts of static and dynamic costs of regulatory governance.  
5.1. The Definition of Governance Costs 
In line with Bauer (2005) and his definition of administrative burdens, we define governance 
costs in a regulatory context as the costs related to tasks performed to sustain competitive but 
fair markets, to set incentives for involved actors to provide a certain level of public service, 
and to coordinate public authorities involved in regulation.137 We assume that governance 
costs are inherently present in any institutional arrangement and as such are influenced by:  
1. the institutional design and the alignment of competences (rules and actors),  
2. the choice of regulatory instruments as well as  
3. the behavior of the actors within an institutional framework.  
The costs are related to tasks and transactions in regulatory regimes concerning bargaining 
and decision-making processes in policy making and policy enforcement, the control of 
institutional actors and the industry as well as the search and supply of information.  
In the following, we distinguish between static and dynamic costs of regulation. Figure 3 
illustrates the hierarchy of the different categories. The two types of static costs are the 
consequence of the institutional design and the interaction of the actors. While direct costs 
affect the involved actors in a rather monetary and resource-based way, indirect costs rather 
affect the actors’ decisions and, therefore, the outcome in the market. The sub-category of 
static-direct costs occurs in connection with the institutional design of the regulatory 
framework and the behavior of actors. In contrast, the category of static-indirect costs arises 
out of false incentives, resulting in an inefficient supply of goods and services. The category 
                                                 
137 We assume that regulatory governance costs differ in different regulatory situations and with the degree of 
liberalization. 
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of the dynamic costs is the consequence of direct and indirect costs in relation to distorted 
future innovation incentives.  
The amount of static-direct cost may in some cases be quantified (e.g., the annual budget of 
regulators or administration costs). In contrast, the negative impacts of the static-indirect as 
well as the dynamic costs are often hardly quantifiable and may have to be analyzed on a 
qualitative basis.138  
Figure 3: Categories and Hierarchy of Regulatory Governance Costs 
 
Source: by author. 
                                                 
138 See Oxera (2004, p. 15). 
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5.2. Institutional Dimensions and Assumptions About Governance Costs  
Before introducing the different types of governance costs, we provide an overview of 
different institutional dimensions (e.g., the number of involved regulatory actors or the 
definition and the scope of the universal service) that potentially have an impact on the 
different regulatory governance costs introduced in the next section. We assume that the 
various dimensions have different impacts in terms of both time (static or dynamic) and 
substance (outcome): The direct costs refer to the interaction between the involved actors and 
only marginally concern the overall markets. The indirect costs act less on the individual 
actors than on the overall market, basic investment decisions of the actors at a certain moment 
respectively. The dynamic costs, on the other hand, influence the future situation of product 
and process innovation.   
In chapter three, the economics of institutions were illustrated according to Williamson 
(1998b).  If the different costs are allocated to the levels, the following dynamic allocation as 
shown in Figure 4 seems appropriate: 
- Direct Costs: They are strongly influenced by Level 2 “Institutional Environment,” 
when institutions are formed, and they definitely also accrue at the “Governance” level 
– the play of the game.  
- Indirect Costs: They are determined at Level 3 and take effect at Level 4 “Resource 
allocation and employment.” 
- Dynamic costs: Dynamic costs occurring as a result of direct and indirect costs can 
best be allocated to Level 4. However, they take effect beyond that, and the costs vary, 
depending on the correct organization of marginal conditions. 
In order to ascertain where the different costs accrue and what impact they have, we first have 
to make assumptions about the accompanying institutional dimensions and determine the 
possible cost drivers generically. 
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Figure 4: Economics of Institutions and Regulatory Governance Costs 
 
Source: Adopted from Williamson (1998a). 
Along the well known distinction between actors and rules introduced by NIE, roughly two 
groups of institutional dimensions can be distinguished. One group rather refers to the 
organization of the actors and interactions between them (institutional organization of actors, 
sharing information, procedures and processes), while the other group concerns policy aspects 
and the material definition of institutions and rules (definition of universal service, access 
regime, degree of liberalization). The different dimensions are summarized in Table 5 and the 
corresponding assumptions are set out in the next section.   
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Table 5: List of Institutional Dimensions 
Institutional Dimensions  
Organization and Interaction of Actors Policy and Regime 
- Number of regulatory actors 
- Modalities and subject of information 
exchange 
- Interaction of sector-specific regulation and 
competition law 
- Regulatory process 
- Stability of institutions (organizational 
perspective) 
 
- Scope of universal service 
- Degree of liberalization 
- Financing and financing mechanism of the 
USO 
- Universal service price regulation 
- Access regime  
- Norms and standardization requirements 
- Labor conditions 
- Stability of institutions (policy perspective) 
Source: by author. 
5.2.1.  Institutional Dimensions: Organization and Interaction of Actors 
The different institutional dimensions concerning the interaction of actors are briefly outlined 
and described in the following. 
Number of Regulatory Actors: In particular, the number of regulatory actors influences the 
direct costs of regulatory governance. A higher number of actors increases monitoring- and 
coordination costs and may also increase the compliance costs of enterprises. The larger the 
institutional actors are, the higher the costs; unclear competences may also result. Depending 
on the requirements and the expenditure of each institution, costs for market entrance can be 
very high, especially for smaller enterprises. This may also lead to dynamic costs. Costs 
increase with the degree of information exchange between the involved institutions, since 
some of the information is requested or collected twice. 
Modalities and Subject of Information Exchange: The information exchange between 
authorities and enterprises is always cost-intensive. The so-called “administrative burdens” 
are repeatedly brought up in national economies. Cost drivers here are certainly the types of 
interfaces between enterprises and authorities, as well as the extent of the duty to supply 
information. Often, the duties to supply information do not apply to incumbents and entrants 
are not the same, and additionally, the information requirements are higher in the field of 
universal service. Here, too, the general rule applies that the more obligations exist, the higher 
the costs for a new entrance into a market will be (licensing regime, information about labor 
conditions or quality of services).  
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Interaction of Sector-Specific Regulation and Competition Law: The interaction between 
sector-specific regulation and competition law is cost-driving as far as the competences are 
not clearly discriminated. Moreover, sector-specific regulators and competition authorities 
may have divergent goals and apply different assessment criteria: while the competition 
authority mainly assesses agreements and market dominance, sector-specific regulation 
authorities are concerned with market failure and social objectives (e.g., a certain level of 
public service available to all citizens at equal and affordable prices).139 It is equally 
important to note how the horizontal coordination between the competition authorities and 
sector-specific regulators is organized. If the information exchange is good, competition 
between the authorities is reduced, along with the costs for the market actors. Within an 
advancing liberalization process with an increasingly functioning market arises the question 
of phasing out sector-specific regulation. As soon as sector-specific regulation becomes 
redundant, the competences in ex-post control of markets could be delegated to competition 
authorities. 
Regulatory Processes: While requirements (e.g., regarding pricing, price regulation or 
universal services) are established, compliance with these requirements must also be verified. 
The requirements and the amount of information to be provided have a decisive effect on 
costs. The more extensive the requirements are and the shorter the time intervals for 
enterprises to provide information and authorities to verify it, the higher the static costs. Ad 
hoc analyses, such as a procedure for cross-subsidization, are cost-intensive for all actors 
involved. Regarding innovation, such procedures may lead to delays in time to market and 
thus influence the pay-off and break-even of new products.  
Stability of Institutions (Organizational Perspective): It can be assumed that a high stability of 
institutions generally has a positive influence on the amount of the regulatory governance 
costs. The more stable the institutions are, the higher the legal and investment security. At the 
same time, processes between the different actors become common practice, learning effects 
decrease and a long-term information exchange leads to know-how transfer. It can be an 
obstacle that as technologies are developed further or consumer behavior changes, the 
institutions cannot be adapted in their substance in due course. Policy processes are very time-
intensive, and the adaptation of institutions through a political debate or a legislative 
                                                 
139 See Oxera (2004). 
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procedure takes a lot of time. We therefore distinguish between the “organizational 
perspective” and the “policy perspective” with regard to the stability of institutions.      
5.2.2.  Institutional Dimensions: Policy and Regime 
This section lines out the several institutional dimensions in relation with policies and regimes 
that may have an impact on regulatory governance costs. 
Scope of Universal Service: The scope and requirements at the level of universal service 
influence regulatory costs insofar as they set up requirements regarding product range, 
product design, service quality, prices, access and affordability. In the majority of cases, it is 
determined who has to provide the universal service, and what verification criteria and 
information obligations exist. The more rigid the requirements are, the higher static 
governance costs will be. There is an impact on dynamic costs if the institutions cannot adapt 
to market conditions, i.e., existing products are not replaced by more modern solutions or the 
existing processes are not improved.  
Degree of Liberalization: The degree of liberalization co-determines the intensity of 
competition in the market and influences financing of the universal service. The more actors 
are active in the market, the higher direct costs of regulation might be. The degree of 
liberalization co-determines investment decisions; for instance, unclear decisions regarding 
liberalization steps lead to insecurities of potential market entrants. Depending on the degree 
of liberalization, the dynamic costs are influenced. When competition is intensified without 
market growth, cost pressure for suppliers in the market increases. 
Financing and Financing Mechanism of the USO: The original financing mechanism for 
universal or public services in network industries was the monopoly. The continuing trend for 
liberalization in these former monopoly industries has the effect of new mechanisms being 
found and introduced. Possible instruments are government-support, self-financing by the 
universal service providers or participative fund solutions, where market players commit to 
paying for the costs of the universal service. The regulatory governance costs change with the 
mechanism, since the control commitments and the compliance requirements in the various 
mechanisms differ. With some mechanisms, the market entrance barriers for potential entrants 
are too high. If the costs have to be borne by the incumbent alone, he might be unfairly 
burdened. Hence, the selection of the financing mechanism has an impact on direct and 
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indirect costs. Dynamic costs are equally affected, because depending on the mechanism the 
payoff for innovations is also reduced or the cost pressure in the processes increases.  
Universal Service Price Regulation: In most cases, price regulation refers to the products of 
the universal service. Products and services outside the universal service are mostly subject to 
competition law. Price regulation, too, can pursue different objectives and consequently 
influence the regulatory governance costs in different ways. Price cap regulation and profit 
regulation do not have the same consequences. It is also relevant to consider whether the 
focus is on consumer protection (affordable prices) or financing of universal service. As 
mentioned above, rigid price regulations may also prevent new, innovative price models and 
thus lead to inefficient prices in the market. At the same time, one must note whether a duty 
to supply information or an authorization requirement exists for the products in the universal 
service. If this is the case, the time to market for new products may be delayed.  
Access Regime: Access regulation also influences the static and dynamic costs. Depending on 
the regime, the access conditions must be negotiated and/or monitored among the 
competitors. In case of disagreements, the regulatory authorities must mediate between the 
competitors. As mentioned above, the access regime also strongly influences the development 
of end-to-end competition and the employment of new technologies. With respect to dynamic 
costs, access regulation or bargaining processes for access agreement can take effect on 
innovation insofar as the processes become less flexible due to the interface between 
competitors, and uncertainties regarding economies of scales occur.   
Norms and Standardization Requirements: Norms and standards take effect in two ways. On 
one hand, they can facilitate the interoperability between suppliers and guarantee the quality 
and security for the customers. On the other hand, they can imply high barriers with regard to 
a market entrance. Static costs accrue when the compliance with standards or with measuring 
criteria in testing the service quality must be monitored.140 Dynamic costs accrue when certain 
norms must be complied with, making process innovations more difficult. 
Labor Conditions: Labor conditions can influence regulatory governance costs in many ways. 
Direct costs result from negotiations with labor unions and from monitoring compliance by 
the regulatory authorities and partially by the labor unions themselves. At the same time, 
labor conditions strongly influence the market development. By defining industry standards 
                                                 
140 E.g., the European Standard EN 13850: Postal service –Quality of service– Measurement of the transit time 
of end-to-end services for single piece priority mail and first class mail. 
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the costs for the provision of services in work- and personnel-intensive sectors and therefore 
influence the number of competitors. Regarding dynamic costs, the labor conditions have an 
influence insofar as the motivation for optimizing processes and to reduce man-power is high 
due to high labor costs.  
Stability of Institutions (Policy Perspective): As mentioned above, the stability of institutions 
can have both positive and negative effects on regulatory governance costs. From a policy 
perspective, the costs are rather high in terms of a high time requirement of political 
processes, since in many cases the adaptation is realized via a legislative procedure. This 
means that in some cases new technologies and consumer behavior change at a rate faster 
than institutions can respond to those developments. Politics must agree to an adaptation of 
institutions, especially in regards to public service. In most cases, this is preceded by a 
lengthy opinion-forming process. In sectors with high investment costs (sunk costs), the 
stability leads to legal and investment security. From the policy perspective, the static costs 
are less relevant than the dynamic ones, since existing products or processes cannot be 
replaced by new, dynamic services due to requirements. 
In the following, the different categories of regulatory governance costs and their 
characteristics are described in detail. The description starts with static-direct and -indirect 
costs before introducing dynamic costs.  
5.3. Static Costs of Regulatory Governance I: Direct Costs 
As mentioned above, regulatory interventions in markets are not free of cost. On one hand, 
the institutional regime has to be defined. On the other hand, the relevant authorities have to 
be set up and provided with the resources that enable them to monitor markets and the 
involved actors and consequently to implement the regulatory guidelines. This includes the 
creation of independent bodies, which control the activities of regulatory authorities and 
coordinate different authorities involved in regulation (e.g., competition authorities vs. sector-
specific regulator) as well as compliance requirements. 
5.3.1.  Monitoring Costs 
Monitoring costs are those that arise from the supervision of various agents assigned with 
regulatory intervention. If the free market does not result in an economically or socially 
desirable outcome, the desirable result may be provided or at least stimulated by the state. A 
principal-agent problem occurs, if the state itself doesn’t provide the required service (e.g., 
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through a state owned enterprise): First through the delegation of the surveillance to one or 
more specialized authorities and second through the relation of the regulator to the designated 
operator. In the first case, the political principals define the agents (the regulatory authorities) 
their constitution, their goals and competences; they also designate the agencies’ head and 
finally monitor the activities of regulatory bodies.  The original rationale of the transfer of 
regulatory tasks and the control of the regulatory process to regulatory authorities is based on 
the assumption that the transaction costs of a change in regulation (and in a sector) are much 
lower when decisions are made by specialized authorities than when they are implemented 
through statutory changes within political institutions. Posner (1974) argues that for instance 
the size of parliaments leads to circumstances where politics delegate recurring decisions and 
functions, which require a certain expertise, to specialized authorities and organizations. 
Thus, the statutory or regulatory guidelines are mostly designed in such a way that regulators 
have the power to choose among different regulatory measures or instruments to achieve the 
regulatory goals defined by their principals.141 Even if the total transaction costs are lower, the 
delegation of the regulation from the political authorities to a specialized authority causes 
(from a principal-agent perspective) monitoring and information costs. In a dynamic 
regulatory context, regulators have their own interests: They behave discretely and 
strategically while trying to expand their powers vis-à-vis the other actors.142 Regulators may 
well tend to act in their own interests and contrarily to the intentions with which they were 
originally established; their activities therefore must be monitored. Monitoring costs arise 
because the agents (regulatory authorities) do not pursue exactly the same objectives as their 
principals. Consequently, agents’ actions must either be guided by (inefficient) incentive 
contracts or tightly monitored and controlled by their principals. 
Another serious principal-agent type problem, which is related to monitoring and information 
costs, is the relationship between regulators and the regulated companies. In regulated 
network industries, principal-agent chains occur: The government or the ministry has to 
control the regulatory authorities, because they benefit from better expertise in the regulated 
industry and from superior information. Furthermore, regulatory authorities (both sector-
specific and competition authorities) have significant information problems in the relationship 
                                                 
141 See Knieps (2007, p. 185). 
142 Prior research highlights that regulatory agencies’ objective functions are multidimensional, e.g., regulators 
tend to maximize their budgets, enlarge the number of employees or enhance career prospects and political 
reputations (Waetherby, 1971; Mueller, 2003). 
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with the companies and markets they monitor. There is a lack of knowledge about the 
technologies used and the pattern of demand in the markets they regulate.143 The principals 
also hardly know the cost structure of operators, their internal incentive systems, as well as 
the contracts with other suppliers and customers.144  
Monitoring costs may not always be clearly quantified, but may be related to personnel costs, 
consultancy fees, costs of administrative overhead and resource consumption. These costs are 
not static in the long run, but change because of external–often political–influences and, for 
example, if the objectives of the regulation change or whenever new regulatory tools or 
mechanisms get implemented. 
5.3.2.  Compliance Costs 
Compliance costs are the costs of the industrial actors, which have (1) to comply with 
regulatory guidelines and (2) to provide information to regulatory authorities. They are borne 
by the operators and also related to principal-agent problems. Since in general the historical 
operator is more heavily regulated than its competitors (through asymmetric regulation) and 
designated to render a certain level of universal service, the historical operator is likely to bear 
the largest portion of the compliance costs.  
Moreover, they have to be on good terms with the regulator. The costs are particularly high 
when regulatory guidelines change radically or get modified. Costs of compliance do not only 
arise in compliance departments or departments of regulatory affairs. In most cases, these 
costs are spread over all departments or business units. The drivers of these costs include 
costs like labor costs, costs of administrative overheads, legal expenses and consultancy fees 
as well as costs that occur in connection with the adjustment to new regulatory requirements.  
Regarding monitoring and compliance costs, Coen (2005) states that there emerges something 
like a resource dependency between regulators and regulated firms. In order to obtain their 
mandate, the regulators try to gather detailed information on, and gain credibility in, the 
market they regulate. At the same time, the regulated business, wishing to understand the 
regulatory principles and processes, is likely to exert influence on the development of 
regulatory institutions and the regime. 
                                                 
143 See Armstrong and Sappington (2006, p. 330) about the control of regulators over monopolists and 
information asymmetries. 
144 See Estache and Martimort (1999). 
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5.3.3.  Coordination Costs 
We call costs that are related to coordination within the regime “coordination costs”; this third 
type of static-direct governance costs is based on the assumption that there is more than a 
single institutional actor involved in regulation. Apart from a sector-specific regulatory 
agency, ministries and competition regulators also play important roles in regulatory regimes. 
Böllhoff (2005) describes a political administrative context, where regulatory regimes even 
include more than these three institutions: besides the sector related ministries, departments 
like the treasury can be involved in regulatory processes. Administrative courts may also play 
a crucial role in decision-making processes. Furthermore, parliamentary actors and 
committees have an impact on regulatory regimes, since they try to influence the evolution of 
the regulatory environment in consideration of their political attitudes. 
There is a strong need to coordinate the different institutional actors and their activities in 
order to avoid over-regulation and overlapping regulatory competences. In line with Bauer 
(2005), we suggest that the more dispersed the regulatory regime becomes (ministries, 
regulators, competition authorities), the more likely are administrative fights over power and 
competences. Furthermore, based on theories of bureaucratic politics and organizational 
behavior, we assume that the involved public authorities try to enhance, or at least to stabilize, 
their own role in the regulatory system.145  
Stemming from the fact that different regulators and institutional actors, such as the sector-
specific regulatory agency and the traditional competition regulator, are intervening into a 
sector, the different authorities need to be coordinated. If coordination is not optimal, there is 
the probability of many additional costs resulting from the duplication and inconsistencies of 
the activities. Another source of governance costs, which are related to coordination, are the 
various additional costs caused by court cases and different types of watchdogs. However, a 
proper definition of competences of different regulators as well as an adequate level of 
standardization may lead to a reduction of coordination costs.     
We distinguish three different types of static direct regulatory governance costs that are 
summarized in Table 6: 
                                                 
145 See Bauer (2005, p. 56). 
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- Monitoring Costs: arise because of informational asymmetries in the relationships of 
principals with their agents: Regulators have to gather and process information, which 
is costly. 
- Compliance Cost: are the costs the industry faces in order to comply with regulatory 
requirements. 
- Coordination Costs: result from multiple institutional actors involved in regulated 
industries, which have to be coordinated. 
Table 6: Summary – Categories of Static-Direct Governance Costs  
Static Costs of Regulatory Governance (I):  
Direct Costs 
Category Key Assumption Drivers Components/ Indicators 
Monitoring Agents/Actors do 
not implicitly share 
the objectives of 
their principals and 
need to be 
monitored 
 
- Agents behavior 
- Information 
Asymmetries 
- Accountability of 
Agents  
- Operators behavior/ 
Strategy 
- Relationships 
(formal/informal) 
- Modalities of 
information 
exchange 
- Distribution of 
Power 
- Institutional design 
- Alignment of 
regulators 
- Regulatory processes 
- Interaction of sector 
specific regulation 
- Annual budgets of agents 
- Salaries and consultancy fees 
- Staff size 
- Number of active operators in 
public services 
- Labor costs related to 
compliance activities 
- Administrative overhead 
- Adjustment to regulatory 
changes 
- Consultancy fees  
- Number of institutional actors 
involved in regulatory 
processes 
- Degree of independence of the 
regulator 
- Accountability of regulators 
 
Compliance  Operators face 
costs when they 
comply with 
regulatory 
directives 
 
Coordination  There is more than 
one single actor 
involved n 
regulatory 
processes and their 
activities have to be 
coordinated 
Source: by author. 
  
Regulatory Institutions and Governance Costs: The Case of the Postal Sector 
88 
5.4. Static Costs of Regulation Governance II: Indirect Costs 
The original model of perfect competition leads to many desirable results: only the most 
efficient suppliers survive and produce at the lowest possible prices; prices are optimal; 
welfare is at its maximum; and consumers cannot become better off without making all others 
worse off. The original rationale behind government intervention and the introduction of 
regulation in network industries was to correct market failures linked to persistent 
monopolistic bottlenecks.146 The result of regulatory intervention (such as network access or 
price regulation) is ideally positive, so that an existing market failure is corrected. But when 
economic regulation is more costly than beneficial, it results in an overall welfare loss. 
Indirect costs of regulation rarely arise because of the institutional design of the regulatory 
system, but are nonetheless a consequence of the mode of regulation and the instruments 
implemented to achieve the regulatory objectives. The economic assumption was that without 
regulatory intervention, prices would be too high, restricting demand and creating excess 
profits; all these inefficiencies lead to high social costs and a loss of welfare. But it is possible 
that policy makers and/or regulators use wrong or imperfect models to guide their decisions, 
with a major impact on the investment incentives of firms, a misallocation of resources, and a 
decline in social welfare. These indirect negative effects of regulatory governance may result 
from a distorted static and dynamic allocation through improper pricing, technology choice 
and innovation incentives.147 The characteristics of these issues are often a result of regulatory 
governance and regulatory decisions. 
We call negative consequences for and effects of regulation on the market static-indirect 
costs. The overall assumption behind the indirect costs is that while the objective of 
regulatory intervention is to improve market functioning, actions of regulators can have 
unintended negative outcomes as well. These outcomes may have effects on the nature of the 
market and the availability of products provided in the market, consumer choice, the level of 
innovation, or may even discourage firms from entering into markets.   
                                                 
146 See section 2.1. 
147 See Viscusi et al. (2005). 
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5.4.1.  Market and Prices 
Crew and Kleindorfer (2006) argue that price regulation does not necessarily result in 
economically optimal prices in monopolies. The optimal (Ramsey) access price, for example, 
considers not only the marginal costs but also the price elasticity of demand and the 
substitutability between the full service and partial access to sub-processes. The determination 
of Ramsey charges often fails in practice due to its sophisticated econometric calculation and 
the analysis of costs.148 Whenever regulators try to determine the efficient Ramsey price, they 
face considerable information asymmetries because they have to know price elasticities as 
well as the marginal costs of the operators. This information may be inaccurate or simply not 
available. Crew and Kleindorfer (2006) conclude that expectations from Ramsey price 
regulation and the incentive regulation intended to motivate operators toward more efficient 
pricing and production are limited due to the predominant information asymmetries,. These 
instruments are not likely to result in efficient pricing. According to Knieps (2005), regulators 
should not oblige operators to apply rigid pricing structures since doing so would constrain 
the entrepreneurial initiative for innovative pricing. Furthermore, it is possible that more 
favorable pricing rules and tariff systems can be found in the future. The development of 
innovative pricing schemes should be open to all competitors (incumbents and new entrants) 
and not be hindered by inadequate authorization procedures of regulatory authorities. If some 
pricing systems can be offered exclusively by entrants, this will constitute a structural 
handicap for competition and discrimination for other operators. Moreover, the pricing 
structure of a functioning market has an important signaling effect on new competitors: If 
prices are reduced excessively through price regulation, it may prevent potential competitors 
from market entrance. 
Other factors associated with the development of a market are structural or institutional entry 
restrictions. A general attribute of network industries is that governments (or regulators) grant 
licenses and concessions. The aim of the licensing system is (1) to oblige the operators to 
render a certain level of public services or (2) conversely to limit the scope of the provided 
service. But who defines based on which information what the optimal and efficient number 
                                                 
148 See Elsenbast (1999, p. 59). 
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of operators in the market is? Depending on the criteria applied, there are different effects on 
competition.149 
Another restriction with effects on the market may be the setting of minimum wages. The 
setting of minimum wages in the German postal sector shows that potential competitors have 
not entered the German market.150 This measure and the exemption of Deutsche Post DHL 
from VAT have been criticized by many competitors (especially TNT) as market access 
barriers: Noting that market deregulation in Germany remains incomplete, the Dutch 
government has already postponed complete liberalization twice. The example of Germany 
shows that no new competitors have entered the market and that the opening of a foreign 
postal market has been delayed. 
Other negative consequences of regulatory intervention (and thus constituting cost of 
regulation) may occur by weighing market power and competition distortion against 
efficiencies in the market. Thus, potentially anti-competitive mergers, agreements or business 
practices could also have positive effects on the market. While a merger leads to a higher 
concentration of firms in a market, it might also lower costs through economies of scale. 
Exclusive supply or purchase contracts may result in more efficient sales and improved 
information exchange, but also protect operators from (desired) competition.151 This does not 
imply that competition regulation in general, and merger control in particular, has only 
negative effects on markets. 
5.4.2.  Capacity and Technology Choice 
An excessive regulation with rigid social, regional or even environmental objectives might 
prevent the regulated operators from aligning their supply with the effective demand and 
consumer needs. This may adversely affect investment activities: regulation should provide 
innovation and investment incentives in a manner that allows the companies to exploit their 
investments. As long as the incentives and protective measures are sub-optimal and do not 
protect investments, there is less innovation and no investment in new technologies in the 
sector. In turn, the market may not develop to the desired extent.  
                                                 
149 In 2000, the Swiss government tendered for example four UMTS licenses in the telecom market. Even if 
rational considerations led to the perception that the number of licenses is four, this does not necessarily imply 
that four players are the optimal number of competitors. See Vantomme and Fratini (2008) about licensing 
systems in the postal sector. 
150 See Ecorys (2008a). 
151 See Oxera (2004, p. 15). 
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An illustrative example for this kind of phenomenon is access regulation to monopolistic 
bottlenecks. Access regulation leads to a situation where access prices are under constant 
pressure by the customer. Thus, access customers are interested in low prices that cut their 
costs and enable them to offer their services below the incumbent’s price level. However, the 
owner of the monopolistic bottleneck has been traditionally motivated to negotiate access 
prices in order to maximize profits. The incentives for innovation are therefore negatively 
influenced by the fact that on one hand the facilities’ owner is not interested in developing his 
facilities and pass efficiency gains to rivals at a low price. On the other hand, other operators 
or new entrants have little incentive to invest in their own infrastructure and potential 
substitutes. The problem worsens when regulators set access prices ex ante and on a low 
level. Depending on the characteristics of the industry, it might happen that the more efficient 
market situation results from no regulation rather than from excessively tight regulatory rules. 
Knieps (2005) and Sidak and Spulber (1998) argue that potential new competitors have no 
incentive to enter a market with new technology if they can buy the necessary capacity at the 
same (or even better) conditions from the incumbent and fulfill parts of the services by means 
of the existing infrastructure. This is increasingly the case when entrants have reason to fear 
that the new technology has been substituted by more efficient solutions and therefore 
devaluated in a short time period. Furthermore, the incumbent operators lack incentives to 
invest in the network infrastructure because they can hardly expect to recover their capital 
expenditures. A crucial question related to investments is: Who bears the risks? There are not 
only technological and systemic risks152, but also risks and uncertainties in relation to 
regulation and the socio-political goals of universal service. Investment activities and thus the 
development of an efficient market are seriously constrained if these risks are unilaterally 
borne by the incumbent operators. 
Thus, static-indirect regulatory governance costs are the costs related to: 
- Quantities and Prices: Actions of regulators (or policy makers) can have negative 
effects on the regulated industries and the consumers 
- Capacity and Technology Choice: Regulation may prevent the regulated operators 
from aligning their supply with the effective demand. 
  
                                                 
152 Systemic risk refers to the risks imposed by interdependencies in a system or market, where the failure of a 
single unit or network of entities can cause a cascading failure. 
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Table 7: Summary – Categories of Static-Indirect Governance Costs  
Static Costs of Regulatory Governance (II):  
Indirect Costs 
Category Key Assumption Drivers Components/ Indicators 
Quantities and 
Prices 
Actions of 
regulators (or 
policy makers) can 
have negative 
effects on the 
regulated industries 
and the consumers 
 
- Sector specific 
characteristics 
- Degree of 
liberalization 
- Regulators 
knowledge about the 
industries 
- Regulators economic 
knowledge/ expertise 
- Price regulation 
- Incentives to invest 
in infrastructure for 
operators 
- Labor conditions 
- Degree of competition 
- Regulatory tools to improve 
competition and sustainability 
of public services. 
- Evolution of product prices 
- Market entry barriers 
- Access regimes/ bottleneck 
regulation Capacity and 
Technology 
Choice 
Regulation may 
prevent the 
regulated operators 
from aligning their 
supply with the 
effective demand 
and needs an affect 
investment 
activities 
Source: by author. 
5.5. Dynamic Costs of Regulation 
In addition to the correction of market failure and the protection of a minimum level of public 
service, regulatory institutions also affect incentives for innovation and investment. In 2005, 
in a report on the application of the Postal Directive to the Council and European Parliament, 
the Commission stated that the Directive intends to “remove barriers to competition in the 
postal sector so as to boost innovation and efficiency which in turn should benefit 
consumers” (2).153 An OECD report in 1999 on promoting competition in postal services 
similarly states that “introducing competition in postal services […] has the potential to lead 
to important improvements in efficiency, productivity and innovation within the postal sector 
with consequences for overall welfare and growth” (60). 154 
Regulatory mechanisms do not work adequately in other markets or industries without any 
adjustment. Therefore, the choice of adequate or optimal regulatory tools and mechanisms is 
often related to specific characteristics and the market structure in a particular industry or 
                                                 
153 See European Commission (2005). 
154 See OECD (1999). 
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geographical market. Knieps (2005) argues that many monopolistic bottleneck areas in 
dynamic sectors gradually disappear owing to rapid technological progress. Due to the 
emergence of intermodal competition, it is actually possible for the original need for 
regulatory intervention to disappear. The regulatory interventions (especially their necessity) 
should be reviewed regularly. In this context, two categories of possible regulatory failures 
exist: a “false positive” occurs when regulators intervene in the market while competition is 
functioning and there is no need for intervention; a “false negative” occurs when regulatory 
authorities do not intervene, when the need for regulatory intervention exists from a 
competition-policy point of view. Other potentially negative impacts of regulation arise 
because of a lack of regulatory dynamics.155 If regulated operators link the design of their 
business model too closely to regulatory rules, prices may be deadlocked in the long run. 
Furthermore, the elimination of regulation endangers the companies’ means of existence. 
Today’s regulatory institutions always affect future regulation. By the time the characteristics 
of the monopolistic bottlenecks and network-specific market powers disappear within parts 
(or the entirety) of the network (e.g., due to technological progress), regulatory intervention 
may be obsolete.156 Armstrong and Sappington (2006) state in this context: “Consequently, 
although liberalization should ultimately lead to reduced regulatory oversight and control, 
more pronounced regulatory and antitrust oversight may be required on an interim basis to 
ensure that regulatory policy is tailored appropriately to the evolving level of competition and 
that competition is protected“ (360). The process of so-called “phasing out”157 of sector-
specific regulation may be delayed by regulator’s self-interested behavior and his interest in 
on-going regulation.158 It is fairly obvious that regulators are rarely interested in reducing 
their influence and cutting their own competences. Regulators have some bureaucratic self- 
interest and tend to act in their own interests and contrary to the intentions with which they 
were originally established.159 Bonardi et al. (2006) argue that agency decisions can have 
                                                 
155 See Knieps (2007). 
156 See Knieps (2007, p. 191). 
157 “Phasing Out”: The period of time when the rationale for regulatory intervention is no longer tenable and the 
sector-specific regulation is likely to be abolished. 
158 See Knieps (1997). 
159 Actors react differently to external threats, constraints and opportunities because they differ in their intrinsic 
perceptions and preferences but also because these are shaped by the specific institutional setting within which 
they interact (Scharpf, 1997, p. 37). Crozier (1964) interprets such a behavior as “the active tendency of 
human agent to take advantage, in any circumstances, of all available means to further his own privileges” 
(194).  
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important consequences for stakeholders (especially firms) and that agencies behave 
differently from elected political institutions. Since regulators are generally appointed rather 
than elected, they do not face the election constraints that typically motivate elected 
politicians’ behavior. Mueller (2003) and Wheaterby (1971) emphasize that regulatory 
agencies’ objective functions are multidimensional: regulators tend to maximize their 
budgets, enlarge the number of employees or enhance career prospects and political 
reputations. Wilks and Bartle (2002) argue that the agencies were not expected to be 
extremely active in developing and implementing policies. However, the regulatory agencies 
have become more active than expected and have contributed to policies in the process. 
Another aspect of dynamic costs is regulatory risk. There are not only technological and 
systemic risks, but also risks and uncertainties in relation to regulation and the socio-political 
goals of universal service. Oxera (2004) defines regulatory risk as “the risk that arises when 
the interaction of uncertainty and regulation changes the cost of financing the operations of 
the firm” (16). Investment activities and thus the development of an efficient market are 
seriously constrained if these risks are unilaterally borne by some operators or even solely by 
the incumbent operators.160 
The extent of regulatory risk is strongly related to the modality regulators apply to the 
operators: Inconsistent decisions, new control mechanisms and the application of new 
regulations may result in or lead to an increase in regulatory risk. Previous work on the issue 
with regard to the UK highlights that inconsistencies in the actions of regulators at price 
reviews may result in an increase of cost of capital.161 Furthermore, regulatory risks may 
occur on different levels of regulatory activities. Knieps and Weiss (2008) for example state 
that as long as the competence to specify the areas and the instruments of sector-specific 
regulation is delegated to regulators, a clear and economically-founded regulatory basis will 
not be applied. Following their example, the market power regulation might be either 
oversized or undersized or even leave areas of network specific market unregulated. Another 
example that they examine demonstrates that the application of price-cap regulation in a 
competitive section of markets may reduce economic risks but should be rejected because 
functioning market signals get disturbed. The important questions regarding the dynamic 
costs of regulation are whether adequate regulatory models and methods are implemented, if 
                                                 
160 This is also highly related to the section on investment and technology. 
161 See Oxera (2004) and Bishop et al. (1995).  
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the chosen means are capable of correcting a market failure rather than result in regulatory 
failure and finally if the chosen means set the right incentives for investment and innovation.  
Innovation can generally be interpreted as a form of investment that results in new or better 
quality products and services or in more cost-efficient processes.162 As long as the incentives 
and protective measures are sub-optimal and do not protect investments, there is less 
innovation and no investment in new technologies or products and services in the sector. This 
has in turn the effect that the market does not develop to the desired extent.163 The dynamic 
costs of regulatory governance result from distorted innovation and infrastructure investment 
incentives. The dynamic costs arise as a consequence of direct and indirect costs of regulatory 
governance. They result in an inefficient level of product and process innovation.  
To summarize: Dynamic costs of regulatory governance are the costs and effects related to the 
development of suppliers’ innovation (dynamic costs). Therefore, dynamic costs have a direct 
impact on the degree of innovation at the level of products and processes.  
- Product Innovation: Regulation may prevent operators from introducing new products 
or services because of uncertainty about their investment and pricing. It may also 
result in a delay of time to market. 
- Process Innovation: Regulation may result in suboptimal processes and keep operators 
from optimizing existing processes or introducing process innovations. 
  
                                                 
162 See Friederiszick et al. (2008). 
163 See Armstrong and Sappington (2006) for a detailed examination of the role of innovation in regulated 
industries in general and Dietl et al. (2008) about innovation incentives for postal operators in general. 
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Table 8: Summary – Categories of Dynamic Governance Costs  
Dynamic Costs of Regulatory Governance 
Category Key Assumption Drivers Components/ Indicators 
Product 
Innovation 
Regulation may 
prevent operators 
from introducing 
new 
products/services 
 
- Changing consumer 
needs and demand 
- Technology change 
- Scope of universal 
service 
- Production cost 
structures 
- Regulatory risk  
- Labor conditions 
- Time needed for 
institutional change 
- Political willingness 
for institutional 
change 
 
- Degree of innovation in an 
industry 
- Time to market for new 
products 
- Regulatory tools to improve 
competition and sustainability 
of public services. 
- Institutional changes in the 
regulatory frameworks and 
governance  
 
Process 
Innovation 
Regulation may 
result in suboptimal 
processes and 
prevent operators 
from optimizing 
existing processes 
or introduce 
process 
innovations. 
Source: by author. 
5.6. Conclusion 
By defining regulatory governance costs, we aim to establish a method of comparing 
regulatory institutions in different regimes. We have therefore developed three different types 
of regulatory governance costs: static-direct, static- indirect and the dynamic costs. Direct 
costs of regulatory governance refer to the interaction between the involved actors, and only 
marginally concern the overall markets. The indirect costs act less on the individual actors 
than the overall market. The dynamic costs, on the other hand, influence the future situation 
of product and process innovation. The concept will be tested on the basis of the case studies 
in chapter 6 and then applied in the analysis in chapter 7.  
The following table summarizes the estimated effects of institutional dimensions of regulation 
on direct and indirect costs and subsequently dynamic costs (distorted product and process 
innovation). The assumptions in this section form the basis for the analysis of regulatory 
governance costs in the postal sector.  
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6. EMPIRICAL PART: CASES IN THE POSTAL SECTOR 
In this chapter, the three cases in the postal sector are constructed. It begins with the 
descriptive case on the Swiss postal sector, before the German postal sector is examined. The 
chapter ends with the description of the postal sector in the UK. The analysis of the cases is 
then provided in chapter 7. 
6.1. Case Switzerland 
In this section, the Swiss postal sector is described in detail. The case study starts with a brief 
overview on the historical development of postal matters in Switzerland, before the major 
regulatory obligations are described. The major regulatory obligations are the Universal 
service obligation and its financing mechanisms, the licensing system, price controls, and the 
access regime. This is followed by a paragraph on the institutional design as well as by a short 
section about the process of market opening and the development of competition. Moreover, 
on overview on recent developments and an outlook is provided. The case ends with a brief 
summary. The other cases on Germany and the UK follow the same structure.  
6.1.1.  History 
At the beginning of the 19th century, the postal system of Switzerland was a private concern. 
In Zurich and St. Gallen, there were “merchant’s posts”; in Bern, the Fischer family operated 
the ‘Fischer’sche’ post. In fact, the young entrepreneur Beat Fischer established the first 
postal network in Bern during the second half of the 17th century. He originally envisioned 
taking over the entire Swiss postal network and, based on Switzerland’s geographical 
position, to establish a connection from North to South across the entire continent. He 
therefore concluded contracts with the Republics of Wallis, Geneva and the Principality of 
Neuenburg at an early stage. He also negotiates on cooperation with competitors in other 
states such as Zurich and St. Gallen.164 After having been conquered by French troops in 
1798, Switzerland became a republic divided into 19 cantons. A first law was adopted, 
requiring the government to create a central administration for the postal system. Switzerland 
was then divided into five postal districts.165 However, the Bernese Post, as well as influential 
merchants from Zurich, opposed the centralization of the postal system and demanded high 
financial compensation. Due to the strong opposition, the centralization was postponed and in 
                                                 
164 See Finger (2004). 
165 See Wyss (1988). 
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1803 the central administration dissolved again, leaving the cantons once again responsible 
for postal services. Subsequently, as cooperation between cantons proved difficult,166 postal 
services within the Swiss Confederation became more and more chaotic.167 
After 1830, the cantons nationalized the different private posts. In 1843, the Zurich Post 
issued the first Swiss postage stamps. Previously only England had introduced postage 
stamps. There, the legendary ‘One Penny Black’ was first issued in 1840. In 1847, the Swiss 
postal system consists of 17 different cantonal postal administrations. At that time, the Canton 
of Schaffhausen was part of the German postal territory, served by the German postal dynasty 
Thurn and Taxis. Upon the foundation of the Swiss Confederation in 1848, all cantonal postal 
administrations were unified.168 Article 33 of the Federal Constitution established the federal 
prerogative for the organization of the Swiss postal system: 11 postal districts were created, 
and the Swiss Post was born on 1 January 1849.169 It assumed the central administration of 
passenger transports, as well as the delivery of mail and cash remittances. In 1849, the first 
two federal postal laws were passed: the law on postal regale and another on postal 
organization. For the first time, uniform postal tariffs were applied to the entire postal 
territory. Prices were kept distinctly low and uniform across the country. In 1852, the 
telegraph was introduced in Switzerland and with the Federal Constitution of 1874, the 
responsibilities for the operation of telephone services were assigned to the General Postal 
Directorate.170 
Between 1859 and 1910, the volumes of delivered mail increased by a factor of twenty and 
again by a factor of three leading up to 1950. This mail included letters, newspapers, 
catalogues, postcards, trade-samples, non-registered packages up to one kilo, postal check 
correspondence, collection documents and consignments of valuables.171  
In 1862, the post introduced money orders, which enabled individuals and companies to send 
money within the country and partially abroad. The early influence that money orders had on 
the mail demonstrated the interconnectedness of financial and postal services in Switzerland. 
                                                 
166 At that time there are more than 300 different currencies in Switzerland and more than 400 road and bridge 
tolls are levied. See Finger (2004). 
167 See Wyss (1988, p. 204). 
168 See Knobel (2011). 
169 See Wyss (1988, p. 201). 
170 See Wyss (1988, p. 214). 
171 See Knobel (2011). 
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The law on the postal check and giro service was established in 1906. Based on this law, 
Swiss Post has had to provide basic services in payment transactions through the present 
day.172 
As early as 1849, there were around 1500 post offices in Switzerland, and the federal state 
considerably expands the network beginning in 1850. By 1914, a record number of 4049 post 
offices have been established. Even today, Swiss Post still operates around 2300 access points 
as a mix of independently-operated post offices and partner agencies, making the Swiss 
network of post offices one of the densest worldwide.173 
After the European Commission presented the Green Paper of postal enterprises in 1992, in 
which it distinguished between universal service and competitive service, Switzerland, too, 
began to discuss the organization of the postal enterprise and the service public. Already at an 
early stage, representatives from the business world advocated a privatization of the post, 
admitting at once that such an option would not be politically enforceable. An expert’s report 
recommended that Switzerland also distinguish between basic and competitive services. The 
postal universal services are part of the Swiss “service public” and define what services the 
post has to provide for citizens. These services were divided into reserved monopoly services 
and non-reserved services: the non-reserved services were also open to private postal 
operators, but the post was under obligation to provide it. Today about two-dozen enterprises 
are mainly active in the package business.174 
At the end of the 20th century, technical developments in communication, the simultaneous 
worldwide liberalization fostered by the WTO, and the emergence of a single European 
market called for structural changes within the Swiss postal and telecommunications network. 
In a total revision, the laws are adapted to the new conditions. In 1997, a new postal services 
act was presented in Switzerland. Subsequently, the two units in charge of the postal, 
telephone and telegraph services, the postal business, and the telecommunication services 
were separated into two different enterprises. As a result, the telecommunication sector was 
given the status of a limited company in 1998, the same year that Swisscom went public. The 
postal system was newly-regulated in both a technical ordinance (Postal Services Act) and an 
organizational ordinance (Postal Organization Act of 30 April 1997). 
                                                 
172See Wyss (1988, p. 281). 
173 See Knobel (2011). 
174 See Knobel (2011). 
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Through this restructuring process, Swiss Post developed from an organizational federal unit 
to a federal enterprise and finally to an independent enterprise. In 2002, the Federal Council, 
in a national overview, took stock of the 1998 postal reform, which was basically seen as a 
success. In this overall view, the Federal Council planned to open up the market in two steps: 
- first, the package market was to be fully opened by 2004, 
- second, the same was to be done for the letter market in 2006, with the exception of 
addressed letters of up to 100 g. 
For definitive decisions regarding market opening, the Federal Council reserved the right to 
commission an evaluation of market opening steps taken so far before he further opens the 
postal market for letters. A further market opening also called for regulatory adjustments. 
Switzerland had previously known no sector-specific regulatory authority for the postal 
market. With an amendatory ordinance to the postal services act, the Federal Council created 
the postal regulatory authority, PostReg.175 
In 2004, the service contract of the post was supplemented with an infrastructure contract in 
Article 2 of the postal services act. Since then, the post has been obligated to operate a 
countrywide network of post offices, ensuring that universal services are available in all 
regions to all segments of the population and at reasonable prices. 
Prior to a gradual opening of the market for letters 100g or less, an evaluation report on the 
already realized effects of the market opening had been commissioned. In this report, 
published in 2005, WIK Consulting concluded that lowering the monopoly for addressed 
letters to 100g does not jeopardize the universal services and their funding.176 Following this 
recommendation, the Federal Council opened the market to letters of up to 100g as of 1 April 
2006. 
In 2009, the Federal Council revised the Postal Services Ordinance again. In it, the Federal 
Council reduced the postal monopoly for letters from 100 grams to 50 grams, effective as of 1 
July 2009. As an accompanying measure, the Federal Council strengthened the postal 
regulatory authority. The Federal Council proposed to parliament to open the market fully on 
occasion of the total revision of the postal laws.177 
                                                 
175 See Swiss Federal Council (2009). 
176 See WIK (2005). 
177 See Detec (2009). 
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In the course of this revision in the years 2010-2013, Swiss Post is to be converted into a 
limited company under special law. At the same time, the sector for financial services, 
PostFinance as limited company under private law, is to be hived off and placed under the 
control of the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority. As a state-owned enterprise, 
Swiss Post has always been subject to political influence.  
Today, the incumbent operator Swiss Post is an autonomous public corporation, owned 
entirely by the Swiss Confederation. Its transformation into a limited company under special 
law is decided within the revision of the Swiss postal legislation. Swiss Post operates within 
the institutional limits laid down by the federal legislation. The government not only 
determines the scope of postal products, services and prices of universal services, but also 
defines the strategic objectives of Swiss Post every four years.178 
6.1.2.  Major Regulatory Obligations 
After having set forth the historical development of the postal market and the relevant 
institutions, we will now present the main regulatory obligations in the Swiss postal market. 
179 Since Switzerland is not a member of the EU, it is not obliged to implement the directives 
of the European Commission. However, it often does consider a similar timing, following the 
European philosophy of liberalization. The current law reform is to ensure universal service 
as well as to promote competition. The parcel market has been fully liberalized in 2004. An 
intermediate step of market opening was the reduction of the reserved area down to 50g from 
July 2009 onwards.180 Depending on the further course of the law’s revision, the full 
liberalization of the Swiss postal market is not to be expected before the end of 2014.  
Universal Service Obligations and Financing Mechanisms 
According to the Postal Services Act, Swiss Post is under the obligation to provide basic 
postal services. The incumbent has to meet various requirements regarding universal services, 
which include postal services, payment transactions, and public transport. At the same time, 
Swiss Post is required to consider regional interests. 
                                                 
178 See IPC (2011) and the Federal Act on Swiss Post’s organization. 
179 The statements refer to current provisions. Planned updates during the revision of the laws will be treated 
later on in this chapter. 
180 From July 2009, the reserved area contains addressed domestic and inbound letters up to a weight of 50g. 
Non-reserved universal services are addressed letters (domestic and inbound) heavier than 50g, parcels up to 
20 kg and all outbound letters. See Swiss Federal Council (2009). 
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Postal Services: Paragraph two of the Postal Services Act of 1997 regulates the requirements 
to be met by the postal universal service. As introduced above, the Postal Services Law 
divides the universal service into a reserved sector, in which only the post may be active 
(monopoly for addressed domestic letters and letters of up to 50 g received from abroad) and 
into a non-reserved sector. The latter includes addressed domestic letters and letters received 
from abroad over 50 g, letters sent abroad, subscription newspapers and journals with regular 
delivery and packages up to 20 kg. The post must offer services in the non-reserved sector, 
though there it faces competition from private operators. 
Delivery of items is required on every workday and at a minimum of five times per week. The 
Postal Ordinance requires the universal service provider (USP) to deliver mail and parcels at 
least five days per week; subscription or press items, such as newspapers and magazines are 
delivered six days per week. Additionally, Swiss Post decided to deliver priority mail six days 
per week as well, with collection being required every workday, at least five times per week. 
Delivery must be made to all residential households occupied all year-round.181 
Payment Services: In Switzerland, financial services are part of the universal services. 
Payments-in, payments-out and money transfers are considered universal services within 
payment transactions. They have to be provided by the network of post offices. 
Infrastructure: The prerequisite for the basic services is an area-wide network of post offices. 
The post must ensure that the universal services are available in all regions, to all groups of 
the population, and at a reasonable distance. Consequently, Swiss Post is required to operate a 
nationwide post office network. As a rule, on average at least 90 percent of the population 
must be able to reach a post office within twenty minutes by foot or public transport. When 
measuring such availability, postal agencies were placed on the same level as post offices, 
though there are no legal requirements regarding the relationship between post offices and 
agencies. Furthermore, the new postal act requires at least one letterbox per locality.182 
Public Transport: As a further task outside the postal legislation, the post has to ensure 
regular passenger road transport. This is provided by Swiss Post’s public transportation unit 
                                                 
181 See Postal Act (1997a). 
182 See Swiss Federal Council (2004). 
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PostBus. For this, the unit PostBus receives compensations within the legislation on public 
transport.183 
Table 10: Universal Service Obligations in Switzerland 
Legal Statute Products Delivery of Items Postal Network 
The Postal Act of 
1997 and the 
Revised federal 
ordinance of 2004 
 
- The conveyance of 
addressed letters 
and 
- Addressed parcels 
up to 20 kg  
- Newspapers and 
magazines;  
- Outbound 
international letters 
- Financial 
transactions. 
- Reserved Area: 
Standard letters and 
direct Mail up to 
50g and priority 
tariff x 3  
- Conveyance every 
working day, at least five 
times a week (six times for 
newspapers and priority 
mail) 
- Delivery to all residential 
areas occupied all year-
round  
 
- A nationwide physical 
post office network 
according to the needs 
of the population and 
the economy 
- At least 90 % of the 
population must be 
able to reach a post 
office within twenty 
minutes by foot or on 
public transport on 
average 
Source: IPC (2011). 
The current Postal Act foresees a multistage model for funding the universal service: 
1. Earnings from the monopoly – the reserved sector of the universal services up to 50g 
2. Earnings from non-reserved services 
3. Earnings from competitive services 
4. Levying of license fees on the turnovers of private operators in the non-reserved 
sector, if below-cost selling in the universal service can be proven  
Today, the basic services in Switzerland are funded exclusively by the monopoly earnings.184  
Licensing System 
Paragraph 3 of the Postal Act and Paragraph 7 of the Postal Ordinance regulate concession 
agreements in the Swiss postal market. The Swiss Post needs no concession, because it is 
under the direct obligation from the Postal Act to provide the basic services in the reserved 
                                                 
183 The obligation of providing a universal service in public transport is mentioned for the sake of completeness. 
In the following discussions we exclude the public transport obligation and the ‘universal service’ includes 
postal and payment services only. See DETEC (2009). 
184 See Swiss Federal Council (2009). 
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and non-reserved sector.185 If private operators regularly and commercially forward items 
within the universal service and, in doing so, achieve a turnover liable to VAT of at least CHF 
100 000, they need a concession. Competitive services −express deliveries in particular− do 
not require a concession. If the companies do not attain the turnover of CHF 100 000 they are 
subject to a simple obligation to report. In order to obtain a concession, enterprises must 
substantiate the logistic and financial means, comply with the applicable laws and 
concessional terms as well as guarantee labor conditions customary in trade for their own 
employees and those of their subcontractors. 
Thus, the licensing obligation serves as an instrument for the surveillance of the providers of 
postal services particularly to control the compliance with statutory provisions and minimum 
standards required by employment law. As mentioned above, in case of proven below-cost 
selling of basic services, fees as a contribution to funding of basic services may be levied 
from the concessionaires. 
Price Controls 
Sectoral price regulation in Switzerland is limited to monopoly services. Basically, Swiss Post 
can fix the prices for services according to economic principles. For services within the 
reserved sector, they must obtain authorization from the competent ministry, the Federal 
Department of Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications. The prices have to be 
(1) independent of the delivery distance, (2) cost-covering and (3) defined according to the 
same principles. In addition, the ministry fixes the reduced prices for the daily delivery of 
newspapers.186  
Every year, the post must prove that the products provided under competition are not cross-
subsidized by universal services. This proof must also be furnished to the regulator, when and 
if they suspect cross-subsidization in individual cases. 
Access Regime 
Existing legislation does not regulate access to the postal infrastructure. Hence, there are no 
requirements regarding access to the incumbent’s infrastructure for alternative operators. 
Competitors negotiate access conditions on an individual, commercial basis. For instance, 
                                                 
185 See PostReg (2011). 
186 The delivery of newspapers in ordinary daily delivery is subsidized by the government with 30 million Swiss 
Francs per year. Early delivery of Newspapers is not subsidized by federal press aid.  
Chapter 6 - Empirical Part: Cases in the Postal Sector 
107 
already today the post grants DHL access to its post-office boxes at negotiated conditions.187 
However, the new postal act foresees that technical188 access to receiver’s address information 
and post-office boxes will eventually be regulated. 
6.1.3.  Institutional Setting and Actors  
The Postal Act and the Postal Organization Act regulate the rights and duties of the Swiss 
Post and the relationship to its owner. In the 2003 Postal Ordinance, the Federal Council 
defined the specification of important Directives of the Postal Act and an extension of the 
regulatory frame.189 Two authorities provide postal compliance with its basic service 
obligations: the Post Regulator PostReg and the Commission Post Offices. The Federal 
Council constituted the Post Regulator (PostReg) and the Commission Post Offices, effective 
1 January 2004, in order to assume the regulatory tasks of the postal market. Prior to this, 
there was no sector-specific regulatory authority for the postal market in Switzerland. 
PostReg now regularly examines the quality of universal services and treats complaints from 
citizens regarding basic services. In controversial cases of post offices being closed down, the 
Commission Post Offices investigates if the criteria of postal legislation are complied with. 
Other actors are the Competition Commission (ComCom) and the price supervisor, which are 
both functionally independent but organizationally accountable to the government. Since the 
State is the formal owner of the incumbent postal operator Swiss Post, the Federal Council is 
involved in the financial control of the incumbent and responsible for the appropriation of its 
profits. The ministry responsible for the postal sector is the Federal Department for 
Environment, Transport, Energy and Communication (DETEC).190  
- The sector-specific regulator (PostReg) is functionally independent but 
organizationally attached to the DETEC.191 The further opening of the package and 
letter market called for regulatory adjustments, which the Federal Council 
implemented in 2003 with a new Postal Ordinance, creating the Post Regulatory 
                                                 
187 See Swiss Post (2009). 
188 See Chapter 2. 
189 See WIK (2005). 
190 Other at least partially involved, ministries are the Department of Finance (FDF) in its function as part owner 
of the incumbent and the Department of Economic Affairs (FDEA), which is the governmental principal of the 
competition commission and the price supervisor. 
191 The European Postal Directive requests a complete separation between the regulators and the regulated 
company. 
Regulatory Institutions and Governance Costs: The Case of the Postal Sector 
108 
Authority (PostReg). The authority monitors the Swiss postal market and ensures the 
provision of high-quality and affordable universal services. It deals with complaints 
from the public about universal services and ensures a fair and functioning 
competition in the postal market (by controlling, for instance, the operators’ 
compliance with sector-specific labor conditions or the prohibition of cross-
subsidization). In addition, the authority provides policy advice to the DETEC. The 
Department is simultaneously responsible for the Swiss Confederation’s owner 
interests and for the sector-specific regulator PostReg.192  
- The ComCom, a group of twelve experts from different disciplines, manages 
competition regulation in the classical sense (ex-post regulatory intervention in anti-
trust and abuse of dominant position matters). The commission’s main tasks are the 
elimination of harmful cartels, monitoring dominant or monopolistic companies for 
signs of anti-competitive behavior, enforcing merger control legislation and 
preventing the imposition of restraints of competition by the state.  
- As mentioned above, Switzerland established the function of the so-called price 
supervisor (Mr. Price), who has the authority to sanction prices in the public sector 
and among firms with significant market power in an ex-ante manner. 
In the course of the total revision of postal legislation, the regulatory authority will be 
reorganized by mid-2012. According to this reorganization, the PostCom commission will be 
introduced, similar to those already established in the infrastructural sectors energy and 
telecommunications (Elcom and ComCom).193 PostCom will assume the tasks of the present 
Commission Post Offices and the PostReg.  Moreover, the commission is given an office used 
to prepare the commission’s business operations. The PostCom is no longer responsible for 
monitoring the basic payment services. This task is transferred to an office in the DETEC and 
in the future will be assumed by the Federal Office of Communications (BAKOM). The 
(BAKOM) will also take over the policy-advice functions for the DETEC. In addition, an 
                                                 
192 See WIK (2005, p. 11). But some substantial regulatory responsibilities concerning price regulation outside 
the reserved area are subject to the price supervisor, which acts in complete independence from the DETEC 
and the Federal Council.  
193 E.g., Elcom (2012) or Comcom (2012). 
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arbitration board will be installed. In the future, the arbitration board can be consulted in case 
of disputes between operators and consumers.194 
6.1.4.  Market Opening and Development of the Postal Market 
The gradual opening of the postal market since 1998 has brought about changes in 
Switzerland’s market situation. Various private operators succeeded in conquering market 
shares in individual sub-segments (courier and express services, package market). Especially 
in the courier and express market, opened in 1998, competition has established itself. In the 
package market, fully opened in 2004, growing competition can also be observed. Here, the 
market share of private operators amounted to 19 percent in 2010, having only slightly 
increased since the opening of the package market. The share of concessionaires in the market 
for packages sent abroad has a volume of more than 75 percent. Deutsche Post Global Mail 
(Switzerland) AG and DPD (Switzerland) Ltd cover the major part of this share.195 
The letter market shows the weakest development of competition, primarily because it was 
opened up to a monopoly limit of 100g only in 2006. This opening made only about 12 
percent of the entire letter volume accessible to competitors In the first year after the 
monopoly was lowered, the post still held 99 percent of the market shares. Data provided by 
Swiss Post shows that since the monopoly was lowered in 2009, about 24 percent (29 percent 
with respect to turnover) of all domestically-addressed letters were are open to competition in 
2010.   
Although more concessionaires have been active in the Swiss letter market since the reduction 
of the monopoly, the development of competition has been slow. According to data provided 
by Swiss Post and the concessionaires for the business year 2010, the entire volume of the 
letter market in the basic services sector amounts to 2.65 (2009: 2.7918) billion items, with a 
turnover of CHF 2.25 (2009: 2.32) billion. Just less than 8 percent of the entire quantity of 
letters are those sent abroad; 6 percent are those coming from abroad. 
By far the biggest sub-segment of basic postal services −with respect to volumes of items and 
turnover− is the market for domestically-addressed letters. According to information provided 
by Swiss Post and the concessionaires, the volume in 2010 amounts to 2.37 items, with a 
                                                 
194 See Swiss Federal Council (2009). The new Postal Act will be treated later in this chapter in the paragraph on 
current developments. 
195 See PostReg (2010). 
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turnover of CHF 1.86 billion.196 Based on the remaining monopoly, the end-to-end 
competition has hardly developed.197 Nevertheless, a first competitor named Quickmail 
entered the letter market, targeting addressed mail heavier than 50g, catalogues and customer 
magazines. Quickmail operates a business model with focus on business customers: 
customers hand in their mail items on Mondays and Tuesdays, the volumes are sorted in a 
single sorting centre in Eastern Switzerland on Tuesdays and Wednesdays. The delivery is 
carried out on Thursdays and Fridays. In January 2010, Quickmail covered 6.3 percent of 
Swiss households. Quickmail planned to expand its network to 30 percent of households by 
the end of 2010 and to 85 percent by the end of 2011. In the early entrance phases, Quickmail 
centralized its operations and delivered in three cantons only.198 
6.1.5.  Recent Developments and Outlook 
The most important development, without doubt, was the new postal legislation with the new 
Postal Act and the new Postal Organization Act. According to the new Postal Organization 
Act, the post is to will be converted into a limited company. By doing this, Switzerland 
follows the European trend toward corporatization. In its dispatch on the Postal Organization, 
the Federal Council writes: with a new Postal Organization Act, the Swiss Post is to obtain 
the legal basis required to meet the manifold challenges of the future.199 The Postal 
Organization Act also anticipated separating the postal financial service provider PostFinance 
and converting it into a limited company. At the same time, it is put under the control of the 
regular Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority, Finma. The Postal Act regulates (1) 
the new market organization, (2) the universal services, and defines (3) the organization and 
interaction of authorities. 
Market Organization:  
The new Postal Act regulates access to post-office boxes and address information. In the 
future, the conditions of the Act are to be negotiated between competitors on a commercial 
basis. The future postal regulation authority PostCom will be able to terminate contract 
negotiations, if the parties cannot reach an agreement. Furthermore, the new organization 
foresees no regulated partial service access to the further postal infrastructure and leaves it to 
                                                 
196 See PostReg (2010). 
197 See WIK (2010, p. 9).  
198 See Maegli (2010). 
199 See Swiss Federal Council (2009). 
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the operators to negotiate this point. This corresponds to the European Postal Directive. In 
addition, the Act regulates the reporting system and the operators’ duty to supply information 
to the regulator. With respect to labor conditions, all postal service providers are under the 
obligation to conduct negotiations on a collective labor agreement with personnel 
associations.    
Universal Service  
In a paragraph on universal services, the Act regulates the requirements concerning the area-
wide network of access points, delivery and the promotion of press. Regarding the 
accessibility of post offices and agencies, the 90/20-rule will probably remain in place. The 
act also contains a paragraph on countrywide basic financial services, which have to be 
provided by the Swiss Post. The new act does not propose a different financing mechanism 
for the universal service as residual monopoly to 50g, as alternative financing models were 
eliminated during parliamentary discussions. The funds solution, planned at first, was 
dropped after the total market opening was postponed. It is foreseeable conceivable that due 
to decreasing letter quantities, the letter monopoly in the long term will not suffice to fund the 
universal service and alternatives will have to be sought. This implies financing risks not only 
for the incumbent but also for the competitors. If an enterprise wants to enter the postal 
market today, it does not know in which form it will have to contribute to the funding of basic 
services. Hence, there are uncertainties about the time after the abolition of the residual 
monopoly.  
Organization of Authorities  
The Postal Act creates the new regulatory authority PostCom with a technical secretariat. In 
the new postal legislation, its tasks are specified and in particular it is determined what duties 
to provide PostCom with information the post and the private providers of postal services 
have. PostCom must procure information in order to perform its core tasks: 
- monitoring the quality of basic services 
- observing the development of the postal market with the purpose of ensuring the 
provision of the country with postal services. 
In addition, PostCom is to install an arbitration board for customers and postal enterprises. 
Administratively, PostCom is attached to the General Secretariat DETEC. While the future 
PostCom will be given new tasks within the new legislation, it no longer has to accomplish 
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today’s tasks in the area policy and international affairs. In the future, these tasks will be 
managed by the Specialized Unit Post in BAKOM, which will also be responsible for press 
promotion duties. With BAKOM, the specialized Unit for postal services, a new actor is 
created, which, in addition to policy tasks (such as the further development of general 
regulatory conditions), assumes roles associated with the control of basic postal and payment 
services. BAKOM is also expected to coordinate the participation and distribution of roles in 
international bodies (e.g., UPU) and, in particular, to assume press promotion tasks which in 
the past were the responsibility of the post.200 Organizationally, the specialized unit is 
attached to BAKOM. This institutional separation ensures that regulatory tasks (PostCom), 
policy tasks (BAKOM) and owner function (General Secretariat DETEC) are managed by 
different organizations.201 
On one hand, the future legislation will separate owner function, policy function and 
monitoring. On the other, thanks to the new specialized unit in the BAKOM (with monitoring 
function and press promotion tasks), an actor is created who accomplishes both executive and 
policy tasks. BAKOM will monitor the accessibility of basic payment services, and PostCom 
will do the same for the basic postal services. A new arbitration board will be created. In 
addition, Price Supervisor and ComCom will continue to play their roles in the postal market. 
There is still no clear delimitation. Moreover, in this environment, another actor, the bank 
regulator FINMA, will pursue its interests within universal financial services and their 
funding. Moreover, by converting Swiss Post into a limited company, the new legislation 
causes the post to be subject to taxation. Consequently, tax authorities will increasingly 
become a stakeholder of the postal enterprise.202 In the new institutional setting, the number 
of involved authorities has increased. 
6.1.6.  Summary of Institutional Dimensions in Switzerland 
The Swiss postal market is in transition. A new legislation will be implemented in the 
summer of 2012, which will convert the Swiss Post into a limited company under special law 
as of 1 January 2013. Static regulatory costs can be said to be relatively high due to the many 
actors involved. With respect to dynamic costs in the Swiss postal market, however, few 
                                                 
200 In the present organization, the post assumes conflicting roles: on hand it is provider of delivery services in a 
competitive market, on the other hand it is responsible for the execution of legislator’s press-political 
directives. 
201 See Swiss Federal Council (2009).  
202 See Swiss Federal Council (2009). 
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conclusions can be drawn, largely because the letter market is in a transitional phase. The 
impacts are not yet clear and therefore cannot yet be estimated and determined. The following 
table briefly summarizes the institutional dimensions. 
Table 11: Institutional Dimensions of the Postal Market in Switzerland 
Institutional 
Dimensions & Cost 
Drivers 
Summary of Characteristics 
Number of Regulatory 
Actors 
High number of actors involved, with even more regulatory actors anticipated in 
the future 
Modalities and Subject 
of information exchange 
Different among regulatory actors, ranging from institutionalized information 
exchange to ad-hoc information 
Interaction of sector-
specific regulation and 
competition law 
Not clear. Three actors involved (Postreg, Price Supervisor, ComCo) 
Regulatory Processes  
 
Different interests in price regulation; extensive reporting  
Stability of Institutions 
(Organizational 
Perspective) 
Very stable in general, though subject to change in 2012 
Scope of Universal 
Service Obligation 
Relatively wide; not in postal product definition but including financial 
transactions and in unique definition of accessibility to the network  
Degree of 
Liberalization 
Monopoly up to 50g; partly liberalized in 2009 
Financing of the USO 
 
Reserved area up to 50g; Self-financing through incumbent; Concession levys 
US Price Regulation 
 
Sector-specific: only for prices in the reserved area and reduced price for press 
distribution; 
Cross-sectoral: antitrust law and price supervisor outside the reserved area 
Access Regime No access regulation for incumbent’s infrastructure, commercial agreements 
between competitors; access for information about address information and P.O. 
Boxes in future law. 
Stability of Institutions 
(Policy Perspective) 
Very stable 
Norms and 
Standardization 
requirements 
Standardization requirements for quality measures concerning the universal 
service 
Labor Conditions Collective labor agreement between incumbent and trade unions; Control of 
compliance with customary labor conditions, relatively high average wages 
compared to other sectors; Public and private law contracts  
Source: by author. 
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6.2. Case Germany 
This section contains the case on the German sector. The case is organized in the same 
structure as the previous case and starts with an overview on the historical development of the 
German postal sector. 
6.2.1.  History 
The modern postal system originates in Germany. Franz von Taxis and his successors from 
the Taxis dynasty installed by order of the widely-ramified Habsburg family a courier 
network, which by the middle of the 16th century had been expanded to cover all of Western 
Europe. At distances of a day’s journey, fixed postal stations were established and gained 
considerable economic importance over time.203 In 1646, the Prussian state post was founded. 
Elector Friedrich Wilhelm introduced the first postal regime, which organized a regular postal 
service between Berlin, Münster, Osnabrück, Kleve and Königsberg. With this edict, private 
persons, particularly merchants, were authorized to send their letters with this electoral 
post.204 By introducing the first postal regime, Friedrich Wilhelm defied the state monopoly 
on the post. In fact, Prussia took over the entire postal rights from the Thurn und Taxis family 
in 1867. The “Thurn and Taxis”-era came to an end: postal services were converted into the 
then newly-founded North German Federal Post.205 
When the German Empire was founded in 1871, it introduced a postal law for the entire 
empire, regulating tasks and service of the imperial post. This development led to a kind of 
monopoly. By 1899, the Empire had prohibited all other commercial institutions that 
accomplished postal tasks.206 In 1924, according to the State Finance Law, the German 
imperial post was integrated into the State Post Ministry as an independent enterprise. After 
the end of World War II, the post was reorganized under the control of the Allies: The Federal 
Post Office as a state enterprise with public functions was tasked with the accomplishment of 
national and international postal and telecommunication services. The services were divided 
into three sectors: the German Federal Post Office Postal Service, the Post Office Bank and 
the Post Office Telephony.       
                                                 
203 See North (1988, p. 31ff). 
204 See North (1988, p. 36). 
205 See Deutsche Post DHL (2012b). 
206 Ibidem. 
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Within the first postal reform, the German Federal Post Office was restructured by the Postal 
Structure Law of 1 July 1989. The former German Federal Post Office was divided into the 
sectors German Federal Post Office Postal Service, German Federal Post Office Bank and 
German Federal Post Office Telekom. In 1990, on the occasion of the German reunification, 
the German Post Office in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) became part of the 
German Federal Post Office. To this day, the headquarters are in Bonn.207 
In 1995, the second postal reform went into effect. This was mainly an administrative reform, 
aimed at strengthening the competitiveness and productivity of the postal enterprises. For this 
purpose, the former postal enterprises were converted into limited companies under private 
law.208 The Federal Government kept the majority of shares for at least five years, though 
private shareholders were essentially permitted. A sale of shares was to take place slowly and 
in increments. The Postal Services Ltd. was under obligation to continue to provide 
countrywide postal and infrastructural services. Simultaneously, the Federal Posts and 
Telecommunications Agency was founded. It had to represent the interests of the Federal 
Government as a shareholder in the three limited companies. At the time, the required 
regulatory tasks were performed by a division within the Federal Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications. The focus of this second postal reform was on privatization and the 
preparations for further liberalization of the postal markets and on the external liberalization 
pressure exerted by the European Commission.209  
A new postal law was adopted in the course of the third reform in December 1997. This 
reform resulted not only in a further opening of the postal market in 1998, making Germany a 
pioneer in liberalizing the European postal markets; it also dissolved the Federal Ministry of 
Posts and Telecommunications in 1997. The regulatory tasks were transferred to a new 
regulatory authority for telecommunications and post, the Federal Network Agency, which 
still functions today.210 The considerations behind this development were sector-specific: 
basic countrywide postal services at affordable prices were to be guaranteed.211 
In advance of the decision to transfer the responsibilities to the Federal Network Agency, 
experts and politicians discussed the transference of the regulatory tasks to the Federal Cartel 
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Office. However, the idea to give the responsibilities for universal service supervision to the 
cartel office was dismissed, because a pure competition authority like the Federal Cartel 
Office might be unable to cope with such a regulation.212 In the summer of 2005, the office 
was made responsible, in addition to the regulation of telecommunication networks and postal 
services, for the energy regulation (power and gas): It was therefore renamed Federal 
Network Agency. Since 2006, the Federal Network Agency has also been responsible for 
surveying the access to the railway infrastructure; hence, it is called the Federal Network 
Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railways.213 
Germany originally planned to open the market completely as early as 2002. However, since 
other European countries followed considerably slower liberalization schedules, the German 
Government decided to reduce their letter monopoly gradually until end of 2007, opening the 
market completely on 1 January 2008.214 
As mentioned above, the privatization of the Deutsche Post was initiated by the second postal 
reform, which hit its peak when the enterprise went public in 2000. The steps toward 
privatization and the related expansion of the Deutsche Post shaped the German postal market 
and made the Deutsche Post one of the biggest logistic groups worldwide.215 
In 1998, after its conversion into a limited company, the Deutsche Post participated in the 
express company DHL International Ltd with a share of about 25 percent. This established the 
basis for a strategic cooperation between Europe’s largest postal enterprise and the worldwide 
market leader for international courier deliveries. The courier enterprise DHL was founded in 
San Francisco in 1969. With a new business idea, the foundation was laid for a company 
operating worldwide. At the same time, a new industrial branch of international air express 
service–that is, the quick transport of documents and the use of airplanes to deliver said 
documents–emerges.216 DHL quickly expanded its network across the world. As of 1979 
DHL extended its services to offer the delivery of not only document, but packages as well. In 
1999, the Deutsche Post further invested in the establishment of a worldwide logistic 
                                                 
212 See Cox (1999, p. 94ff). 
213 See Federal Network Agency (2012). 
214 See Brandt et al. (2007, p. 66). 
215 The following historical information regarding the development of the German Post was taken from Deutsche  
Post DHL (2012b).  
216 Initially, the company founders transport freight documents personally by aircraft from San Francisco to 
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network: it purchased the Swiss logistic company Danzas, as well as the biggest American 
service provider in the field of international air freight, Air Express International (AEI).  
At the end of 1998, the Federal Government sold its shares in the Postbank AG to the 
Deutsche Post AG. In November 2000 the Deutsche Post AG went public, the largest going 
public in Germany and the third largest worldwide. In early 2001 Deutsche Post increased its 
share in DHL to 75 percent. At the end of 2002, DHL became a one hundred percent 
subsidiary of the Deutsche Post. In 2003, the Deutsche Post concentrated its entire express 
and logistic business under the DHL brand.217  
In June 2004, Postbank went public, effectively representing one of the biggest IPO 
announcements ever in the German capital market. In the same year, the international letter 
services began to be operated under a new overall brand: Deutsche Post Global Mail became 
DHL Global Mail. In December 2005, the Deutsche Post took over the British logistic group 
Exel. Around 111,000 employees worked for Exel in 135 countries. In June 2005, an 
additional 126.5 million shares of the Deutsche Post were sold; as a result, more than 53.8 
percent of all postal shares were then held by diverse shareholders. By 2010, the Federal 
Government still held 30.5 percent of the shares via the Reconstruction Loan Corporation 
(KfW).218 
In 2008, DHL began operating its own European air-freight hub at the Leipzig/Halle airport. 
Since 2009, the Deutsche Post operates under the name Deutsche Post DHL. That same year, 
the Deutsche Post AG sold a minimum participation in Postbank of 22.9 percent to Deutsche 
Bank. Over the next three years, Deutsche Bank had the option of taking over an additional 
27.4 percent of Postbank. In this way, Deutsche Post gradually withdrew from the bank 
business and began to focus on logistics. Due to this consistent extension of the logistic 
network, the Deutsche Post DHL became the leading postal and logistic group worldwide. In 
2010, a group turnover of more than 51 billion Euros was generated. In addition, the Deutsche 
Post DHL employs a staff of more than 470,000 in over 220 countries, making it one of the 
world’s largest employers.219   
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6.2.2.  Major Regulatory Obligations 
Universal Service Obligations and Financing Mechanisms 
The German Postal Act was unique insofar as the Deutsche Post was not under the exclusive 
obligation to provide universal service and the provision of the universal service relied on 
market forces. The universal service products were defined in the PUDLV (Postal Universal 
Service Ordinance), as letters up to a weight of 2000 g, as well as newspapers, journals and 
packages up to a weight of 20 kg. For letters, additional services, such as registered, insured 
and cash-on-delivery items, were also part of the universal service. The items of the universal 
service must be delivered at least every working day, i.e. six times per week. The quality 
requirements for priority items (E+1) dictated that at least 80 percent of the items were to be 
delivered on time, with 95 percent for non-priority items.220  
Regarding the access points, the PUDLV specified the following: nationwide 12 000 
permanent postal facilities must exist nationwide; there must be at least one post office in 
municipalities with more than 2000 residents; in communities with more than 4000 
inhabitants, a mailbox should be reachable within a 1000 meter distance; and, finally, in 
developed contiguous areas, a mailbox should be available within one kilometer. 
In Germany, the regulatory authority was not permitted to take steps with respect to the 
universal service obligation, as long as the basic services were guaranteed through market 
forces without a universal service obligation. The Postal Act specified that the universal 
service be provided by the DP AG and by other contractors. So de jure there is no explicit 
obligation for the Deutsche Post, de facto the Deutsche Post provides it on a voluntary basis 
(no designated operator). However, the Deutsche Post was under the obligation to announce, 
within a six-month period if it could no longer provide certain parts of the universal service. 
As soon as this was the case or the universal service was no longer properly guaranteed, the 
regulatory authority had to commit a postal enterprise to provide the missing services. The 
Federal Network Agency investigated if a licensee was prepared to provide the universal 
services without compensation. If no enterprise volunteers, one or several enterprises can be 
committed. However, this happens on condition that these licensees have a market 
dominating position. The corresponding procedure is provided for in the Postal Act.221 The 
German Postal Act contains no specific directives regarding the calculation of net costs for 
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the universal service. If the licensee suffers a deficit due to the obligation to provide the 
universal service, he may request compensation by the other licensees in the form of a fonds 
solution.222 
In a WIK report (2009b) titled “The role of regulators in a more competitive market,” the 
German example is called best practice with respect to “reliance on market forces to ensure 
universal service where feasible” (284).  
Table 12: Universal Service Obligations in Germany 
Legal Statute Products Delivery of Items Postal Network 
- Postal Act 
amended 22nd 
1997 
- Postal Universal 
Service 
Ordinance 
amended 15th 
December 1999 
- Postal Rates 
Regulation 
Ordinance 6th 
October 1999 
- Postal License 
Fees Ordinance 
4th February 
2002 
- Postal Services 
Ordinance 21st 
August 2001 
 
 
 
- Conveyance of items 
of correspondence up 
to 2 kg (including 
registered, insured and 
cash-on-delivery 
items) 
-  newspapers and 
magazines  
- addressed parcels up 
to 20 kg. 
 
- Once per day from 
Monday to Saturday 
- Delivery has to be 
provided to the 
residence or business 
premises of the 
addressee 
- 12,000 fixed location 
facilities, with at least 
1 permanent facility in 
any municipality with 
more than 2,000 
residents 
- Customers in any 
municipality with more 
than 4,000 residents or 
in adjoining built-up 
areas shall in general 
be able to reach a 
permanent facility 
within no more than 
2,000 m 
- Additionally, in every 
district one permanent 
facility shall be located 
per 80 km². All other 
locations must be 
served by mobile 
postal service units.  
- Customers in 
contiguous built-up 
residential areas should 
have a letterbox within 
1,000m  
Source: IPC (2011) 
Price Controls 
Within the German letter market, the sectoral price regulation refers to items subject to 
license of market dominating enterprises. But ex-ante price regulation only applies to mailed 
quantities up to 50 pieces. Bulk mail (and thus the entire business customer segment) is not 
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Regulatory Institutions and Governance Costs: The Case of the Postal Sector 
120 
subject to ex-ante price regulation.223 However, all prices of market dominating enterprises 
are subject to ex-post control by the Federal Network Agency.  
The regulatory authority does not interfere as long as the prices correspond to the following 
criteria: 
- They are based on the costs of an efficient service 
- They do not include any surcharges due to a market dominating position 
- They do not include any discounts disadvantageous to other competitors. 
The prices must be fixed in a cost-oriented manner. At the same time, the universal services 
must be affordable according to Article 11 of the Postal Act. The Federal Network Agency 
can apply two different price regulation procedures. The regulation can be carried out both by 
single price approval and by a price cap procedure. However, the price cap procedure is 
predominant in price regulation.224 On this point, the Federal Network Agency (2011a) 
writes: “Price cap controls are an appropriate means of ensuring that the prices charged for 
licensed postal services under the Postal Act are based on costs and that abuse is prevented 
ex-ante in the regulated sector. The risk of excessive pricing, prohibited cross-subsidies, price 
dumping and predatory discounts in the ex-ante regulated sector can also be effectively 
limited under a price cap regime. Furthermore, price cap controls are marked by increased 
flexibility and planning certainty for the regulated operator and competitors of the dominant 
company” (1). 
Licensing System 
Paragraph 2 of the Postal Act of 1997 regulates the license domain. Before the monopoly was 
abolished, the Postal Act contained a limited exclusive license for the Deutsche Post. 
Basically, the access to the letter market became available to every interested enterprise after 
the gradual reduction of the monopoly. However, a license must be acquired for the 
commercial consignment of letters.225  
The license is granted by the Federal Network Agency. There is no limit to the number of 
licenses, though the postal providers must meet certain requirements before they are granted a 
license. An applicant may be denied the license if his performance, reliability and know-how 
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are challenged by the regulatory authority. Further reasons may include the endangerment of 
public safety or the non-compliance with labor conditions customary in this line of 
business.226 In connection with granting of licenses labor conditions are an important issue. 
They will be treated later in this chapter. 
Access Regime 
German network access is regulated and described in Paragraph 6, Article 28-32 respectively, 
of the Postal Act. According to Article 21, a market dominating enterprise is under the 
obligation to offer access to the partial services to other providers of postal services. Both 
providers of postal services and end customers are entitled to access to the network of the DP 
AG at the same conditions. According to Article 30, the access agreements with competitors 
and end customers must be submitted to the Federal Network Agency one month after the 
conclusion of their negotiations. 
In addition to the right to network access competitors also have the right, according to Article 
29, to access post-office boxes and information about address changes.227 Based on various 
decisions of the regulatory authority, the DP AG grants access to inward sorting centers and 
outward sorting centers. There is no access to local delivery offices.228 
Generally, access prices and conditions are to be negotiated among market participants. The 
negotiated contracts have to be submitted to the Federal Network Agency. The regulatory 
authority does not intervene as long as the prices correspond to the following criteria: If no 
agreement between the parties can be reached, the Federal Network Agency can be called 
upon to mediate. If the partners cannot draw an agreement within three months, the regulatory 
authority will define the contractual terms. If the DP AG abuses its market dominating 
position, the Federal Network Agency can declare the contracts void. The regulation of access 
tariffs fundamentally changed after the complete market opening in 2008. The ex-ante 
regulation, in application until end of 2007, was replaced by an ex-ante control.  
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6.2.3.  Institutional Setting and Actors 
As mentioned above, the Postal Act of 1997 and the associated ordinances were applied to the 
postal service in Germany.229 The Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWI), 
the competent ministry for the postal market, is responsible for the postal policy.230 The two 
postal market authorities are the Federal Network Agency, responsible for sector-specific 
regulation, and the Federal Cartel Office, responsible for antitrust.  
Found in 2008, the Federal Network Agency is reports to the government, existing under the 
control of the Ministry of Economics and Technology. The agency employs 2,600 people, 
100 of which deal with the postal market. Its principal task is to foster competition and 
guarantee non-discriminating network access by regulating the sectors post, 
telecommunications, energy and railway. 231 The main duties of the agency in the postal 
market are monitoring the provision of the universal service, ensuring accounting separation 
of the postal operator, setting price control, issuing licenses and ensuring compliance with 
those licenses.232   
The Federal Cartel Office, an independent federal authority, is also assigned to the Ministry of 
Economics and Technology. Its primary task is to apply and enforce and the “Act Against 
Restraints of Competition” (GWB). As a result, the duties of the Federal Cartel Office also 
include the enforcement of the cartel ban, merger control, the control of abusive practices by 
market dominating, market strong enterprises, and, as of 1999, the review of awards in public 
procurement. The Federal Cartel Office has around 320 employees, about half of whom are 
lawyers and economists. 233 
In case of abusive behavior of operators within the regulated sectors (such as 
telecommunications and post), the Federal Cartel Office is prohibited by the GWB from 
becoming active in parallel with the Federal Network Agency. However, the Federal Cartel 
Office becomes active to enforce the European prohibition of abuse of market power in 
Article 102 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.234 
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The Monopoly Commission, a third actor within the regulatory environment, is an 
independent advisory board in the field of competition policy and regulation. Required by law 
to oversee competition in Germany in general as well as in individual economic sectors, the 
Commission determines whether competition in individual markets is impeded by excessive 
amalgamation and examines the practice of merger control by the cartel authorities. Every 
two years, the monopoly commission prepares an expert’s report on the status and 
development in postal markets, submitting this report to the legislative authority. The 
Commission has 5 members and an office, which provides the Commission with scientific, 
administrative and technical support. Organizationally, it is part of the Federal Cartel 
Office.235 
6.2.4.  Market Opening and Development of the Postal Market 
As mentioned above, the German letter market was fully opened in 2008. Prior to this, 
however, there had been competition: In 2003, the market share of the Deutsche Post AG was 
96.3 percent and 93.3 percent of the number of letters in the licensed sector in 2005.236 In 
2007, before the market was fully opened, the market share of the Deutsche Post was 91.7 
percent according to the Federal Network Agency (2009). All this was true despite the fact 
that until the end of the year lightweight items (50g or below) and direct mail were still part 
of the monopoly.  
In 2007, the total turnover of the division of the letter market that was subject to license was 
about 10 billion Euros for around 17.5 billion items.237 Since the letter market was fully 
opened, the number of items in the licensed sector up to 1000 g was declining. According to 
the Federal Network Agency, there was a decline from 17.5 billion items in 2008 to 16.3 
billion items in 2009 to 16.6 billion items in 2010 due to the economic crisis. During the same 
period, the turnover in this segment declines by 600 million from 9.6 billion to 9 billion 
Euros.238 
For letter services, there was no distinct change in market shares. In 2008, the Deutsche Post 
delivered 91.9 percent of the letter volume in the licensed sector, a figure that develops from 
90.8 percent in 2009 to 89.8 percent in 2010. The competitors could continuously increase 
                                                 
235 See Monopoly Commission (2012) for further information. 
236 Federal Network Agency (2009, p. 41).  
237 See Federal Network Agency (2007).  
238 See Federal Network Agency (2011b). 
Regulatory Institutions and Governance Costs: The Case of the Postal Sector 
124 
their market shares, but at a rather low level. Three years after the market had been fully 
opened, they increased their market shares by about 2 percent to 10.2 percent letter volume.239  
A similar development can also be observed regarding turnovers. The development of 
turnovers and volumes since 2008 is summarized in 13. 
Table 13: Development of Market Shares in the Licensed Letter Market240 
 Market Shares in % 
Turnover Letter Volumes 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 
DP AG 91,5 90,7 89,6 91,9 90,8 89,8 
Competitors 8,5 9,3 10,4 8,1 8,2 10,2 
Source: Federal Network Agency (2011c, p. 34). 
From 1998 to 2011, the Federal Network Agency issued a total of 2685 licenses. In 2010 and 
2011, the number of issued licenses strongly declined. While 127 licenses were issued in 
2008, the number went down to 20 in 2011. According to the Federal Network Agency, this 
downward trend indicated that the market for the commercial delivery of letters had been 
saturated. On the other hand, the Federal Network Agency pointed out in its activity report 
that there was fierce cutthroat competition in the licensed sector of the letter market.241  
In the years 2010 and 2011, as in previous years, several operators left the market due to 
insolvency or in view of the market situation. According to estimates by the Federal Network 
Agency, around 600 to 650 licensees are currently active in the market. The other enterprises 
do not make use of their licenses. Most competitors operate locally or regionally, and many of 
these enterprises were originally founded by local publishers. They traditionally offered early-
morning delivery for newspapers. However, many of these small companies fell victim to the 
wave of consolidation or were bought up.  
It is interesting to look at the different business models of enterprises active in the licensed 
letter market. WIK distinguishes among three models in the German market: letter deliverer, 
consolidator and networker:242 
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- Letter deliverers offer the entire postal value-chain process from collection to 
delivery. Hence, they offer their beginning-to-end service and are guided by product 
design and the Deutsche Post.  
- Consolidators collect big quantities mail items from various customers, pre-sort them 
and furnish them to a letter deliverer.  Their business model is based on the credit of 
discounts, which they obtain from the delivery of big pre-sorted quantities.  
- Offering neither collection nor delivery services, networkers concentrate on the 
provision of logistics and distribution services for letter deliverers. They have no 
collection and delivery service of their own. 
The largest competitor of Deutsche Post is the Dutch incumbent TNT. In 2000, TNT and the 
Hermes Logistik group founded EP Europost, which was recently renamed TNT Post AG. 
The strategy was to succeed 10 percent of addressed mail in Germany by concentrating on 
B2C and B2B mail volumes. The interesting point in TNT’s entry model is that the company 
predominantly provides centralized services, such as sorting and transportation as well as 
support functions, while two thirds of the collection and the delivery are mainly delegated to 
local and regional postal operators. By cooperating with their partner networks, TNT covers 
90 percent of German households without operating its own nationwide delivery network.243 
In addition to TNT Post, the DP AG’s biggest competitors are some regionally operating 
delivery services, most of which are owned by newspaper publishers. These delivery 
enterprises offer their services locally and regionally. Some competitors currently endeavor to 
establish an area-wide delivery network through co-operations.244 This initiative, called “Mail 
Alliance,” is an operational association of 140 partners offering an alternative countrywide 
delivery of letters. Using this network, regional letter deliverers can offer national delivery of 
letters to their customers. According to the website, 75 percent of German households are 
covered as of January 2012.245 
Since 2005, the DP AG has been under the obligation to treat competitors and consolidators 
equally, and the upstream access volumes of the DP AG have strongly increased.246 While 
between 2000 and 2004 no more than 25 contracts were concluded between DPAG and 
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competitors, the total number of contracts increased to 483 by the end of 2008.247 
Accordingly, the quantities of mail items delivered by competitors or consolidators jumped 
from 29 million to 1.14 billion between 2005 and 2008. In 2009, the corresponding figure was 
1.2 billion; in 2010 the quantity of items delivered via the partial service access increased to 
1.6 billion, an increase of 33 percent compared to the preceding year. In its report, the 
Monopoly Commission assumes that due to the partial service discounts the partial service 
quantities will continue to increase and that at large the partial service access will gain in 
importance.248 
WIK (2010) states that in Germany end-to-end competition and network access are currently 
establishing themselves side by side. While the quantity of items delivered via network access 
has significantly increased in past years, there has been less increase in the volume of items 
delivered by the competitors.249 
6.2.5.  Recent Developments and Outlook 
In the second half of 2010, the Deutsche Post launched the “E-PostLetter.” This is a hybrid 
(physical and electronic) product, combining the hybrid and fully electronic dispatch of 
messages. The sender can choose if he wants to send his message purely electronically, or 
electronically with a physical delivery to the receiver. With the E-PostLetter offer, the 
Deutsche Post wants to compensate for the decreasing quantities in the physical letter 
business. In addition to the Deutsche Post, other enterprises like Deutsche Telekom, GMX 
and Web.de offer similar products.250 Thus, the E-product directly competes with other hybrid 
offers. At the same time, the fully electronic solution of the E-PostLetter competes with 
operators that provide either electronic signatures or legally-binding electronic 
communication solutions. 
The biggest competition for the E-PostLetter is the fully electronic solution of DE-Mail. DE-
Mail is a project coordinated by the Federal Ministry of the Interior, which is meant to enable 
the binding and confidential delivery of documents and messages via Internet. Enterprises like 
Deutsche Telekom, GMX and Web.de offer DE-Mail. Since DE-Mail constitutes no physical 
postal service, it is fully governed by the Telecommunications Act.  The E-PostLetter, on the 
                                                 
247 See Federal Network Agency (2009, p. 72) and Dieke et al. (2010, p. 48).  
248 DP AG raised the access rate discounts as of 1. July 2010. See Monopoly Commission (2011). 
249 See Dieke et al. (2010, p. 48). 
250 See Spiegel Online (2010). 
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other hand, is subject to the privacy of correspondence, since it is in the physical sector. 
According to the Federal Network Agency251, it is not yet possible to know whether DE-Mail 
and E-PostLetter will be able to establish themselves on the market. Consequently, it remains 
unclear what impact these products will have on the letter market. According to Dieke et al. 
(2010, p. 26ff), the market volume of hybrid post is estimated at less than 1 percent of 
mailouts. 
The Federal Network Agency (2010) concludes that the new technological developments also 
call for adjustments on the legal level: “Moreover, new technically innovative products such 
as hybrid letters require an adjustment of the postal act to the developments of the postal 
market” (5). 
In January 2012, the European Union came to a decision regarding subsidies which can have 
considerable consequences for the Deutsche Post: the European Commission thinks that the 
DP AG received unjustified subsidies of up to one billion Euro. Therefore, the state must 
reclaim between 500 million and one billion Euros from the enterprise. The Commission 
states that a combination of highly-regulated prices and subventions for pensions payments 
resulted in an illegal subsidy. These subsidies gave the Deutsche Post an advantage over its 
competitors, though the exact amount will have to be determined by the German authorities. 
The Post does not want to accept the claim: it states the repayment decision of the EU 
Commission is unfounded and assumes that there is no legal basis for it. In fact, according to 
spiegel.de, the group is confident that law courts will not uphold the EU Commission’s 
decision. The Post has coordinated this resistance with the Federal Government. It therefore 
remains open if and in what amount the Post will have to reimburse funds.252 
In its current activity report, the Federal Network Agency estimates that by now more than 
600 licensees are active in the German letter market. Three quarters of them are mainly 
operating locally and achieve a turnover of less than 500 000 Euro. As mentioned above, the 
market share of the Deutsche Post AG decreased by three percent to 89 percent between 2008 
and 2010.253 Since the letter market as a whole shrunk simultaneously, the Post during this 
period lost almost 10 percent of items to competing operators and electronic alternatives to 
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the letter. The decline considerably contributes to halving the profit margin of the Post for 
letters from 16 percent to 8 percent.254   
In a special expert’s report published at the end of 2011, the Monopoly Commission 
comments on the development of the German postal market: the commission concluded that 
the competition development in the German letter market had been stagnating and that effects 
of competition do not have the anticipated impact. According to the Monopoly Commission, 
the market share of the Deutsche Post was very high and had hardly changed. For the 
stagnating development of competition, the commission held responsible economic entry 
barriers such as economies of scale and scope of the DP AG and cost disadvantages suffered 
by the competitors. For the Commission, additional reasons were to do with institutional entry 
barriers. According to the Monopoly Commission, the current Postal Act is still is inadequate 
and does not offer the instruments needed to boost competition. The Federal Network Agency 
is not in a position to control the DP AG and it thinks that the DP AG has too much room for 
maneuver in the market. Furthermore, it states that the VAT exemption for universal services 
de facto favors the DP AG. Prior to July 2010 the DP AG had been exempted from VAT for 
letter services. After having been admonished by the European Court of Justice, the German 
Parliament decided that from then on, the exemption only applied to the universal service for 
private customers and that competitors were also exempt from VAT if they provided parts of 
the universal service all over the country. Since then, the Deutsche Post had paid VAT in the 
amount of half a billion Euro. 
In order to create a more competitive environment, the Monopoly Commission recommended 
renewing the Postal Act. Regulations are to be introduced, which allow a stronger control of 
the DP AG as market-dominating enterprise and an extension of the Federal Network 
Agency’s powers of investigation. Consequently, the Monopoly Commission (2011) proposed 
a number of institutional changes in the existing regulatory provisions in order to promote the 
development of competition. Examples are 
- tightening the regulation of access tariffs, 
- an obligation for presentation of DP AG’s contracts with major business clients, 
- adaptations of material requirements for pricing, 
- or a further adaptation of exemption from VAT. 
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For the Monopoly Commission, no convincing reason exists to exempt universal postal 
services from VAT. Services in other sectors of public utilities, which are part of the 
population’s basic needs255, are also not exempt from VAT.  
The CEO of the DP AG does not support an extension of the existing regulation and in view 
of the market situation calls instead for a deregulation: “The existing price regulation 
procedure made sense in times of increasing volumes. But now the quantity of items is 
declining. And we must pay VAT, the minimum wage has gone down. It is about time that 
like all other enterprises we could fix the prices in line with the market. Whether we will do 
this in the end, remains to be seen. This also depends on competition.”256 
In addition, the Monopoly Commission also criticizes the role of the Federal Government, 
which acts as shareholder of the DP AG and as a competition watchdog that should establish 
competition on the postal market. According to the Monopoly Commission, the Federal 
Government has not been very motivated to do this, since the higher the profits of the DP AG 
are and the less competition there is on the postal market, the higher the stock price of the DP 
AG will be. In summary, the commission states that the Federal Government would harm 
itself, if it created general conditions on the postal market that boost competition. It therefore 
postulates that the Federal Government should part as quickly as possible with all financial 
instruments, which give the state a special interest in the DP AG. 
In its activity report, the Federal Network Agency summarized the development of the 
German letter market. The agency came to the conclusion that the market opening of 2008 
hardly brought about any fundamental changes in market conditions. The agency assumes that 
in the future there will be more competition in market access, although it also expects end-to-
end competition to tend toward decline. 
As a consequence, the agency will determine if the existing ex-post regulation of access 
prices is sufficient or if a new ex-ante regulation should be introduced. In its report, it calls for 
a strengthening of the existing regulatory instruments and for the introduction of new 
instruments to be used to accompany and strengthen competition.257 
With respect to a revision of the postal act, the agency demands the following: 
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256 Interview with CEO Frank Appel in the Wirtschaftswoche (2011) in May. 
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- strengthening the powers of investigation in the field of abuse control, 
- the possibility of an ex-post control for tariffs which according to today’s law are 
subject to ex-ante control, 
- an ex-ante regulation for bulk mail.258 
The requests of the Federal Network Agency are chiefly based on provisions contained in the 
German Telecommunications Act. In summary, the agency therefore calls for an adjustment 
of postal regulation to the regulation in the telecommunications market. 
In its outlook, the Federal Network Agency (2011b) sums up that there is no functioning 
competition in the letter market and that a regulation of the market-dominating enterprise is 
still necessary. It gives a positive assessment of the competitors’ efforts to offer area-wide 
services through co-operations. The agency believes that a stronger abuse control and ex-ante 
access tariff regulation are necessary for the success of these networks. Regarding the 
substitution of letter services by electronic alternatives, the agency hopes that this will make 
the future scope of services offered more manifold. It sees it as an opportunity for the postal 
and telecommunications sectors to move closer together and for existing structures to be 
divided. Moreover, the technical innovations require that the Postal Act be adjusted along the 
development of the postal market. 
6.2.6.  Summary of Institutional Dimensions in Germany 
Although the German postal market has been open for quite a long time, no effective 
competition has developed. Therefore, the Monopoly Commission and the Federal Network 
Agency demand a stronger one-sided regulation. Moreover, the view of the authorities 
involved in postal matters is advanced that competition does not develop because of the 
market-dominating enterprise DP AG. As a result, a revision of the Postal Act has been 
requested. The harmonization of exemption from VAT for all operators seems plausible, as it 
would increase the equal treatment of the different operators; however, other proposals go in 
the opposite direction. The DP AG is to meet requirements that do not apply to other 
operators. Such a one-sided regulation does not seem to make much sense in a fully opened 
market.259 Moreover, the authorities think that the act has to be adjusted according to the 
changing market conditions and particularly due to the e-substitution.  
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Table 14: Institutional Dimensions of the Postal Market in Germany 
Institutional 
Dimensions & Cost 
Drivers 
Summary of Characteristics 
Number of Regulatory 
Actors 
Two institutions with monitoring function (Federal Network Agency and 
Federal Cartel Office) and the Monopoly Commission 
Modalities and Subject 
of Information 
Exchange 
Different between regulatory actors; the Monopoly Commission and the 
Federal Network Agency demand more competences toward the market-
dominating enterprise  
Interaction of Sector-
specific Regulation and 
Competition law 
Not fully clarified. The Federal Network Agency requests more competences 
as in case of the Telecommunications Act 
Regulatory Processes Very formal. Ex-post regulation only for private customer services (fewer 
than 50 items). Particularly with respect to the pricing for access 
remunerations the Federal Network Agency would like to be involved earlier 
ex-ante.  
Stability of Institutions 
(Organizational 
Perspective) 
Very stable in general; the setting of institutions is stable. Especially the 
Federal Network Agency is established. 
Scope of Universal 
Service Obligation 
Relatively wide 
Degree of 
Liberalization 
Fully liberalized in 2008 
Financing of the USO No designated operator but self-financing through incumbent; No net cost 
approach. 
US Price Regulation Price cap: ex ante regulation only for prices for private customers. Access 
tariffs are under ex-post control. The federal network agency demands higher 
ex-ante competences regarding access tariffs 
Access Regime No access regulation for incumbent’s infrastructure so far, commercial 
agreements between competitors; The federal Network Agency demands 
more ex-ante regulation in order to foster competition.  
Stability of Institution 
(Policy Perspective) 
Very stable 
Norms and 
Standardization 
Requirements 
Standardization requirements for quality measures concerning the universal 
service 
Labor Conditions High degree of uncertainties because of minimal wage decision of the 
government. Finally solved in court cases: no minimum wage for the sector  
Source: By Author 
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6.3. Case Great Britain 
Section 6.3 contains the last of the three case studies and explores the postal market in the 
UK. The case starts with a brief overview of the history of the UK postal sector. In the 
following, the organization of the sector corresponds with that of the other two cases. 
6.3.1.  History  
Despite its role in the reform of other public utilities, the UK acted rather as a follower than a 
leader in the European postal liberalization debate, seeming to be less optimistic about the 
liberalization of postal services than in other areas of liberalization.260 Today, Royal Mail is 
still the national postal service in Great Britain.  
Historically, the UK was the founder of the traditional post office model, and the role of the 
state in the provision of postal services goes back many centuries.261 The history of Royal 
Mail can be traced back to the year 1516, when Heinrich VIII appointed a “Master of the 
Posts.” In 1635, Charles I opened the Royal Mail postal service to the public. In 1660, under 
Charles II, the General Post Office started operations. Before 1840, the British postal system 
was highly complex and very expensive. Letters were charged by distance and the number of 
sheets of paper they contained. The recipient mostly paid the charge. In January 1837, 
Rowland Hill published his pamphlet “Post Office Reform: Its Importance and 
Practicability.” He had no doubt that the source of trouble lay in the complexity of the charges 
and the mixture of paid and unpaid letters. His solution was prepayment. The charge should 
be low and uniform: he recommended that it be 1d up to one ounce in weight. 
In 1840, the post underwent fundamental reforms and the so-called Penny Post was 
introduced. For an item delivered within Great Britain, there was a single charge to be paid by 
the sender. In order to prove that he had paid the charge, the sender affixed the first self-
adhesive postage stamp, the “One Penny Black.”262 
The development of Roland Hill’s Penny Post in 1840 has been widely recognized as a 
dominant principle of postal service administration and the provision of services. Hill’s postal 
reform was an immediate success. The number of chargeable letters in 1839 was only about 
76 million items. By 1850, the number of items increased to almost 350 million and continued 
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to grow dramatically. Adhesive postage stamps were gradually introduced throughout the 
world. With the change to charging by weight, envelopes became normal for the first time. 
In the course of the technical development, Royal Mail introduced telegraphy in 1870 and 
telephony in 1912. Before the foundation of British Telecom, Royal Mail was responsible for 
the British telephone network. The National Giro Bank was founded in 1968 and sold to 
Alliance & Leicester in 1989. 
Organizationally, the British Post Office was operated as a civil service department until 
1969, when it was transformed into a public corporation. In 1984, the telecommunications 
business was separated from the postal business. In contrast to earlier state monopolies, such 
as the Stationery Office, British Gas and British Telecom, it was not privatized in the 1980s 
and 1990s. 
In the 1970s, the overall British discussion on postal office reform emphasized organizational 
matters, like the separation of telecommunications, more than questions about the 
development of competition and ownership. In the late 1970s, the Post Office went from a 
loss generating to a profitable enterprise. As part of the improvement in 1985, the Post Office 
restructured its operation by splitting into four businesses: Letters, parcels, counter services 
and banking.263 The British “Post Office” was renamed “Consignia” in 2000. This change was 
very unpopular, both with the public and the staff. The organization’s name then changed 
again in 2001 to “Royal Mail Group plc,” operational with three units: Royal Mail (delivering 
letters), Parcelforce (delivering parcels) and Post Office Limited (managing the nationwide 
network of post offices). At the same time, Royal Mail became a public limited company in 
March 2001. Today, Royal Mail is 100 percent government-owned. The company was 
renamed again in March 2007 and changed from “Royal Mail Group plc” to “Royal Mail ltd.”   
The initial debate on postal reform began in the late 1980s, and the first substantial proposals 
were presented in 1991 in the wake of the “Citizens Charter,” a government initiative on 
public sector reform.264 The initiative proposed the possibility of a further reduction of the 
postal monopoly and the implementation of independent regulation in the UK. Therefore, the 
government announced plans to reduce the monopoly and to privatize. Competition was 
expected to increase under the control of a postal regulatory agency while meeting the 
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universal service obligations. Although several proposals were provided265, they failed due to 
a combination of differences in the government (e.g., doubts on the possible financial losses 
of the treasury and the popularity of such a policy), as well as the governing party (which was 
worried about the reduction of universal services in rural areas and the closure of post 
offices).  
Moreover, trade unions waged a campaign against privatization that was backed by many 
other groups. The campaign challenged the effects of privatization and liberalization on the 
quality of services and social cohesion. During this time, the Post Office’s management, 
which was strongly in favor of privatization, not only failed to ensure privatization but also 
missed the opportunity to obtain greater autonomy in the public sector. In this rather uncertain 
situation concerning the development of the British postal market, the government supported 
the European Commission’s proposals for the liberalization of the postal sector.  
In the negotiations, they positioned themselves between the enthusiastic liberalizers and the 
opponents of change: The UK adhered to the primacy of universal services and uniform 
tariffs, supported only gradual liberalization and had reservations about the commission’s 
intentions to implement a competition policy in the postal sector. The Post Office itself had 
been highly skeptical about the initial proposal of the Directive, since it was seen as a 
potential threat to the postal system in the UK.  
In 2011 the new Postal Services Act 2011 entered into force. While hardly any adjustments in 
the universal service were made, the regulation of the sector was reorganized. The Postcomm, 
responsible so far for the postal market, was integrated into the regulatory authority for the 
telecommunications sector Ofcom. In addition, the new act permits the privatization of 
RoyalMail, but only on certain conditions: e.g., the Royal Mail personnel must be offered at 
least 10 percent of the shares. Thus, private investors can buy 90 percent of the shares of 
Royal Mail.  
Post Office ltd. is not to be sold. It is to be converted into a mutual ownership structure, 
whose organization has not yet been defined. In addition, the state has confirmed it will 
continue to subsidize the Post Office with 180 million pounds in 2011 and 2012.266 At the 
beginning of 2012, the exact date of privatization had not yet been fixed. 
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In the past, Royal Mail faced very big problems with the pension funds. At the end of 2011, 
the deficit of the pension funds amounted to 8.4 billion pounds. According to the Postal 
Services Act 2011, this deficit is now covered by the state. 
6.3.2.  Major Regulatory Obligations 
In the following, we give a short overview of the most important regulatory issues in the 
British postal regulatory regime. 
The Universal Service Obligation 
The regulator is responsible for the definition of the universal postal service. In June 2004, 
following a year-long review, Postcomm listed areas of postal services offered that the 
incumbent operator Royal Mail was required to provide as universal postal services at an 
affordable flat rate:267 
- priority and non-priority mail services up to 2 kilos 
- a non-priority service for parcels weighing up to 20 kilos 
- a registered and insured service and a range of support services to ensure the security 
and integrity of the mail268 
- international outbound service269  
Furthermore, it was decided that Royal Mail’s universal service obligation should also include 
its recorded (signed for) product and at least one bulk mail product. Stakeholders were 
consulted on which bulk product or products should be included in the universal service. In 
June 2005, Postcomm announced that it had decided to include “Mailsort 1400” (first and 
second class) and “Cleanmail” (first and second class).270 
There are special provisions that include free postal services for items specifically produced 
or customized for blind as well as partially sighted people. Moreover, item collection and 
                                                 
267 See Postcomm (2009). 
268 Royal Mail’s re-direction (up to 12 months), Keepsafe, Poste Restante, certificate of posting and business 
collections.  
269 Royal Mail's international public tariff and international signed-for products. The UK is also subject to the 
Universal Postal Union’s requirement to deliver mail coming from abroad.  
270 Mailsort 1400 covers mail of all formats up to 2kg in weight and pre-sorted according to the location of the 
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delivery should be provided six days per week (excluding public holidays). This means that at 
least one delivery of postal items must be provided on every working day to the home of 
every individual in the UK. Likewise, at least one collection of postal items per working day 
must be effected from each access point.271  
In regards to the financing of the USO, Postcomm assessed whether and to what extent 
providing the universal service imposed a cost or a benefit on Royal Mail in 2001. The 
incumbent operator Royal Mail, the only provider of the universal service in the UK, was 
required to provide the service under the terms of the license granted by Postcomm. At this 
time, Postcomm came to the conclusion that Royal Mail's capability to deliver to every 
address in the UK was a commercial advantage rather than a burden. Postcomm estimated 
that the cost of Royal Mail's universal service provision was about £81 million, representing 
about 1.7 percent of its revenues from its mail business. This excluded any quantification of 
the benefits of being the universal service provider and was based on actual rather than 
efficiency costs. Postcomm finally concluded that the universal service did not represent a 
significant burden in the market at that time. 
Ten years later, Ofcom (2011) gave a completely different assessment of the situation: The 
agency concluded that the provision of the universal service was threatened by Royal Mail’s 
then-current financial position. The part of Royal Mail responsible for delivering the universal 
service made a loss of 120 million Pounds in the period of 2010-2011 on a cost base of 7 
billion pounds. Royal Mail’s negative operating cash gap had widened, and it reported an 
outflow on its mail activities of over 600 million pounds in 2010, in part due to its 
contribution towards the 300 million pound annual costs of servicing its pension deficit and 
the cash cost of its modernization program. Since Royal Mail’s current price control was 
imposed in 2006, its cumulative cash performance had been around 3 billion pounds below 
the result expected by the regulator Postcomm in 2006. 
In 2011, Royal Mail identified the cost of regulation as a major burden for the universal 
service provider. As mentioned above, Royal Mail was still making a loss in its core letter 
business. Funding and servicing the regulatory regime cost Royal Mail around £50 million 
British pounds in 2011; this figure included payments for the regulator’s running costs and 
Royal Mail’s costs to comply with the license and answer the regulator’s questions. also It 
                                                 
271 See Eccles (2009). Access points: post boxes and other facilities provided by Royal Mail for the collection of 
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also included the cost of running a unit to manage access to our network as required by Royal 
Mail’s license.272 
Table 15: Universal Service Obligation in Great Britain 
Legal Statute Products Delivery of Items Postal Network 
Postal Service 
Act of 2011 and 
the Consumers, 
Estate Agents and 
Redress Act 2007 
 
 
- Conveyance of 
postal items and 
parcels up to 20 
kg273 
- Provision of 
registered post 
services. 
- services to blind or 
partially sighted 
- Reserved area: Full 
market opening in 
2006 
- 6 times per week, once 
every working day, 
including Saturday 
- The home or premises of 
every individual in the UK  
- License requirement to 
provide facilities such 
that the premises of not 
less than 95% of users 
are within 5km  
- Not less than 95% of 
users in each postcode 
area are within 10 km 
of such access points.  
Source: IPC (2011). 
Licensing Regime 
The former standard license granted by Postcomm to the operators is effective for ten years. 
The original license framework sets out the standards and requirements for the licensees with 
the goal to balance between protecting customers and encouraging new competitors to come 
into the market.274 An individual license enables, but does not require, the provision of postal 
services. The framework applies to all operators and came into force on 1 January 2006 and 
was amended on 16 January 2008. The license area covers most types of mail items 
(unaddressed direct mail is not included) costing less than 1 pound or up to 350 grams. 
The mentioned standard license:  
- is issued for a rolling ten years period. 275 
- requires each licensee to provide information about its own performance.  
- requires license holders to set up systems to handle customer complaints  
                                                 
272 See Royal Mail (2011). 
273 In Royal Mail’s former license the regulator (Postcomm) has defined the services that should be provided in 
the discharge of the USO. First class stamped mail, first class metered, second class stamped mail, second 
class metered, standard parcel, airmail Europe, airmail world zone 1, airmail world zone 2, surface mail, 
special delivery (next day) non-account as well as a wide range of bulk mail products. 
274 See Public Sector Review (2011). 
275 Notice of ten years cannot be given until 25 March 2016, which brings other licenses into line with that of 
Royal Mail. Postcomm believes this will provide operators with enough certainty to invest into the newly-
opened market. 
Regulatory Institutions and Governance Costs: The Case of the Postal Sector 
138 
- introduces two codes of practice, to make sure that all operators meet common 
standards when handling mail.276  
- requires some licensees to pay an annual fee. Only those licensees with a licensed area 
turnover in excess of £10 million per annum have to pay an annual license fee, which 
is based on market shares. 
There are additional requirements that apply to Royal Mail. As the dominant company, Royal 
Mail is subject to rigid price and service quality requirements. The incumbent Royal Mail was 
granted its current 15-year license on 23 March 2001. The special license sets out in detail 
Royal Mail's obligation to provide a universal postal service across the United Kingdom, as 
well as the service standards it is expected to meet. Royal Mail’s license contains the 
following obligations related to competition:277 
- Negotiate access to Royal Mail’s network without illegitimate discrimination between 
users (condition 9 part 1) or on the basis of an access code to be agreed with 
Postcomm (condition 9 part 2). 
- Avoidance of any unfair commercial advantage in favor of Royal Mail’s business or 
any other contracting party involved with the grant of network access (condition 10-
2). 
- Not to disclose any information gained through the provision of access to the facilities 
to any other business of the Royal Mail group (condition 10-2). 
- To grant no more favorable terms of access to Royal Mail’s business than those on 
which access is made available to other persons (condition 10-5). 
- Avoidance of undue discrimination and/or undue preference between persons and 
classes of persons (condition 11-2a) 
- Avoidance of excessive or predatory pricing (condition 11-2b) 
- Transparency of pricing of postal services by submitting detailed tariffs to Postcomm 
and the consumer council (condition 7) 
- To provide Postcomm with copies of merger control notifications and informal 
submissions to be made to the European Commission or the Office of fair trading 
(condition 12). 
                                                 
276 (1) A mail integrity code, requiring licensees to ensure the safety and security of the mail they handle, and (2) 
a common operational procedures code, is designed to manage inter-operator issues and dealing with 
operational issues, including handling wrongly addressed and misdelivered mail. 
277 See Eccles (2009). 
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- Employment of a competition compliance officer to facilitate compliance with the 
regulatory obligations under the license (condition 13). 
- Accounting separation as regards individual types of licensed services, other universal 
postal services and individual types of postal services outside the scope of universal 
service, and non postal services, not to reduce the scope of its regulated services or to 
offer less favorable terms to users without Postcomm’s approval (conditions 15 and 
21), respectively. 
Furthermore, Royal Mails services are subject to quality and performance obligations based 
on its license. These obligations are backed up by a compensation system for business 
customers.278 Moreover, Postcomm is allowed to impose a monetary fine if it considers that 
Royal Mail has not made all reasonable efforts to achieve the service targets. 
The new Postal Services Act 2011 provides for the introduction of a regulatory framework 
based on “general authorizations” to replace the licensing regime which was introduced under 
the Postal Services Act 2000. There are 59 UK holders of postal operator licenses under the 
old arrangements, including Royal Mail Group, who have become regulated postal operators. 
The new postal regulator Ofcom has designated Royal Mail as the universal service provider, 
which requires us to provide a universal postal service at a uniform price throughout the UK. 
All license holders in the UK are required to conduct accounts that separate revenue and costs 
in relation with postal services within the licensed area from other operations and to provide 
the information to Postcomm on an annual basis. Furthermore, all licensees are required to 
provide the NRA with quarterly revenue and volume data for the licensed as well as the non- 
licensed areas of their operations.279 
Access Regime 
Due to its license, Royal Mail has been required to provide access to its facilities since 2001. 
Therefore, Royal Mail provides downstream access to services concerning the mail 
conveyance and delivery facilities of its network. Condition 9 of Royal Mail’s license lays 
down the access rules for the incumbent.280 Access is open to mail consolidators, competing 
                                                 
278 The compensation scheme involves a one percent reduction in postal charges for each percent that Royal 
mails falls below the national delivery time target and a retail compensation system to compensate customers 
for domestic first class mail failed to deliver within three working days. 
279 See Ecorys (2008c). 
280 Condition 9 was adapted in May 2006. 
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operators as well as some bulk-mail customers. The access point is usually at the delivery or 
sorting office for downstream conveyance and delivery by Royal Mail. 
Access prices are not strictly regulated and to be negotiated between the involved parties. 
Access terms must be on prices that are based on reasonable allocations of costs and must not 
unduly discriminate between parties having access to Royal Mails Network. According to 
Postcomm, prices should be based on costs of the downstream delivery. In the event that 
negotiations fail, the parties can appeal to Postcomm to determine the conditions in the form 
of a direction to Royal Mail concerning the terms of access.281 
The postal act does not regulate the cost-price relation for access pricing. The price control is 
also settled in the license in condition 21, which says that access prices should be set with 
reference to a margin between the corresponding retail and access services (the so-called head 
room margin).282 
A first access agreement was implemented in 2004 between Royal Mail and its competitor 
UK Mail after a two-year negotiations period and only after a preparatory intervention by 
Postcomm. The regulator regulated the minimum headroom as a minimum percentage price 
difference ex-post. Today, Royal Mail offers a ‘National Condition 9 Access Agreement’ that 
sets out detailed standard terms and conditions on which access customers can feed in mail 
into Royal Mail’s network. The mail entered by the access customer must comply with the 
national geographic posting profile requirements.283 The National Condition 9 Access 
Agreement is based on the access agreement with UK Mail. The consequence of such an 
agreement seems to be that access for customers who would like to hand over items only for 
rural areas where delivery is expensive have to pay more than the basic access price per item 
specified in the Condition 9 agreement. During 2004, another pricing access agreement was 
negotiated which is based on average zonal tariffs.  
Price Controls 
Condition 21 of Royal Mail’s license defines the pricing framework within which Royal Mail 
is required to operate. The current price controls apply from 2006 to 2010, and Postcomm 
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283 Each posting handed over by the customer must contain items for delivery to 31 postcode areas defined as 
mandatory and must also hand over postal items for delivery to a minimum of 60 postcode areas. Based on this 
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decided recently not to change the system after 2010. The price control provision in condition 
21 includes a complex formula for Royal Mail retail prices. The price control is in the form of 
an RPI-X, across two different baskets.284 Eccles (2009) contends that it is “important to note 
that the pricing provisions contain no reference to the price being geared or oriented to costs 
as required by the relevant provision of the EU Postal Services Directive 97/67 and the further 
amending Directive 2008/6/EC” (347). 
Based on the license, Royal Mail is under the obligation to apply affordable prices and a 
uniform tariff to services within the universal service. The price control applies not only to 
products within the universal service but also to all regulated services. For instance, the price 
control mechanisms also apply to bulk-mail services outside the USO. Due to condition 7, 
Royal Mail is obliged to ensure transparency of its prices and not to offer discounts without 
submitting details of the tariffs to Postcomm and the consumer council. Price controls 
currently apply to approximately 80 percent of Royal Mail’s revenues at a time when they are 
declining every year. Royal Mail states that in the UK, prices for stamps are low compared to 
those of other countries.285 
6.3.3.  Institutional Setting and Actors 
In 2001, the British Government created a regulatory body for postal affairs called Postcomm. 
In the same year, the Consumer Council for Postal Service, better known as Postwatch, was 
founded to ensure that customers could express their problems with postal services. The 
Postal Services Commission (Postcomm) is an independent regulator established by the Postal 
Services Act 2000. The agency is answerable to Parliament for ensuring the provision of a 
universal postal service throughout the UK.  
The primary goal of the regulatory agency under the Postal Service Act 2000 is to assure the 
provision of universal services. The service has to be provided at affordable and uniform 
prices nationwide in the UK. An additional objective of the regulator is the promotion of 
competition between postal operators. Nevertheless, the promotion of effective competition is 
subordinate to the protection of postal service users’ interests.286 Postcomm’s annual budget, 
funded by license fees, is around 10 million pounds; the agency has about 60 employees. 
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Postcomm has a full set of regulatory powers. In summary, Postcomm is in charge of and 
active in the following areas287: 
- Protecting the universal service 
- Licensing postal operators 
- Introducing competition in the mail market 
- Regulating Royal Mail 
- Advising Government in questions concerning the post office network 
- Complaints and redress procedures288 
The Postal Services Act 2011 designates Ofcom −the independent regulator and competition 
authority for the UK communications sector−as the new regulatory authority for postal 
services in the UK from 1 October 2011. Under the new Postal Act, Ofcom’s primary duty is 
to secure the provision of the universal postal service, also having regard to its financial 
sustainability. Ofcom regulates television and radio, telecommunications and bandwidth. 
Other national actors involved in postal matters are the ‘Office of Fair Trading’ (OFT) and the 
cross-sectoral Competition Commission. The Competition Commission conducts 
investigations concerning mergers, markets and the regulation of the major regulated 
industries. The OFT can enforce competition and consumer protection rules after their own 
investigation.289 There is a memorandum of understanding with the OFT, which aims to 
promote cooperation and coordination between the two agencies when dealing with cases of 
anti-competitive behavior for which they have overlapping responsibilities.290 
Even though this is not part of postal law, the Consumers Estate Agents and Redress Act 2007 
sets up the merger of the postal consumer body Postwatch and other consumer protection 
bodies in “Consumer Focus,” which results in a formal abolition of the sector-specific 
watchdog. Consumer Focus is an agency that represents consumer interests. It has strong 
legislative powers, including the right to investigate consumer complaints if they are of 
broader interest, the right to demand information from operators, the power to conduct 
                                                 
287 See Ecorys (2008a) and www.postcomm.gov.uk. 
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Postwatch and today’s cross-sectoral consumer watchdog ‘Consumer Focus’ helps with individual complaints 
about postal services. 
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research and the right to investigate an official super-complaint regarding failing services. 
Consumer Focus publishes reports on the quality of services on a regular basis.291 
6.3.4.  Market Opening and Development of the Postal Market 
In late 2001, the British Council of Ministers reached an agreement on the further 
liberalization of postal services, and Postcomm published a report, recommending a phased 
opening of the market with full competition, which was implemented in 2006. The original 
Postal Services Act contains a reserved area up to 100g for incoming cross-border single 
items. Direct mail was liberalized above 100g for mailings over 4000 items.  
Finally, the mail market has been fully liberalized since January 2006 with respect to the 
Postal Services Act 2000, which regulates the provision of postal services. The act has been 
revised at the end of 2003 after several consultations undertaken by the British regulatory 
authority Postcomm. These include the definition of an industry code of practice for common 
operational procedures and protecting the integrity of mail.  
The British postal sector is one of the largest in Europe, but the sector has also seen the 
steepest decline in volumes. The volume of mail has fallen by 25 percent since 2006, as 
consumers have moved away from traditional mail and towards digital means of 
communication.292 
Since the market was fully opened in 2006, no sustainable end-to-end competition has 
developed in Great Britain. The licensed enterprises are mainly active in the consolidation 
business. They offer preliminary services such as pre-sorting to major customers, post items 
to Royal Mail and take advantage of the low access prices of Royal Mail wholesale.293 Based 
on the low access prices, the competitors have made only few investments into their own 
infrastructures. While the delivered volume of competitors for items to 350g was at 39 million 
items in 2005, they declined to around 24 million items until 2009.294 The market shares in 
this segment are at about 0.01 percent. With almost one hundred percent market share, the 
delivery organization has a de facto delivery monopoly in the liberalized letter market. 
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Today, the main competitors of Royal Mail are the DX Group, TNT Post UK and the DP AG 
subsidiary DHL Global Mail. They are mainly active in the business-to-business segment.295 
At the same time, the DX Group, with around 10 million delivered items, is the main 
competitor of Royal Mail in the end-to-end sector. But here, too, it mainly concentrates on 
business customers.296 
According to Pohl (2010), the number of licensees in the British postal market is rather low. 
At the end of 2010, 51 licensees were in the market.297 In the case of active competitors, these 
are mostly big enterprises. Pohl attributes the small number of licensees to the strict 
requirements (e.g., regarding proof of performance) and relatively high license costs. These 
strict requirements were somewhat relaxed in 2008, in order to induce small and medium 
enterprises to enter the market.298 How the situation will develop after a renewed relaxation of 
licensing terms aiming at a “general authorization” at the end of 2011 remains to be seen.  
6.3.5.  Recent Developments and Outlook 
In order to analyze the situation of the universal service, an independent review entitled 
“Modernise or decline - Policies to maintain universal services in the United Kingdom” was 
conducted. The so-called Hooper Report (2008) sheds light on various risks and uncertainties 
concerning the future of UK’s postal services. With respect to the shape of the sector-specific 
Regulator Postcomm and the regulatory regime, the report proposes: “Effective competition 
can help realize a positive future. A new regulatory regime is needed to place postal 
regulation within the broader context of the communications market” (15).  
Therefore, the report recommends not only transforming the self-contained Postcomm to 
Ofcom299, but also conducting a comprehensive analysis of the postal markets and examining 
the extent to which Royal Mail has market power in the different segments. According to the 
report, changing to a new system of regulation would first require a greater clarity of Royal 
Mail costs. However, even though the report outlines other suggestions for improving the 
situation of British mail market (and of Royal Mail itself) and therefore reducing risks for the 
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USO, it also gives rise to uncertainty: it proposes radical changes in the regulatory regime 
which affect the operator’s businesses and consequently their ultimate return on investment.  
Back in 2010, Hooper produced an updated report called “Saving the Royal Mail's Universal 
Service in a Digital Age.” The report recognized the deterioration of Royal Mail's financial 
position in the interim and reaffirmed the following policy recommendations300:  
- That the Royal Mail needed to be opened up for private investments; 
- Addressing the pension deficit by moving it to the governmental treasury; 
- That responsibility for regulating the postal sector should definitely be transferred to 
Ofcom. 
The revision of the law considered in the first Hooper Report (2008), further specified in the 
second report (2010)301, was completed by putting into force the new Postal Services Act 
2011. Since October 2011, Ofcom has been responsible for the regulation in the postal 
market. With this, Great Britain follows the trend presented in Chapter 2 toward bigger 
regulatory authorities in charge of several sectors. 
Ofcom’s evaluations of the present regulation are very sobering. In a public consultation on 
the topic “Securing the Universal Service – Proposal for the future framework for economic 
Regulation,” the Agency summarizes past developments and criticizes the present regulatory 
regime.302  
According to Ofcom, the present regime is very extensive: 
- Over 80 percent of the turnover of Royal Mail is subject to price regulation. The 
approach to price regulation is similar to that in the other regulated public utilities. 
The strict price control reduces the flexibility of Royal Mail to adjust to unexpected 
changes in the market.  
- Far-reaching reporting and publication regulations regarding prices and general terms 
of business for products inside and outside the universal service (requirement to 
publish commercial proposals three months in advance).  
- The requirements to be met by Royal Mail in the universal service are higher than in 
most European countries. E.g., Royal Mail must deliver items 6 times per week, while 
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the European Directive foresees 5 days only. Inevitably this has an impact on the costs 
of the universal service.  
- Royal Mail is under the obligation to grant relatively low priced access over the entire 
value-added chain. 
- Direct ex-ante regulation of access prices and fixed margins for access operators. 
- Quality requirements directly influence the permitted turnovers of products under 
price regulation.303 
Regarding regulation of the postal market, Ofcom (2011) states: “Traditional approach of 
Regulation has failed” (5). For the agency, this is due to the fact that price regulation has not 
been protected against price increases and that the incentive mechanisms have not worked. 
Due to the financial situation in past years, Royal Mail repeatedly had to ask for price 
increases. In spite of repeated price increases, the incumbent currently makes no excessive 
profits. In addition, Royal Mail is strongly limited in its development, while the market and 
the proportions are subject to rapid change.304 
The main changes proposed by Ofcom intended to secure the universal service in the long 
term at the end of 2011 include an extensive deregulation305: 
- The very detailed license system is to be converted into a model with general 
authorizations (this measure has already been realized). 
- The abolishment of a major part of price regulation in the retail and wholesale sector. 
- The abolishment of direct regulation of access prices and of the fixed margin for 
access operators. 
- More commercial independence for Royal Mail. 
However, Ofcom also points out the risk of this deregulation. The behavior of Royal Mail in 
particular can have different effects on the development of the universal service and 
competition. Royal Mail can be tempted to increase the prices instead of making its services 
more efficient. Such behavior would in turn harm the universal service, since consumers react 
to higher price. In addition, Royal Mail may try, based on deregulation, to inhibit the 
development of competition. The Agency proposes different protective measures. Beside 
Royal Mail’s continuing obligation to grant access, the performance of Royal Mail and the 
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increase in efficiency of operations are to be monitored. With respect to the development of 
end-to-end competition, Ofcom remains rather skeptical. This would certainly be desirable, 
but it could also have a negative impact on the universal service. Regarding competition in the 
postal market, Ofcom (2011) states that the challenge for the postal enterprises is 
considerable: “Postal services inevitably face some degree of competition from other modes 
of communication. This has the potential to provide a real constraint on Royal Mail’s ability 
to raise prices, although at present it is not possible to be certain about its strength” (8).  
The consultation on the proposals regarding the deregulation of the postal market was started 
in December. By the time this study was completed, the results were not yet available. It will 
be interesting to observe how the British postal market develops and whether the financial 
situation of Royal Mail improves. 
In its Business Report 2010-2011, Royal Mail (2011) comments as follows on the adjustment 
of the regulatory regime: “The time is right to review and significantly change the regulatory 
structure. Solid progress has already been made” (14).  
According to the outlook of Royal Mail, the postal market is in a phase of change. Letter 
volumes continue to decrease. During the last five years, the volume of delivered individual 
items has diminished by 40 percent. For the future, Royal Mail expects a decline of 5 percent 
per year. In addition, Royal Mail calls the old regulatory regime a burden for the provider of 
universal service. The incumbent requests that Royal Mail and other market actors be treated 
equally. At the same time, Royal Mail also commits itself to basic services, the “one-price-
goes-anywhere, six-days-a-week”- rule remains part of the Postal Services Act 2011.306 
However, by March 2012 Ofcom allowed Royal Mail to set the price of first-class and 
business mail. As a consequence, Royal Mail announced record increases of a first class 
stamp from 46p to 60p by 30 April, with second class rising from 36p to 50p - the steepest 
stamp price increase in over ten years.307   
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6.3.6.  Summary of Institutional Dimensions in the UK 
In Britain, the postal market was fully opened on 1 January 2006. The universal service 
essentially remained as it was before (meaning it remained subject to more stringent 
requirements than stipulated in the EU Directive), and the regulatory body PostComm was 
assigned new, extensive competencies. The British postal market is thus one of the most 
strictly regulated in Europe, and its universal service provider the Royal Mail is the postal 
service with the biggest financial difficulties in Europe. The network of postal outlets had 
been outsourced to Post Office Ltd. many years before. It is operated by franchisees and runs 
a deficit despite the fact that it receives state subsidies. The British regulator Postcomm 
enforced a de facto regulation of access to Royal Mail’s network. This regulatory intervention 
led to very low access prices. As a result, downstream competition is less severe than in other 
liberalized postal markets; there are hardly any new competitors across all stages of the postal 
value chain. Instead, the trend in consolidation (collection and sorting) is growing faster than 
in other European markets. Mail items are handed over to Royal Mail’s network for delivery 
at low prices. This kind of access regulation strengthens the delivery organization and thus the 
position of Royal Mail in the market. The example shows that the original interventions may 
cause a follow-up regulatory intervention.  
From a regulatory-economic view, the situation in the British postal market is problematic. 
Universal service regulations are combined with asymmetric access regulations. It seems 
important that these asymmetries can be corrected with the new regulatory regime.308 
Ofcom currently proposes a deregulation of the British postal sector. The agency took over 
the responsibility for regulation in the postal sector from the former regulator Postcomm. A 
public consultation on the proposals for amendments of the regulatory framework was opened 
by the end of 2011 in line with the new postal service act of that same year. The overall 
objective of the Postal Services Act is to safeguard the universal service by ensuring that 
Royal Mail can attract external capital and deliver a commercial rate of return.309  
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Table 16: Institutional Dimensions of the Postal Market in Great Britain 
Institutional 
Dimensions & Cost 
Drivers 
Summary of Characteristics 
Number of Regulatory 
Actors 
 
In the UK the number of involved institutions is relatively high. In addition to 
Ofcom, the Competition Commission and the Office of Fair Trading also play 
their part. Moreover, Consumer Focus has extensive competences in the 
postal market. Before the merger with Consumer Focus, there was also the 
sector-specific Watchdog Postwatch. 
Modalities and Subject 
of information exchange 
In the old regime the requirements are very severe. Royal Mail has extensive 
obligations to inform with respect to quality, prices and terms of business.  
Interaction of sector-
specific regulation and 
competition law 
Not fully clarified. PostCom was a very strong institution. How this will work 
with Ofcom remains to be seen. A memorandum of understanding with the 
OFT exists. 
Regulatory Processes  Extensive regulations for reporting and publication for royal Mail. The price 
approval process is lengthy and intensive. 
The license fees for incumbent and competitors are very high. License 
holders are required to conduct accounts which separate revenue and costs in 
relation with postal services within the licensed area from other operations 
and to provide the information to Postcom on and an annual basis. 
Stability of Institutions 
(Organizational 
Perspective) 
Not very stable: Transfer of regulatory competence from Postcomm to Ofcom 
at the end of 2011. Repeated adjustments in the license regime. Conversion of 
Postwatch to Consumer Focus in 2008. 
Scope of Universal 
Service Obligation 
Relatively narrow  
Degree of 
Liberalization 
Fully liberalized in 2006 
Financing of the USO At present the USO is financed by licensed area revenue of Royal Mail 
ensured by price control. No net cost approach and no provision for a 
compensation fund. 
US Price Regulation Price-Cap Regulation (RPI-X). Price control mechanisms are also applied to 
bulk-mail services outside the USO. Due to condition 7 Royal Mail is obliged 
to take steps to ensure transparency of its prices and not to offer discounts 
without submitting to Postcomm and the consumer council details of the 
prices. More than 80 Percent of Royal Mails Revenues are under price 
control. Price controls are subject to major changes according to the new 
postal services act.  
Access Regime Mandatory access to Royal Mail’s Infrastructure. The price control says that 
access prices should be set with reference to a margin between the 
corresponding retail and access services (the so-called head room margin). 
De facto this implies a maximum price cap. Very low access prices. 
Stability of Institutions 
(Policy Perspective) 
Not very stable. E.g., the licensing regime has been changed. The whole 
regulatory framework and price controls are subject to change in 2012. 
Norms and 
Standardization 
Requirements 
High standardization requirements for quality measures. Condition 4 of Royal 
Mail’s license specifies standards and levels of compensation. The range of 
measures set is very extensive. 
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Labor Conditions 
 
 
There is a collective bargaining over terms and conditions of employment at 
the national level; these may differ (for example, over issues like maternity 
leave) between the various parts of Royal Mail. National agreements’ 
implementation is often delegated to local areas, which has resulted in local 
disputes. Royal Mail faces serious troubles with its deficit in pension funds.  
Source: by Author 
6.4. Conclusion 
The three cases clearly show that there is a huge variance in the institutional settings, the 
market structures and the development of competition in the described postal markets. The 
summarizing tables in the end of each case illustrate how different the characteristics of the 
institutional dimensions are. E.g., there is still a monopoly for letters up to 50g in 
Switzerland, while the other two postal markets had been opened for a couple of years. 
Another example is the completely different access regulation approaches chosen while 
pursuing the same objectives: namely to promote end-to-end competition. At the end, the 
outcomes and impacts of the chosen approaches differ as well. But, since the cases are 
presented in a purely descriptive manner, there is no analysis on how the different 
characteristics of the institutional dimensions influence the regulatory governance costs in the 
regulatory regimes. This analysis is done in the next chapter. Each type of regulatory 
governance costs (static-direct, static-indirect and dynamic) is discussed for each case before 
a comparative appreciation is given. 
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7. ANALYSIS & EXAMPLES: APPRECIATION OF REGULATORY 
GOVERNANCE COSTS 
In the following, we provide an overview of where and how the different costs of regulatory 
governance in the three different postal markets accrue. The chapter first compares the 
different types of governance costs per country, before concluding with an assessment of 
governance costs.  
7.1. Static Costs of Regulatory Governance I: Direct Costs 
As previously mentioned, the direct costs of regulatory governance accrue due to the 
institutional design and depend on the relationships and the separation of competences of the 
involved institutional actors.  
7.1.1.  Monitoring Costs 
The analysis of the different costs is structured as follows. Every category of costs is briefly 
discussed per country and a short comparative appreciation per category is given.   
Switzerland  
PostReg is a rather small agency with 6.4 full-time equivalents (9 persons) dealing with postal 
affairs. The Annual Budget, financed by the Ministry, is around 1.3 Million Euros.310 
In 2006, the OECD published a report, in which Switzerland was criticized for its rather 
unusual approach in regulatory matters in most infrastructure sectors, even though the 
function of the Price Supervisor was not studied in detail.311 The OECD report highlights, 
among others, “the absence of a coherent framework for the regulatory authorities” (69), 
which means that “Switzerland currently only is at an early stage of really independent 
sectoral regulators” (70), and concludes that the “evolution of regulation in the network 
industries has been slower in Switzerland than in the European countries” (139). It also 
criticizes the lack of independence of sector specific regulators when it comes to sector 
specific regulation. While Switzerland generally follows the EU Directives in substantive 
matters, it has yet to do so in institutional matters.  
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In the course of the legislative process, PostReg is interested in expanding its regulatory 
responsibilities and the competences in monitoring to sanction the operator(s). It is evident 
that the regulator has tried to influence the process and to stipulate its concerns in the new 
postal law. As part of the consultation process, PostReg already commented on the draft law 
and on the intention to transform Postreg into a PostCom. The regulator’s comment calls for 
(1) broader authority, (2) access regulation, (3) price cap regulation and (4) a clear 
competence in the price-setting process. The latter concern is supported by operators, since 
this may lead to a reduction of coordination costs mentioned in the section below.312 
Germany  
With its 2600 employees, the Federal Network Agency is a very big authority. According to 
IPC (2011) one hundred persons are dealing with the postal sector. WIK (2009b) estimates 
the number of persons dealing with postal issues at 48. Thus, the postal division seems to 
have grown. The budget is financed by the government.  
Every two years, the authority publishes a report on the postal market. According to Postal 
Act Art. 47, the network agency is obliged to inform legislative organs and the public about 
its activity and the developments in the postal sector. In doing so, it provides information 
about developments of the general conditions, corporate structure, net access, prices and 
competition. In the section on activities, licensing, price regulation, control of abusive 
practices, and monitoring of the universal service are described. Monitoring costs accrue, 
particularly in the areas of licensing, price regulation and universal service.313 Enterprises, 
which provide postal services, are under the obligation according to Art. 37 of the Postal Act 
to provide the Federal Network Agency with the information it needs to accomplish its duty 
to report. 
Although the DP AG is not specifically obligated by law to provide the universal service, it 
can be assumed that as a market-dominating enterprise it is more strongly monitored than the 
others. The tariffs of the market-dominating enterprise in the licensed sector have to be 
approved annually by the Federal Network Agency.314 In connection with the price approval, 
the Federal Cartel Office is also assigned with the responsibility of establishing market 
dominance and delimiting the relevant markets. The other prices of Deutsche Post are 
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monitored ex-ante. The Federal Network Agency and the Monopoly Commission call for a 
revision of the law, making possible a stronger ex-ante monitoring of access prices.  
Until 2004, the Federal Network Agency carried out its own end-to-end measurement for 
monitoring the compliance with quality requirements for letters. At the end of 2004, however, 
this approach had to be abandoned after the German Federal Court of Auditors criticized the 
Agency and Deutsche Post’s double end-to-end measurement . Since then only the DP AG 
has measured the processing time of letters. This resulted in a reduction of monitoring costs. 
In its Activity Report (2011b), the Federal Network Agency points out that an own, 
independent measurement of processing times is necessary. But so far this measurement could 
not be resumed, because the agency could not raise the financial means needed for an 
independent measurement.315  
United Kingdom 
The former regulatory authority Postcomm is one of Europe’s biggest postal regulators; it also 
has a large budget of about 10 million pounds. According to WIK (2009b), about 65 persons 
are dealing with postal issues.316 The budget is financed by the licensees, with Royal Mail 
bearing the biggest share. As mentioned above, today’s license fees in the British letter 
market are rather high for the competitors, too. 
Royal Mail is obligated by an extended license to provide the universal service. At the same 
time there are extensive requirements with regard to network access. Under the present 
regulatory regime the monitoring costs are rather high. As already mentioned above, Royal 
Mail, in its Business Report 2010-2011, quantifies the costs based on the license (for 
financing the Postcomm, supply of information and the costs for compliance) at about 50 
million British pounds. 
It remains unseen how the monitoring costs under the new regulatory regime will develop. In 
the new regime, Royal Mail is no longer obligated by a license to provide universal services, 
but has been appointed provisionally as provider of universal services by Ofcom. According 
to Ofcom (2011), the majority of price controls is to be abolished, and Royal Mail is to obtain 
more commercial freedom. However, according to the regulatory authority, Royal Mail has to 
become more efficient, and there is the risk that predominantly Royal Mail will make price 
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adjustments. Therefore, Ofcom already announced that the performance of Royal Mail will be 
closely monitored and that the balance between the increase in efficiency and price measures 
will be ensured.  
Comparative Appreciation: 
The comparison shows that the monitoring costs in the three countries differ. In all three 
countries there are far-reaching duties to supply information regarding the universal services. 
The main reason for the monitoring costs seems to be the universal service, the corresponding 
price control and access conditions. 
The size and the budget of the regulatory authority cannot be the sole criterion for 
determining monitoring costs. We notice, however, that while the biggest authority has been 
installed in Great Britain, the funding of universal services is at risk there. Moreover, the size 
of the regulatory authority did not guarantee the development of competition after 
liberalization. The means are predominantly used to monitor Royal Mail. Due to the high 
requirements to be met by the quality measurement in the universal service and the great 
number of products under price control, the monitoring costs are very high, particularly for 
the incumbent Royal Mail. Even several years after liberalization, it is mainly the incumbent 
who is monitored.  
7.1.2.  Compliance Costs 
Switzerland 
Due to the incumbent’s profit situation in recent years and that there is a certain market 
power, the price supervisor conducts extensive assessments of postal tariffs.317 The increasing 
involvement of different regulators also implies higher liabilities for operators regarding the 
provision of information. Furthermore, given that various regulators apply different methods 
and have different perceptions when they analyze postal matters, the operators have to 
increase their knowledge of the various methods, which increases compliance costs. 
In addition to reporting to the Federal Council (based on Article 42 of the Swiss Postal 
Ordinance), the incumbent is obliged to submit a comprehensive report about the compliance 
with the postal legislation to PostReg. The reporting requirements include the following 
issues: 
                                                 
317 See the section about coordination cost in the Swiss postal market. 
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- Density and evolution of the postal network 
- Costs of the universal services and the postal network 
- An outline of services classified as reserved, non-reserved and services under 
competition 
- Costs and revenues of the different services (reserved, non-reserved, competition) as 
well as the applied transfer prices and cost allocations 
- Results of the independent quality inspection concerning the quality of universal 
service and customer satisfaction 
- Intentions of development and changes in the universal service 
- Development of employment 
In its annual report, PostReg judges if the postal incumbent correctly discloses the financial 
regulatory statement, if the incumbent complies with the rules concerning prohibition of 
cross-subsidization, and if the quality requirements have been fulfilled.318  
The requirement that 90 percent of the population be able to reach a post office within 20 
minutes is unique throughout the world, no benchmark to measure this availability therefore 
exists. Accordingly, a new method that would make such a measurement possible had to be 
developed. The result was a complicated method: by means of geocoded population data 
provided by the Swiss national census and based on electronic geoinformation systems the 
value for the accessibility of the postal network is calculated at an annual basis.. This method 
was developed by Swisspost, tested and certified by an institute of the Ecole Polytechnique 
Fédéral and finally approved as the official measuring method by the postal regulator in 2004. 
In Switzerland, 97 percent of letters must be delivered on time. When tenders for the quality 
measuring system were invited, the post regulator was closely involved. In addition, the 
measurements are to correspond to the CEN Quality Standard EN 13580.319 Hence, the Swiss 
Post is free to choose its quality measuring systems. According to the new postal legislation, 
PostCom will have to approve the method for the end-to-end transit time measurement of 
letters and packages. The approval procedure and the need to verify the compliance with 
requirements and standards will also result in compliance costs. 
                                                 
318 See PostReg (2010) and Postal Ordinance (2003) Art. 42.   
319 See SNV (2002). 
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Germany 
The Federal Network Agency exercises a special control over the market-dominating 
enterprise DP AG in case it should abuse its position. In particular, this applies to the access 
to post office boxes and to the infrastructure. At first the Federal Network Agency asks the 
incumbent to stop the detected abuse. If there is no reaction, the authority can prescribe a 
behavior to DP AG or prohibit abusive behavior. Moreover, it can void contracts in whole or 
in part.320 
An important issue in connection with compliance costs is that of minimum wage in the 
postal sector. Due to its impact on the German postal market, minimum wage is dealt with 
under the section on dynamic costs. 
United Kingdom 
License holders in the UK are required to conduct accounts, which separate revenue and costs 
in relation to postal services within the licensed area from other operations and to provide the 
information on an annual basis to Postcomm. Furthermore, the licensees are required to 
provide the NRA with quarterly revenue and volume data for the licensed as well as the non-
licensed areas of their operations.321 
Furthermore, Royal Mail services are subject to extensive quality and performance 
obligations based on its license. These obligations are backed up by a compensation system 
for business customers. The compensation scheme involves a one-percent reduction in postal 
charges for each percent that Royal mails falls below the national delivery time target and a 
retail compensation system to compensate customers for domestic first class mail that fails to 
be delivered within three working days.  
Moreover, Postcomm is allowed to impose a monetary fine if it believes that Royal Mail has 
not made every reasonable effort to achieve the service targets. Due to condition 9 of the 
former license, Royal Mail is obliged to employ a competition compliance officer to facilitate 
compliance with the regulatory obligations under the license. 
To resolve risks concerning claims about unfair commercial advantages and as a reaction to a 
number of complaints regarding discriminatory behavior (as regards negotiations as well as 
Condition 10 of Royal Mail’s former license), Royal Mail established its separate wholesale 
                                                 
320 See Postal Act (1997b), Art. 32. 
321 See Ecorys (2008c). 
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unit in early 2006. The unit was formerly based within the regulatory affairs department of 
Royal Mail. Postcomm claimed the lack of physical separation of Royal Mail’s wholesale unit 
and the retail teams. The Agency asked for a full separation of data systems, accounting, and 
security systems.322 
Comparative Appreciation: 
In the first instance, the compliance costs depend on the duty to give information for the 
providers and the organization of the exchange of information. The providers of universal 
services, which for the most part are also the market-dominating enterprise, have the greatest 
duties to give information. Where costs accrue based on the terms of license, the incumbents 
bear the biggest share of costs. The compliance costs get even higher if several authorities ask 
for information and the number of interfaces for the enterprises increases. This is particularly 
true for Switzerland.  
Royal Mail is even obligated to appoint a compliance officer. With the organizational 
displacement of the wholesale unit the compliance requirements have an impact on the 
existing organization. A special form of compliance costs is the imposed compensation 
payments for customers of Royal Mail for noncompliance with the quality requirements. The 
regulator can also impose a fine. Of the compared postal markets, Great Britain seems to have 
the highest compliance costs, which Royal Mail quantifies at 50 million pounds. Moreover, 
with respect to the license costs in Great Britain, they are also relatively high for the 
competitors with a standard license. 
So far no country charges license costs to finance the universal service. With the charged fees, 
the procedural costs and operating costs of the regulatory authorities are covered. 
7.1.3.  Coordination Costs 
Switzerland 
As a specialized department for postal matters, representative of the owners’ interests, and 
principal of the sector-specific regulator, the DETEC holds different positions.  On one hand, 
it prepares (in consultation with the FDF) the Federal Council’s decisions about the 
achievement of the strategic goals of the incumbent. Simultaneously, PostReg is 
                                                 
322 See Ecccles (2009). Royal mail was in contravention of condition 10-2 of its license, which says not to 
disclose any information gained through the provision of access to the facilities to any other business of Royal 
Mail. 
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administratively attached to the DETEC, the same department that holds the administrative 
lead in the postal legislation reform.  
As mentioned in Section 2, postal markets (postal operators, in particular) were historically 
isolated from anti-trust laws and regulatory intervention. At the beginning, DETEC, the 
competition commission, and the price supervisor were concerned with regulatory issues in 
the Swiss postal market. In 2000, the price supervisor began to pay attention to postal tariffs 
for the first time since the postal reform in 1998. The new sector-specific regulator PostReg 
was set up simultaneously with the implementation of the new postal ordinance in 2004. This 
institutional rearrangement not only increased the number of involved regulators, but the 
particular interests of the various regulatory authorities in the postal market as well. The non-
specific regulators are increasingly active and tend to expand the competences in the former 
monopolistic postal market. Except for the verification of compliance with the prohibition of 
cross-subsidizing, the current regulatory framework does not give any competences to the 
sector-specific regulator with respect to the surveillance of competition. Issues concerning the 
incumbent’s potential abuse of market power are subject to the ComCo. In the course of the 
legislative process, PostReg tries to expand its responsibilities and competences to impose 
sanctions related to the surveillance of competition.323  
The incumbent postal operator criticizes the lack of legal certainty regarding PostReg’s 
competences and enforcement capacity under the postal act of 1997 and its modification 
ordinance in 2004. In the meantime, the regulator and Swiss Post bargained and accepted a 
rather informal modus vivendi for the interim period until the new law will be enacted. 
The price supervisor is increasingly interested in postal product prices in the non-reserved 
area (postal items heavier than 50g). In the reserved area, where prices are verified and finally 
fixed by the DETEC (following the recommendation of PostReg), the price supervisor has the 
right to give a recommendation but no power to enforce it autonomously. In this context, it is 
worth mentioning that the various regulatory bodies involved and the Federal Council (in its 
role as owner) have different criteria to assess profits and hence the prices of the incumbent:  
- Price Supervisor: Due to the incumbent’s current profit situation (910/728/825 million 
CHF in 2010/2009/2008)324, the price supervisor examines whether Swiss Post has 
                                                 
323 See PostReg (2008). 
324 See Swiss Post (2011b). 
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been realizing inadequate profits. He argues that current postal tariffs are too high and 
that earnings should be redistributed to the citizens in the form of tariff reductions.325  
- PostReg: The Regulator is less interested in the incumbent’s profit situation than in the 
cost structure behind the prices, as long as there is no reasonable suspicion regarding 
an abuse of market power.  
- Government: As the owner and the strategic principal, the state profits largely from a 
well-performing incumbent.326 
- Competition Commission: ComCo is unlikely to be interested in the profits of the 
postal incumbent. However, ComCo became active in the postal sector at the end of 
2008 as Swiss Post announced various acquisitions in the field of early newspaper 
delivery, and a potential abuse of market power was suspected.327  
Nevertheless, considering the coordination of regulators the mentioned OECD report 
highlights a coordination deficit between sector specific regulation and cross-sectoral 
regulation (e.g., competition regulation and price regulation). 
Germany  
In the German letter market, a total of 3 actors–the Federal Network Agency, the Federal 
Cartel Office and the Monopoly Commission–are concerned with the postal matters. While 
the Federal Network Agency and the Federal Cartel intervene actively in the market, the 
Monopoly Commission has more of an observer status in the field of policy advice.328  
In its expert reports, the commission makes policy recommendations. In its 2011 report, the 
Monopoly Commission pointed out that in contrast to the other infrastructures (power, gas 
and telecommunications), it had no right to inspect the files of the Federal Network Agency in 
postal regulation. As a policy recommendation, it therefore invites the legislator in its report 
to create the legal basis that would give the Monopoly Commission the right to inspect those 
files. 
                                                 
325 In March 2009, the Price Supervisor reached an agreement with Swiss Post: Swiss Post lowers some of its 
letter prices (especially large letters) and simplifies its range as of 1 July 2009. The intended adjustment of 
parcel prices and prices for international consignments, originally planned for April 2009, got deferred by a 
year. See Price Supervisor (2009). 
326 In the accounting year 2007, Swiss Post realized a profit for the first time, which allowed for a payout of 300 
million CHF (200 millions in 2008) to the Swiss Confederation. 
327 See ComCo (2009). 
328 See Federal Cartel Office (2010, p.15).  
Regulatory Institutions and Governance Costs: The Case of the Postal Sector 
160 
The cooperation between Federal Network Agency and Federal Cartel Office is regulated 
under Article 48 of the Postal Act. Together with the Federal Cartel Office, the Federal 
Network Agency decides on the delimitation of factually and territorially relevant markets 
and on the identification of a market-dominating position within the Postal Act. When the 
Federal Network Agency reaches decisions in the field of price regulation329 or network 
access330, the Federal Cartel Office has the right to comment before the procedure is 
completed. 
United Kingdom 
The number of regulatory actors in the British postal market is rather high. Today they 
include the Ofcom, the Competition Commission, the Office for Fair Trading and Consumer 
Focus. The sector-specific regulation is very pronounced and aims almost exclusively at 
Royal Mail. The cooperation between Ofcom and the Competition Commission is regulated 
in Section 59 and 60 of the Postal Services Act 2011.331 
There is a cooperation agreement between Postcomm and the OFT. Whether it will be 
transferred to Ofcom remains unclear. Since the regulatory regime is to be adjusted in 2012, 
the coordination among the involved authorities will in all likelihood also be discussed. 
Comparative Appreciation: 
The more actors are in charge of regulatory tasks or with the observation of the market, the 
higher the coordination costs will be. In all three compared markets several actors are 
involved in the postal market. While the division of roles is quite clear in Germany, there are 
strong overlaps in the Swiss postal market. In this connection, the different goals and the 
assessment criteria seem to be problematic. 
As a result, there are uncertainties about competences. The new Swiss postal legislation 
foresees another actor, the BAKOM, which is given tasks of implementing the promotion of 
the press, monitoring universal payment services, international relations and policy advice. 
This will make the regime even more complex and coordination costs will increase. 
                                                 
329 See Postal Act (1997b) section 5. 
330 See Postal Act (1997b) section 6. 
331 See Postal services Act (2011). 
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The division of roles in policy advice also remains unclear. The postal regulatory authority is 
not expected to assume policy advice functions. In Germany, a good solution seems to have 
been found with the installation of the Monopoly Commission. In Great Britain, the 
regulatory authority itself conducts the consultations on the future regulatory regime. In 
Switzerland, PostReg accomplishes some policy tasks, and this function will be assumed by 
BAKOM in the future. 
In the three postal markets, the regulation of market power has not yet been clarified. In all 
three cases, the competition commission and the sector-specific regulatory authority play their 
part, confirming the statement in chapter two about the unclear division of roles between the 
different authorities: even in liberalized letter markets no phasing-out can be identified. The 
sector-specific authorities maintain their strong role in the postal markets. It is interesting to 
compare the developments in Germany and Great Britain: while the newly installed 
regulatory authority Ofcom has a tendency to relax regulation, the Monopoly Commission 
and the Federal Network Agency request a stronger ex-ante regulation (particularly for access 
prices). From an economic view, the call for more ex-ante regulation in the field of network 
access is incomprehensible. And also when we observe the development in the German letter 
market, we see that more end-to-end competition has evolved here than in Great Britain.  
Regulatory Institutions and Governance Costs: The Case of the Postal Sector 
162 
7.2. Static Costs of Regulatory Governance II: Indirect Costs  
As noted above, the indirect costs of regulation are somehow related to the direct costs, 
though mostly as the outcomes and effects of regulation in the market. In particular, indirect 
costs are in relationship with the allocation of competences and the instruments implemented 
to regulate.332 
7.2.1.  Quantities and Prices   
Switzerland  
Prices in the Swiss letter market are relatively stable. The last increase in prices for letters 
took place in 2004; a planned mark-up was postponed until April 2010 due to an agreement 
with the Price Supervisor. Since 2004, the price of a single piece priority letter has been 1 
CHF. The expectation of falling prices in the postal market has always been mentioned as an 
argument for the full liberalization of the postal sector. But currently the pieces will not be 
lowered, at least not for private customers, because about 85 percent of the revenue is earned 
through business and bulk mail. As mentioned above, a rigid regulation of prices means that 
new or innovative pricing models cannot be established by the operator. In Switzerland, 
prices in the reserved area are fixed by DETEC. So far, universal service has been funded by 
the residual monopoly.333  
Furthermore, the Swiss experience in the parcel market shows that in the course of the full 
market liberalization in 2004, suppliers were able to negotiate the mutual use of infrastructure 
on a commercial basis. In 2006, Swiss Post implemented a basic agreement with private 
postal service providers, which defined the mutual access to the infrastructure. Based on this 
contract, Swiss Post and DHL negotiated the access conditions to the incumbent’s P.O. box 
facilities in summer 2008.334 
In 2009, the incumbent is expanding its operations in the early newspaper delivery. This is 
done mainly through the acquisition of established delivery organizations of the large 
publishers in the Swiss midland. There is a certain risk that a large manufacturer builds a 
                                                 
332 See Jaag (2007) to read more about costs of regulation in relation with universal service.  
333 See Maegli et al. (2010a). 
334 See Swiss Post (2008). 
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natural monopoly and gains considerable market power.335 But one also has to consider 
whether a duplication of logistic networks in the night and early morning hours is 
economically reasonable and efficient.  Furthermore, the horizontal integration of early 
delivery organizations facilitates the achievement of substantial economies of scale. The 
willingness of publishers to sell the vertically integrated early delivery organizations (which 
are actually far away from their traditional core business) shows that they assume that the 
early delivery can be operated more efficiently.336  
The Competition Commission therefore evaluates both situations, deciding which 
consequences it is willing to accept.  If it does not approve the acquisition, economies of scale 
are difficult or impossible to achieve in the early newspaper delivery. If the merger is 
approved, however, it leads to a concentration of suppliers. Both solutions have different 
impacts on the further development of the market. The competition commission finally 
approved the acquisition in autumn 2009.337   
Germany 
The development of the price for a 20 g standard letter of the DPAG has been mostly constant 
since the year 2000. In 2003, the respective postage was lowered by EUR 0.01 to EUR 0.55. 
Thus, the price development for the 20 g standard letter is slightly declining, both nominally 
and in real terms.   
WIK (2010) observes that at the moment end-to-end-competition and network access exist in 
parallel in Germany. While the volume of items received via network access showed a 
relatively strong increase in past years, the increase of the volume of the items directly 
delivered by competitors was weaker.  
Most of the competitors‘ letter prices including VAT are below the prices of the Deutsche 
Post AG (DPAG), which until mid 2010 was exempt from VAT.338 Effective as of 1 July 
2010, the VAT privilege of the Deutsche Post is abolished. The revision of the VAT law in 
                                                 
335 However, a natural monopoly in the early delivery business is even easier contestable than the natural 
monopoly in the traditional daily mail delivery: sorting costs are much lower and the costs accrue in the sub-
processes of transport and delivery. 
336 Knieps (2007) states that the implementation of separate home delivery systems by different publishers and 
operators constitutes an inefficient duplication of costs. 
337 See ComCo (2009). 
338 See Federal Network Agency (2009, p. 45). 
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the postal market draws a line between universal for private customers exempt from tax and 
tax liability for bulk deliverers and business customers.  
In connection with the market development in Germany, minimum wage is certainly an 
interesting issue: the fixing of minimum wage by the government resulted in a long legal 
dispute, which led to much uncertainty regarding security of investment.339 
United Kingdom 
The Ecorys Study (2008b) includes a survey that asked the three biggest competitors (among 
other things) for their opinion about the UK price control. The statements are fundamentally 
different. Whilst royal Mail states that it is prevented from competing with the other operators 
from the pricing perspective. The competitors UK Mail and TNT claim that Royal Mail’s 
pricing policies are irrational and aimed at finding opportunities for competitors rather than 
recognizing needs of customers. Therefore, TNT filed a complaint with Postcomm about the 
pricing policies of Royal Mail. In their conclusion on pricing, Ecorys (2008b) states that the 
main battlefield in the next few years will be the pricing policies of Royal Mail and how 
Postcomm will deal with the issue. 
A couple of years ago, the definition of the USO and its financing came under discussion 
because (1) Royal Mail reported as of 2007/2008 an estimated loss of £100 million for the 
universal service340 and (2) because Royal Mail was exempted from VAT for its universal 
services. Thus, the competitor TNT filed a court complaint to dispute the validity of the VAT 
exemption from services provided by Royal Mail, saying it provided comparable services but 
was subject to VAT. The European Court of Justice took the view that the services provided 
by the two companies were not comparable and that Royal Mail supplies postal services 
under a legal regime, which is substantially different from that of an operator such as TNT. 
Royal Mail was designated in 2001 as the only universal postal service provider in the United 
Kingdom. Later, in 2006, the UK postal market was fully liberalized, without affecting the 
status and obligations of Royal Mail, the court said.341 Hooper (2008) states that the VAT 
distortion in the British mail market does almost not apply in the access case but nevertheless 
it constitutes a key barrier, which hinders end-to-end competition.342 Between 2003 and 2011, 
                                                 
339 A detailed description of the situation in Germany is given in the next section.  
340 See Ecorys (2008b). 
341 See European Court of Justice (2009).  
342 See the Hooper Report (2008). 
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the prices for standard letters, first class stamps respectively, increased from 26 pence to 46 
pence. During the same period, the prices for second-class stamps increased from 20 pence to 
36 pence. 
The prices have increased, although the majority of prices of Royal Mail have been subject to 
price control since 2006. Originally, the control was set up so that in real terms the letter price 
would decrease by 1 percent per year. But the price control mechanism also includes various 
corrective measures. According to one of these mechanisms, the volume of mail items is 
considered when the price is set and approved. Since the volume of letters was declining 
strongly, Royal Mail was able to increase the prices between 2006 and 2010 to compensate 
partially for the falling volume through price adjustments. According to Ofcom (2011), the 
prices for private customers have risen faster and stronger than the bulk mail prices. Ofcom 
(2011) concludes that in the future there will be further price increases in order to ensure the 
universal service in a sustainable way. In March 2012, Ofcom relaxed its rules and allowed 
Royal Mail to set the price of first-class and business mail. Royal Mail quickly announced 
record increases of a first class stamp from 46p to 60p on 30 April, with second-class rising 
from 36p to 50p, the steepest stamp price increase in over ten years.  
According to the Agency, this is not the only measure. Due to the high fixed costs and to the 
slow implementation of the modernization plans, Royal Mail was not able to reduce the 
process costs or to keep up with the decreasing volumes. As a consequence, unit costs have 
significantly gone up. Now the regulatory authority Ofcom asks Royal Mail to realize 
significant cost reductions and increases in efficiency. 
Comparative Appreciation: 
The costs regarding quantities and prices depend on the degree to which regulation influences 
the development of the market and therefore the consumers. This mainly applies to the price 
level. What is expected of the liberalization of the postal markets is the improvement of 
services and a decline in prices. In all three countries, the prices in the universal service (at 
least in the reserved service) are subject to approval by an authority. In Switzerland and in 
Germany, the retail prices remained constant during the last ten years. In Great Britain, they 
have increased considerably. However, the original price level was very low.  
With respect to prices the current developments of volumes play an important part. When 
letter volumes decline, unit costs increase. As long as the costs of the universal service are 
borne by the incumbents themselves and no financing mechanisms exist, the prices will have 
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to adjust to market developments. Otherwise, the funding base for the universal service breaks 
away in the medium term. A rigid price regulation system combined with high requirements 
for range of services, quality and accessibility in the universal service endangers the funding 
of the universal service. This becomes clear in the case of the United Kingdom and is 
confirmed by both regulator and incumbent. The approval procedure for product prices also 
has its impact. If it lasts too long, the situation in the market may have changed in the 
meantime and new price adjustments may already be required when the price measures are 
implemented. The prices in the postal markets of Switzerland and Germany have been 
relatively stable so far. The faster market conditions change, however, the shorter the reaction 
time has to be. 
The price situation for bulk mail (major customers, consolidators or competitors) has 
improved in the compared markets. Based on the organization of the access regime, this has 
different effects. Access prices are very low and specified via headroom margin, especially in 
Great Britain. Royal Mail has declared that it de facto subsidizes its competitors due to the 
low access prices, since the prices do not cover the costs: because the volumes decrease and 
the unit costs increase, Royal Mail bears the load of these costs.343 The respective effects on 
the development of end-to-end competition have already been described above. In summary, 
the regulation has the opposite effect of the one originally planned. The result:  
- no end-to-end competition and lacking incentives for competitors to establish their 
own networks 
- no efficiency gains in the incumbent’s value chain  
- a monopolization of the incumbent’s delivery system  
- universal service is endangered  
- bad financial situation of the incumbent Royal Mail 
In comparison, the end-to-end competition in Germany has already developed relatively even 
before the market was opened. Today, the access prices are controlled ex-post and not 
predetermined. Since 1998, the competitors have attained about 10 percent market shares with 
their own delivery networks, demonstrating that both end-to-end competition and upstream 
competition can exist side by side. The increase of DP AG’s discount tariffs in 2010 lets us 
assume that the access business model is gaining in importance for the DP AG.  
                                                 
343 See Hooper (2010). 
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The structure of operators active in the German letter market differs from that in Great 
Britain. Even after a consolidation phase, the number of active licensees (around 600-650) is 
relatively high. There are many regional providers with regional collection and delivery 
services and few big competitors who by means of regional providers could offer area-wide 
delivery. In Great Britain, the number of licensees is rather small.  
An important element of short and long term market development in a personnel-intensive 
sector - such as the post - are the terms of employment, specifically minimum wage. 
Minimum wage can turn into a high hurdle for potential competitors who start their business 
from scratch, preventing market entrance or impairing the financial situation of the 
competitors. Even if this was not the main reason for the financial difficulties and the failure 
of the PIN Group in Germany, the fixing of high minimum wages certainly played a role in 
this case.  
A VAT regime, where the exemption from VAT is too one-sided, can have a similar effect. It 
can certainly be argued that the exemption from VAT for the designated universal service 
operator constitutes a financial assistance for the universal service. Depending on the scope of 
VAT exemption, it can also be a competitive advantage. The type of regime introduced in 
Germany after the decision of the European Court of Justice, according to which operators 
provide the area-wide services of the universal service, seems to make sense. However, this 
only applies to products for private customers and not for bulk mail. As a consequence, many 
competitors are again excluded from exemption. In Great Britain, only Royal Mail is 
excluded from VAT, though there is no other provider active in the universal service. In 
Switzerland, Swiss Post has paid VAT on a voluntary basis since 2009, although there is an 
exemption for items below 50g. 
7.2.2.  Capacity and Technology Choice 
Switzerland  
Switzerland maintains one of the densest postal outlet networks in the world. Even in a fully 
liberalized market, it is in the incumbent’s commercial interest to have a modern and 
nationwide postal network in order to provide adequate and cost efficient services. Therefore, 
it is debatable whether a legally regulated infrastructure contract is needed or whether this 
leads to an efficient provision of postal services. Even though the definition of the availability 
of postal access points delivers a certain value-added for residential customers, future-
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oriented and innovative solutions with focus on the changing customer needs and 
technological developments get partially disabled through excessively rigid definitions. 
Examples of modern solutions are postal agencies operated by third parties, a definition of the 
Universal Service that allows for electronic delivery of postal items (which allows for 
flexibility in physical delivery frequencies). Agencies operated by third parties have much 
longer opening times than traditional post offices, which is in line with changing customer 
needs. Whether the design of the postal network is advantageous to the citizens depends more 
than ever not only on geographical accessibility, but also on whether the offered portfolio of 
products and services is in accordance with changing customer needs. 
In its business report, Swiss Post (2011b) states that it is in competition with 80 percent of its 
turnover, and (with the remaining 20 percent) in competition with electronic means of 
communication with its products in the reserved, the regulated service respectively.344 This 
means that the post is in competition with other technologies. Swiss Post, therefore, wants to 
position itself at the interface between physical and electronic products. The market segment 
assigned to the letter is no longer called letter market, but, more comprehensively, 
communication market. However, today’s regime, which refers exclusively to the letter, does 
not take this fact into account. Only the new act takes up the idea of a technologically neutral 
delivery (physical or electronic) in the universal service. In this way, the legislator allows for 
the social and technological change. Whether this possibility will really be put into practice 
and what impact the development of the universal service345 will have on the delivered 
quantities remains open. Swiss Post already offers corresponding products outside the 
universal service.346  
In recent years, the incumbent has been investing heavily into his sorting facilities. The 
investment into three new sorting facilities and the centralization of the sorting process grant 
Swiss Post long-term savings of about 150 million CHF annually. Furthermore, the 
reorganization results in substantial efficiency gains in the provision of postal services.  
During the second half of 2011, Swiss Post introduced the so-called sequencing in some 
regions. This technology makes it possible to sort a considerable part of the mail 
                                                 
344 See Swiss Post (2011b). 
345 For example the delivery days in rural and remote regions. 
346 The Swiss Post has established itself at the interface between the physical and digital world. According to a 
study by UPU, Swiss Post, with its hybrid and digital products and services is among the best postal 
enterprises in this field. See Swiss Post (2012) and UPU (2012).  
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automatically down to the sequence of personal mailboxes. Manual sorting is no longer 
necessary. This is a reaction to the increasing cost pressure in delivery. The introduction of 
sequencing requires infrastructural investments. At the same time, the new technology 
reduced the workload for the post by a total of around 270 personnel units compared to 
today.347 Additionally, Swiss Post has invested into new delivery vehicles in recent years. In 
2008, it started converting its vehicle fleet. By 2016, all mopeds are to be replaced by electric 
scooters.348 
Germany  
As mentioned above, competition in relation to other competitors developed well in Germany. 
The competitors of Deutsche Post found ways to set up end-to-end delivery networks. Local 
providers of postal services join platforms like Mail Alliance in order to offer area-wide 
services. By 2011, Mail Alliance has already attained a service coverage of 75 percent of 
German households. It is certainly decisive that the different small networks are interoperable 
and that the processes have been successfully approved. 
The German postal market is also affected by declining letter volumes. Therefore, Deutsche 
Post also outs its hope on innovation in delivery. In order to meet changing customer needs, 
for instance, it introduced the so-called pack station. The pack station is an automatic parcel 
delivery system of DP AG. Countrywide there are currently about 2500 automats (as of 
November 2011), where the customer can pick up and deliver certain items around the clock. 
The E-PostLetter of DP AG is an example of the necessary preoccupation with new 
technologies that are not directly connected to the original workflow of postal enterprises. 
Here, the DP AG competes not with other postal enterprises, but directly with enterprises like 
1&1 and the Deutsche Telecom. The E-PostLetter is expected to help compensate the decline 
in the physical sector. The Federal Network Agency has also given attention to the E-
PostLetter. Since the physical delivery of the E-PostLetter corresponds to the delivery of a 
standard letter, the price for it is subject to approval. At the request of the Deutsche Post the 
price was fixed at 0.39 Euro.349 And thus the physical delivery of the E-Post letter has been 
regulated. As mentioned above, the Federal Network Agency requests, that because the 
technological developments and E-Substitution, that the regulatory framework must change. 
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United Kingdom 
The combination of mandatory access and headroom regulation was originally intended to 
accelerate the evolution of competition. Postcomm estimated that new entrants would be 
likely to use the opportunity of access to royal mail’s facilities to realize economies of scales, 
which in turn facilitates the development of their own end-to-end networks. Instead, the trend 
in consolidation (collection and sorting) has been growing much faster than in other European 
markets. Mail items are handed over to Royal Mail’s network for delivery at low prices.  
After the full market opening in the UK, the universal service essentially remained, and the 
definition of the USO in the UK is still more extensive than required in the European  
Directive. Royal Mail therefore claims that the definition of the USO should be narrowed. 
Futhermore, Royal Mail states that stamp prices should cover economic costs of providing the 
service. TNT argues that the number of days for deliveries and collection could be reduced to 
five days, but that the decision should be left to Royal Mail. The other major competitor, UK 
Mail, is also in favor of reducing the delivery days and mentions that there is a potential 
opportunity to reduce the costs of the USO.350 In the end the access regime had the 
consequence that competitors have not established their own access networks. They are not 
motivated to invest into other technologies because of the low access prices. If competitors do 
not invest into their own networks based on the attractive access conditions, the product range 
will be predominantly geared to the products and services offered by the incumbent.351 
Consequently, the competitors’ business model will rely on the incumbent’s business model. 
That is exactly what happened in the UK. 
Due to the definition of the universal service, the range of products offered by Royal Mail is 
strongly standardized. As the strong reduction of letter volumes shows, consumer behavior 
changed significantly during the period after the market was fully opened, and the products in 
the universal service were not adjusted. The requirement of six delivery days per week 
remains enforced. If no investments into new technologies are made, there will be no 
innovation in the postal market. According to Hooper (2010), the competitors of Royal Mail 
complain that its delivery, compared to the best in class, is very inefficient. Therefore, the 
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competitors also wonder why they should finance such an inefficient system with higher 
access prices. 
In contrast, Royal Mail has not been motivated to invest into new technologies, since the 
existing infrastructure is used to full capacity by the competitors’ letters. Together with 
strongly declining volumes, this has fatal consequences: Royal Mail is in bad financial 
condition and at the same time has to realize an extensive modernization program. The 
modernization program of Hooper (2010) also proposes technological measures:  
- higher degree of automatization in the processes of Royal Mail 
- rationalization measures within the network of mail centers 
- diversification into new revenue streams352 
Another issue with access agreement is the length of negotiations of the parties. TNT, for 
example, states that one of the most important reasons to opt for the standard national access 
agreement instead of negotiating its own conditions with Royal Mail was that a potential long 
period of negotiations could be avoided. In turn, this is a compromise where TNT chose to 
reduce the time to market instead of optimizing its access conditions. 
TNT stopped its own end-to-end delivery and now concentrates again on the consolidation 
business in the UK. Even if the overall mail volumes in Britain are declining, the other 
operators succeeded to increase their volumes in the upstream markets. Approximately more 
than every third letter in the UK is collected by competitors of Royal Mail, but finally handed 
over to Royal Mail for the delivery. In January 2012, TNT commented as follows on the 
possibility to resume end-to-end delivery: “It’s something that’s been under consideration, but 
nothing is being launched. The company cannot roll anything out until there’s changes in the 
VAT regime, and that’s something the government has to agree to change.”353 
Comparative Appreciation: 
The examples show different aspects of the selection and further development of 
technologies. On one hand, increases in efficiency in the traditional value chain of the letter 
must be achieved through investments into the sorting and delivery technology. On the other 
hand, the preoccupation with technologies becomes necessary which so far were not known or 
used in the postal sector. Basically, potential entrants into the postal market have to ask 
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themselves whether they should invest into a shrinking market or not. If the market is entered, 
the selection of the business model very much depends on the general market structure and 
the corresponding volumes. 
If access conditions and prices of the postal infrastructure are fixed by law in an ex-ante 
manner, this may cause negative impacts on the amortization of the sorting devices. 
Moreover, it prevents the development of new pricing solutions in the form of negotiations 
between the incumbents and market entrants. 
In Great Britain, the costs regarding capacity and technology choice are very high to access 
regime and price regulation. The shows illustratively how regulatory conditions have their 
effect on the products and technology choice.  
The example of Great Britain clearly shows that access regulation promoted the business 
model of consolidators. Neither Royal Mail nor the competitors made sustainable investments 
into new technologies. This kind of access regulation not only strengthens the traditional 
delivery organization, but also weakens the position of Royal Mail in the upstream market. 
Royal Mail has hardly invested into increases in efficiency and new technologies. After TNT 
made efforts to establish its own delivery system in towns, the enterprise has withdrawn again 
and now concentrates on the consolidation business. As already mentioned above, the 
conclusion that the new regulatory authority Ofcom has drawn about the present regulatory 
regime is very clear: Regulation has failed in Post.  
By comparison, these costs concerning capacity and technology choice are rather low in 
Germany and Switzerland. The example of Germany shows that competitors invest into end-
to-end networks. Here, in addition to deliverers of letter mail and consolidators, the additional 
business model of the networker has established itself. The latter invests into platforms, 
making the interoperability between regional providers of letter services work. They offer the 
associated partners a platform for the central control of letter mail delivery and services such 
as marketing and quality management. 
In Switzerland and Germany, investments of the incumbents into new technologies can be 
observed. Particularly in the field of hybrid solutions and electronic delivery, the two 
enterprises have made investments. It remains to be seen how these investments will pay off. 
Here, the new Swiss Postal Act points in a new direction. New technologies are made 
possible as alternative delivery forms in the universal service. This motivates operators to 
invest into the respective technologies.  
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7.3. Dynamic Costs of Regulatory Governance 
In the following, we give some examples of dynamic costs of regulatory governance in the 
postal sector. In general, they occur as a consequence of static costs and in combination with 
unclear regulatory ruling ending in juridical proceedings, with too rigid regulatory regimes 
that hinder the development of markets or with unforeseen consequences of regulation. Since 
the impact on product and process cannot be considered in total isolation from each other, the 
comparison for both types is made without a clear separation.  
Switzerland 
As of yet, it has been difficult to estimate how regulatory dynamics affect the evolution of the 
market. The example of the Swiss postal law reform clearly shows that the sector-specific 
regulator is trying to influence the formation of regulatory institutions, and hence the 
evolution of the regulatory environment. Due to the pursuit of broader powers to direct, legal 
access regulation, price cap regulation and a clear assignment in the pricing process, the 
regulator seeks to defend its own interests and tries to enhance its institutional legitimacy. 
There is a risk of over-regulation, and of inhibiting rather than stimulating the development of 
the market.354 Against this background, it is of great interest that no unnecessary requirements 
be laid down and fixed in new postal laws: regulation should not hinder the market’s 
development but rather facilitate the phasing-out of regulation after a successful liberalization. 
The example of the Swiss postal market shows that the connection of stable institutions can 
have both positive and negative effects. In effect today is a postal act that was originally 
enforced in 1997 and later adapted in 2003 and 2009. As early as autumn 2002, the parliament 
discussed the full opening of the letter market and decided to approach it. Historically, the 
development was as follows:355 
Originally, the Federal Council foresees a gradual procedure for the market opening. As a first 
step in 2004, the parcels market should be fully opened; as a second step in 2006, the same 
should be done for the letter market except for letters to 100 g.  
For the final decisions, the Federal Council reserves the right, before opening the postal 
market further, to commission an evaluation of the market opening thus realized. On 1 May 
2006, the Federal Council took note that the policy of a gradual, controlled opening that had 
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been followed since 1998 was successful. The two central goals–to offer basic services of 
good quality to the population in all parts of the country, and to safeguard the funding of these 
basic services–could be achieved. At the same time, the Federal Council observed that for the 
further opening process a total revision of the Postal Act and of the Postal Organization Act 
had to be initiated, because the then-current legislation did not permit a total opening of the 
market.    
After the consultation procedure, concluded in 2008, the new Postal Act and the Postal 
Organization Act were submitted to parliament. In political circles, the bill gave rise to some 
controversy. The most controversial points of the bill were the time schedule for the market 
opening presented by the Federal Council and the line of action proposed for lowering the 
letter monopoly from 100g to 50g, and finally down to 0g. The Federal Council took into 
account the objections: in the draft act, the full market opening was formulated separately as a 
federal decree subject to a possible referendum. Thus, the eligible voters were given the 
opportunity to demand for a popular vote on the full market opening. This decision did not 
satisfy the parliament and politics. In December 2010, the new legislation was approved by 
parliament. The original decision to implement the total market opening in stages was again 
postponed.356 The new act was expected to enter into force in the second half of 2012.  
Consequently, the current revision of the law in Switzerland does not include a total opening 
of the market. Three years after entry into force of the new legislation, the Federal Council 
has to present to parliament a report on further steps that could be taken to reduce the 
monopoly. This report will probably propose full market opening. As mentioned above, this 
full opening will not be realized before 2015; thus, from the time of the original decision in 
2004, it will likely take more than 10 years to implement. Consequently, the major part of 
letter mail will remain in the reserved sector for years to come. It will be interesting to see 
how competition develops. It can be expected that no new enterprises will become active in 
the market. Another interesting aspect is the development of the market entrant Quickmail, 
and the question of whether it can achieve its goals under the given conditions.   
Although it will not open the market for the time being, Switzerland, with its new Postal Act, 
is more progressive than other European countries with respect to the definition of the 
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universal service.357 Switzerland was the first country to include a discretionary provision 
permitting technology-neutral delivery in the new Postal Act of 17 December 2010.358 While 
so far this idea did not become part of the corresponding decree of the federal council, it 
remains possible as an option. It remains open, therefore, what dynamic effect this will have 
and whether the definition of the universal service will be implemented. Politics, it seems, are 
not ready for this. Since questions about the definition of the universal service are closely 
connected to the question of market opening, as shown above, a political debate on a possible 
adjustment will probably only become possible upon a decision on market opening. 
Germany 
Expecting that operators with low wage strategies will enter the market, unions and some 
political parties demand a minimum wage for the postal sector. They argue that without a 
minimum wage, the DP AG cannot effectively stand its ground under competitive 
conditions.359 Furthermore, they state that low wage strategies are immoral, since employees 
depend on additional social security transfer payments.    
As an accompanying measure to the complete opening of the market, the Federal Ministry for 
Labor and Social Affairs, on 28 December 2007, fixed a binding minimum wage in the letter 
services sector. This minimum wage was negotiated by the Verdi union and the Employers’ 
Association for Postal Services. The negotiated minimum wage of 9.80 Euro per hour exceeds 
the average wage paid by the competitors of DP AG by 20 to 30 percent. As a result, the 
introduced minimum wage has been criticized by the Ministry of Economics and Technology, 
the Federal Network Agency and the Monopoly Commission. The biggest competitors of the 
DP AG, especially TNT and the PIN group complain publically and accuse the government of 
not considering the counterproposal of 7.50 Euro per hour. Several parties (TNT, PIN and the 
association of couriers) filed a lawsuit against the German Government with the intention of 
having the decision declared null and void. They argued that the fixing of the minimum wage 
infringes on the competitors’ right to negotiate their own Collective Wage Agreements with 
the unions. Although in March 2008 the Administrative Court of Berlin and in December 
2008 the Higher Administrative Court of Berlin-Brandenburg confirmed the legal opinion of 
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TNT Post, the legal dispute continues. The existing legal uncertainty hinders the development 
of a market-based competition on the German letter market. The introduction of minimum 
wage was followed by a wave of bankruptcies. During the first quarter of 2008, the PIN 
Group let 7000 employees go. Between 2007 and 2009, a total of approximately 19000 jobs 
disappeared, about 17000 of which occurred in 2008 alone.360 It is clear that the economic 
downturn during this period also played a part in these figures. 
At the same, it remains uncertain whether the two biggest competitors, PIN and TNT, will 
remain in the market.361 Owing to the fixed minimum wage, TNT has been considering 
withdrawing from the German letter market. During the first quarter of 2008, the PIN Group 
filed for bankruptcy. While PIN dropped out, TNT decided to stay in the market, but without 
paying the decreed minimum wage. At the same time, TNT must make high provisions to 
prepare for the case that it should lose the lawsuit. After the lawsuit had been filed in 2008 
and passed through the legal system, the Federal Administrative Court came to a decision in 
January 2010: The court declared the decree on the minimum wage by the Federal Ministry 
for Labor and Social Affairs null and void.362  
Another example for dynamic effects is the unilateral exemption from VAT of the DP AG. 
Prior to 1 July 2010, the turnovers of DP AG are exempt from VAT.363 As the only enterprise, 
the post doesn’t have to raise VAT on postal items. The reason given for this is that the DP 
AG has to provide the universal service. The services of the competitors are fully liable to 
VAT. Competitors like the Dutch TNT protest vehemently against this treatment. 
In April 2009, the European Court of Justice decides that the exemption from tax of one 
market operator only is unlawful.364 After several attempts, the lower and upper house of 
German Parliament decided in March 2010 to change the Value Added Tax Act. In the private 
customer sector the Deutsche Post AG remains exempt from VAT, but becomes liable to 
VAT in the business customer sector. The new regulation enters into force on 1 July 2010. 
Since then, other providers of postal services have been exempt from VAT, so long as they 
provide at least part of the universal services, such as the transport of packages, permanently 
and area-wide. At the same time, many postal services of Deutsche Post (e.g., bulk mail) are 
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fully liable to VAT, which so far were tax-privileged. TNT-Post comments the decision of the 
Bundesrat and observes that this is “an important step toward fair competitive 
competitions.”365  
United Kingdom 
Royal Mail believes that the regulatory framework creates a disincentive to postal operators, 
which leads them to concentrate on price rather than innovation. Permitting cost-reflective 
pricing will facilitate sustainable competition, which creates the right incentives for efficient 
entry. The current regulatory framework enables competitors to enter the market with very 
little risk; in order to facilitate innovation, there must be incentives for all operators to invest. 
Deregulation will allow greater investment certainty and thus innovation, by enabling normal 
competitive forces to shape the industry.366 
Since the launch of the access regime, the access volumes have grown rapidly. In 2010, 
around 40 percent of letter volumes (7 billion items) were processed via access agreements. 
Due to the headroom margin system Royal Mail lost money on these items. Therefore, they 
called for an adequate regulation, which took into consideration the changed situation in the 
sector. 
Concerning the development of end-to-end competition, the Hooper Report (2008) concludes 
that there is uncertainty about the future development of the market, which makes it difficult 
for operators to assess the likely return on the investment. The consequences of falling 
volumes, developments in new technologies, and regulation at the end of current price control 
are difficult to predict. Furthermore, some operators claim that any investment in an end-to-
end delivery network would be threatened by the ability of Royal Mail to hamper competition 
in the future.367  
The fact that the competitors’ business models are predominantly based on the offered 
services and the business entail a very high risk in the medium and long term: The changes in 
the regulatory regime proposed in 2010, which are now adopted by Ofcom, also have far 
reaching consequences for the competitors. The competitors entered the market under the 
present regulatory regime after the market opening and the price regulation of 2006.  
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Now this regime is to be adjusted. Of course, these adjustments also have commercial 
consequences for the competitors. If the present ex-ante regime is abolished, competition law 
has a stronger significance in the postal market. While this gives Royal Mail more 
commercial flexibility, the uncertainty for the competitors increases, as it will take a while 
during the transition phase for the legal means regarding anti-competitive behavior to take 
effect. Under extreme circumstances, cases can last so long that smaller competitors are 
forced out of the market. 368 
Both product innovation and process innovation are appreciated in the following.   
Comparative Appreciation: Product Innovation 
Although the stability of institutions has a positive effect on investment security, the influence 
on the universal service is rather negative in connection with product innovations. This is the 
case if legal stipulations on the universal service cannot be adjusted quickly enough per 
changes in the market. Excessively rigid definitions of the universal services prevent the 
further development of products. 
All in all, the legislative process in Switzerland has lasted very long and remains 
uncompleted. The emergence of the new Postal Services Act in the UK also lasted several 
years. The bases for the adjustments in the regulatory regime were missing, and due to rigid 
price regulation, together with the access regime and the requirements in the universal 
service, the incumbent got into more and more trouble.  
As mentioned above, the traditional Universal Service Obligations in the postal sector often 
include an obligation to deliver countrywide at least five days per week.369 In all three 
examined countries, the incumbents deliver six days per week. There have been various 
attempts at reducing the cost associated with this obligation. Examples include delivery to 
centralized Post Office boxes in remote regions instead of doorstep delivery, reduced delivery 
frequency in remote areas, outsourcing of rural deliveries to partner firms with more flexible 
labor cost, or differentiated pricing (zonal pricing) to reflect differences in delivery cost 
across regions. 
The most important hindrance for the introduction of such relaxations to the USO is lacking 
consumer consent. However, from a technology point of view, in many places, giving away 
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free e-readers such as Kindle or iPad would cost considerably less than printing and 
delivering postal items. Hence, the USO could be adjusted so that convenient alternative 
forms of delivery means may be chosen as alternatives to physical delivery.  
An example for such an electronic delivery service complementing and potentially 
substituting physical delivery is reverse hybrid mail.370 The commercial viability of such a 
service depends on the possibility of substituting physical delivery processes which itself 
depends on the formulation of the USO. Hence, innovative processes and products may only 
display their full potential in an accordingly formulated or adjusted regulatory regime. 
In the long term, an adjustment of the universal service due to declining letter volumes and 
changed customer behavior will be unavoidable. In the future, electronic alternatives and 
flexibility regarding delivery time and days have to be made possible. Although the 
regulatory framework has not yet been adjusted, postal enterprises have to prepare for these 
adjustments today. A difficult decision must be made: should the postal enterprises substitute 
their current business and their letter volumes with digital products? In order to do this, the 
postal enterprises have to be certain today that the investments into new technologies and the 
development of products will be worthwhile also in connection with the universal service.   
Ex-ante price control has a decisive influence on product innovations and the pricing of 
products. Long-lasting approval processes increase the time to market. Moreover, timely 
reactions to changes in a quickly altering environment are impossible. Innovative price 
models are prevented by extensive price regulation as in case of the UK. In the present 
regime, 80 percent of the turnover of Royal Mail is under price control in England. As a 
consequence, the regulatory authority sees itself more in the role of a product manager of 
prices than in that of a supervisor. It is in the nature of things that the regulatory authority 
does not have primary information about the markets and their development and that it can 
hardly observe the changes in customer behavior. All experience regarding developments is 
missing, since this is a new state authority. Therefore, most market changes are recognized 
with a certain delay. 
While volumes are strongly declining, the requirements remain the same, which leads to a 
shrinking financing basis for the universal service. Since the turnovers have to be used to fund 
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the universal service, fewer financial means are available for innovations. Today flexibility in 
pricing is required, since hardly any financing instruments other than the turnovers of 
incumbents are applied.  
The selection of the financing mechanism for the universal can also influence the innovation 
incentives of the competitors. In case of a funds solution, which is funded by all market 
operators, the amount of the contributions plays a crucial role. The higher the contribution of 
a provider, the fewer means are available for innovation. This is true both for the incumbent 
and the competitor. The uncertainty regarding the financing concepts to be applied in the 
future can therefore also have an impact on investment incentives. 
The lengthy debate and the legal dispute concerning the introduction of a minimum wage in 
the German postal market has hindered the development of competition and therefore had a 
negative effect on investment incentives in the German postal market. While TNT did not pay 
minimum wage, it had to make provisions for the case that the minimum wage should be 
fixed after all. During a period of legal uncertainty of more than two years, TNT could invest 
fewer means into the development of networks and into the end-to-end process. As a 
consequence there was more effort in the cost reduction in existing processes than in 
developing new products. The example shows how the length of the procedure leads to high 
costs for the industry and to regulatory uncertainty. It is certainly true that economic reasons 
also played their part in the bankruptcy of the PIN Group and the Springer Publishing House 
withdrew as an investor. But shortly after the introduction of minimum wage, the structure of 
the market changed significantly. 
Comparative Appreciation: Process Innovation 
The regulatory governance costs regarding process innovations can also be shown using the 
example of the letter market in Great Britain. Since the market was opened, almost no 
innovation has taken place. Competition concentrates on prices in the upstream range, and 
there is no product innovation. 
Hence, in the UK, the de facto regulation of downstream access has various effects: First, it 
prohibits the development of competing delivery networks. Due to the possibility of partially 
bypassing Royal Mail’s upstream operations, economies of scale and scope are lost in these 
processes. It also creates regulatory risk for all involved operators because their business 
models very much depend on the terms of network access. This translates into investment 
risk, so that investments in innovation and infrastructures are deterred. 
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As a consequence of ex-ante regimes, no investments are made and no innovation incentives 
are offered. In Germany, the access conditions are monitored ex-post. Here the market 
development differs from that of Great Britain, and both competitors and the incumbent 
realized innovation at all levels of the postal value chain. Smaller providers have looked for 
innovative solutions in order to realize an area-wider delivery. In this case, hindrances in the 
development of competition were due not to the definition of access conditions, but to 
uncertainties in connection with the discussion of minimum wages. 
7.4. Synthesis and Conclusion 
After the analysis has been concluded, this section will provide the synthesis. The purpose of 
the section is to determine which institutional dimensions and cost drivers have a relatively 
high influence on the different regulatory governance costs. 
7.4.1.  Different Stages of Regulatory Regimes 
In chapter 3, different levels concerning the economics of institutions were introduced. The 
three compared postal markets in Switzerland, Germany and the UK are all in different phases 
regarding regulation and liberalization.  
With reference to chapter 3 and the different levels of analysis, Switzerland is most likely on 
Level 2 (get the institutional environment right) in transition to Level 3 (get the governance 
structures right): in Switzerland the full opening of the letter market has not yet been taking 
place and was further postponed in the new Postal Act, although this was originally a goal 
when the revision started. A postal legislation has been adopted and will be put into force 
during the second half of 2012. The institutional setting is being redefined; new actors in 
postal market regulation are created. The Swiss Post is in good commercial shape and will be 
converted into a limited company. 
Germany is already one level further and is on the threshold to Level 4 (get the marginal 
conditions right): In Germany, the market was fully opened in 2008. Subsequently, 
discussions about the introduction of minimum wage and the exemption from VAT led to 
legal disputes and uncertainties. Competitors have a share of about 11 percent in the letter 
market; DP AG provides the universal service on a voluntary basis. There are calls for an 
amendment to the postal legislation, and it is very likely that this will happen in the near 
future. Today Deutsche Post is one of the biggest logistic enterprises worldwide.   
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Great Britain is on Level 4: In Great Britain, the market was fully opened as early as 2006. 
Regulation did not achieve the original goal of well-functioning competition with sustainable 
maintenance of the universal service. The strong regulatory interventions and their 
consequences have to be corrected through a new postal legislation. This has been in force 
since October 2011 and is currently being implemented. The former regulatory authority 
PostComm is dissolved and the tasks of postal market regulation are transferred to Ofcom. 
The effects of the institutional adjustments cannot be assessed at this point.  
Due to the fact that the three postal markets are not in the same phase, not all types of 
regulatory governance costs can be assessed in the same way. Static costs and particularly 
direct costs can be assessed in all three markets. For instance, the dynamic effects (dynamic 
costs) can hardly be assessed in Switzerland, since the primary goal of the present regulatory 
framework is not the promotion of competition and practically no market entrances take 
place. In contrast, dynamic costs and their effects in the markets of Germany and Great 
Britain can be observed relatively well. The effects can be best seen in Great Britain, due to 
the fact that it has been more than six years since the market opening and very strong 
regulatory interventions have taken place. 
7.4.2.  Institutional Dimensions and Impacts on Regulatory Governance Costs 
In Chapter 5, a list of different institutional dimensions was introduced.371 Not all dimensions 
have the same strong impact on regulatory governance costs. In the following the different 
dimensions and their impact are discussed. The appraisals of the different institutional 
dimensions and their influence are based on the observations from the case studies, and on the 
semi-structured expert interviews on the framework of regulatory governance costs. 
Number of Regulatory Actors: 
The number of involved actors mainly affects the direct costs. The higher the number of 
actors, the higher the different need for information will be. Compliance costs also increase, 
since different actors have a need for information. The coordination costs also rise. In 
particular, this was confirmed in the case of Switzerland. Depending on the degree of 
horizontal exchange of information between the authorities, this may lead to a duplication of 
the provided information. The examples in Germany and Switzerland show that the regulatory 
authorities generally call for more rights of inspection and competences. The effects on the 
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indirect and dynamic costs are rather slight. In the German letter market, many smaller 
enterprises are active in the market, which shows that they are not deterred from a market 
entrance. In general, it can be said that the larger these actors are, the higher the direct costs 
will be. 
Modalities and Subject of Information Exchange:  
Regarding the exchange of information, five different drivers can be identified in the postal 
market. There are information exchanges with reference to the universal service, to prices 
under price control, to access conditions, labor conditions and turnovers in the market. 
Generally, it can be said here that in the three markets the obligation to provide information is 
very much concentrated on the incumbents. The reason for this is that while they are the 
providers of the universal service, they are also market-dominating enterprises. The exchange 
of information therefore has an impact mainly on the direct costs of the incumbent 
(monitoring and compliance). If the obligation to provide information is generally excessive, 
smaller enterprises are deterred from entering the market. In the UK, the direct costs have so 
far been particularly high due to extensive obligations to provide information about the high 
number of products under price regulation, quality requirements, and the access regime. The 
main problem with information exchange is the asymmetry that exists at the expense of the 
incumbent. The organization of information exchange has only little impact on indirect and 
dynamic costs. 
Interaction of Sector-Specific Regulation and Competition Law:  
The analysis of the three markets confirms that the division of roles in the postal market has 
not been fully clarified. In the UK, the former Postcomm has extensive competences in the 
area of access conditions; however, the strict regime did finally not result in the desired 
effects. Hooper (2010) concludes that competition law will play a more important role in the 
future British postal market, since the ex-ante regulation is to be abolished. This development 
corresponds to the economic rationales for regulation.372 In Germany, however, the regulatory 
authority and the Monopoly Commission call for stronger ex-ante regulation in order to foster 
the development of competition. In view of the developments in the UK, these requests are to 
be reconsidered. Generally, it can be said that with respect to the access regime the 
competition authorities have enough competence and expertise to intervene in case of market 
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abuse. Here, too, the question arises of whether it would make sense to duplicate the 
knowhow for the assessment of network access abuse. Observations of some cases show that 
it probably would not. Ex-ante regulation increases both the static-direct costs, as the example 
UK shows, and the indirect and dynamic costs in the postal market to a considerable degree. 
The costs are mainly borne by incumbents and customers.  
Regulatory Processes:  
Regarding the regulatory process, similar statements as those made above on information 
exchange apply. Here, too, an extreme example is provided by the UK, where Royal Mail is 
in the present license regime under the obligation to appoint a compliance officer to ensure 
the compliance processes. Here, the more obligations to provide information that exist, the 
higher the direct costs are. Static-indirect costs and dynamic costs are rather low. Dynamic 
costs accrue if the universal services are concerned and have to be approved based on lengthy 
processes. This is the case in Switzerland, where every year a list of services in the universal 
has to be approved by DETEC, the responsible department, in coordination with the postal 
regulator. Approval procedures for methods in quality measurement have similar effects. For 
instance, new technologies may permit more effective and efficient measurements, though 
due to the long approval process and the exchange of information, the implementation and 
introduction take very long. 
Stability of Institutions (Organizational Perspective):  
The stability of institutions has a considerable impact on all types of costs. As far as direct 
costs are concerned, the monitoring, compliance and coordination costs decrease over time, 
since the processes have begun to work out (learning effects). Stable institutions also have a 
positive effect on market development and investments into postal markets. The transfer of 
the regulatory tasks from PostComm to Ofcom certainly had a positive impact. But there are 
also uncertainties regarding the organization of the future regime. As mentioned above, the 
business models of the competitors are largely based on the product range and the current 
price system of Royal Mail. Adjustments of the access regime, which lead to price increases 
by Royal Mail, directly influence the competitors. The new institutional features of the postal 
legislation in Switzerland will certainly affect the costs by increasing the number of 
regulatory actors. The enterprises must set up institutional practice and the exchange of 
information has to be restarted. 
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Scope of Universal Service: 
The scope and definition of the universal service influence all three types of costs. There are 
direct costs, since the compliance with the requirements regarding the universal has to be 
monitored. The higher the number of products and the stricter the respective requirements, the 
higher monitoring and compliance costs will be. The interaction of competition and universal 
service obligation is also significant. In the UK, for example, the sustainable funding of the 
universal service has become endangered, since no adequate instruments for the promotion of 
competition were selected. Additionally, it must be possible to adjust the definition and scope 
of the universal service to the changed customer behavior and market conditions. As a 
consequence of rigid definitions, existing products, which are no longer in demand or in 
demand in a different, cannot be taken from the market or renewed. The scope of the 
universal service greatly influences regulatory governance costs. Therefore, the definition 
must anticipate and assimilate future developments or adjustments must be possible, when the 
conditions change.   
Degree of Liberalization: 
The degree of liberalization has had a big impact on regulatory governance costs. This is 
particularly true since letter volumes decline, thereby increasing unit costs per letter, if no cost 
reductions and increases in efficiency are realized. The more providers there are in the 
market, the smaller the volumes per provider, if the mail volumes further decline. In addition, 
it becomes evident that end-to-end competition develops hardly at all or very slowly. In the 
compared cases, end-to-end competition can be observed, though even in this respect, the 
competitors have only about one tenth of the market shares. We see that the original goals of 
securing the universal service and simultaneous promotion of competition strongly diverge. In 
a liberalized market, the right incentives for providing the universal service must be given and 
not be based on rigid requirements. In open markets, the universal service must be organized 
in line with the market. Here, Germany seems to be successful. A legal basis for the provision 
of the universal service in conformity with the market has existed since 1997. In this 
connection, the example of Germany is presented as best practice by WIK (2009b).373 Even if 
the creation of end-to-end competition remains a goal in England, the preservation of a 
financeable universal service is given preference over competition in the new postal act. 
Hence, the challenge is to find a balance between adequate universal service regulation and to 
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set sufficient incentives for incumbent operators to develop in market-oriented companies.374 
The impact of the degree of liberalization is particularly strong for dynamic costs.  
Financing and Financing Mechanism of the USO:  
The manner of financing also influences all three types of costs. Depending on the financing 
mechanism, the direct costs for the incumbent increase due to compliance requirements. In 
case of self-financing by the incumbent, it has to be ensured that market-driven and cost-
covering prices permit the funding of the services. In case of fund solutions, it must be made 
sure that the burden of financing is not borne by the incumbent alone. At the same time, the 
shares to be paid by market entrants should not be so high that they do not enter the market or 
have no financial means to invest into innovation. As described in chapter 2, no financing 
mechanism has prevailed in the postal market so far. In the compared markets, only 
Switzerland has a residual monopoly. The legislator foresees that the universal service 
continuous to be self-financed by Swiss Post. In Germany, the financing fund fixed in the 
Postal Act of 1997 has not yet been applied, since the DP AG provides the universal service 
on a voluntary basis. In the UK, funding is endangered because Royal Mail does not cover its 
costs. Here, the solution entails more commercial freedom (hence deregulation) for Royal 
Mail and a modernization program. If the total financial load for the providers is too big, the 
resources needed to realize innovations are lacking. The uncertainty about the method that 
will be applied in the future can have direct and dynamic effects.  
Universal Service Price Regulation:  
A form of price regulation exists in all three of the compared postal markets. In the UK, 80 
percent of Royal Mail’s turnover is under price regulation. Based on the headroom margin, 
the retail prices also have an influence on the access prices. This results de facto in an ex-ante 
regulation of access prices. Even under price control, the prices for private customers have 
increased in the UK. Access prices are rather low. In the future, price regulation in the UK 
will be strongly reduced, and the ex-ante regulation of access prices abolished. In this way, 
governance costs are to be reduced. In Switzerland, the services in the reserved area are 
subject to approval, and the price supervisor monitors the prices ex-post. In Germany, the 
prices of the DP AG (market-dominating enterprise) are in the licensed sector. As a rule, price 
approval procedures are very time-consuming and last too long when the market situation 
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changes. In order to avoid excessive regulatory governance costs, it must be possible for the 
enterprises to demand market-driven and cost-covering prices. Price regulation should be 
limited to as few products as possible (standard letters). Since the letter market is subject to 
very strong substitution competition, it can be assumed that prices will not increase when 
price regulation is reduced: If the products are too expensive, they are not in demand, and the 
enterprises price themselves out of the market. Consequently, a phasing-out of price 
regulation can be envisaged. In this way, regulatory governance costs could be reduced.  
Access Regime:  
The impact of access regulation in the UK shows what effects such regulation can have. Its 
influence on all types of regulatory governance costs is strong. Both according to economic 
theory375 and to practical experience, an access regulation that goes beyond access to post-
office boxes and address data does not make sense. From the view of regulatory governance 
costs, direct costs, based on the need for monitoring, are too high. Dynamic costs are also 
very high. During the present access regime, there was barely any innovation in the UK: in 
fact, Royal Mail worked inefficiently and hardly any new products were developed. In spite 
of low access prices, no end-to-end competition developed in the UK. Consequently, the 
dynamic costs are very high. In Germany, where a moderate access regime without ex-ante 
regulation and control was chosen, competition developed much more effectively. We can 
conclude that there is no case for access regulation in the postal market. The instruments of 
the competition authorities suffice to intervene in cases of market abuse. A phasing out of 
sector-specific regulation does not only lower regulatory governance costs, but also 
contributes to further clarifying the roles of sector-specific regulation and competition law. 
Stability of Institutions (Rules and Policy Perspective):  
When conditions change, it must be possible to adjust institutions. Since the political opinion-
forming process takes a lot of time, this is difficult. Early signals were sent to political circles 
in the UK in the form of two Hooper Reports (2008 and 2010), which stated that the stability 
of the universal service was in danger, Royal Mail was in bad financial shape, and access 
regulation was not leading to the best possible results. However, it took until 2012 to adjust 
the regulatory framework. As already mentioned above, the current and future definition of 
the universal service must take into account the changes in communication behavior and in 
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the postal markets. Therefore, the developments will have to be under constant observation. 
As another requirement, the general regulatory conditions have to be scrutinized for their 
compatibility with consumer behavior, technological development and the market. While in 
the short term this will increase direct governance costs, it will reduce dynamic costs in the 
future. It is important that policy tasks for the review of general conditions are not performed 
by the regulators, but by actors, who are neither involved in the regulatory process nor 
dependent of the involved actors’ interests. 
Norms and Standardization Requirements:  
The norms and standards predominantly influence direct costs, since, for instance, the review 
of quality requirements leads to long approval procedures between regulatory authorities and 
postal enterprises. In addition, the compliance with standards must be monitored. Examples 
here are measuring the accessibility of post offices or end-to-end measuring methods in the 
delivery of letters.  
Labor Conditions:  
Since the postal market is very personnel-intensive, labor conditions have a considerable 
impact on the regulatory governance costs. As the example of Germany has shown, fixing a 
minimum wage and the resulting uncertainty influenced the development of the market. 
Establishing a minimum wage for the entire sector is a rather drastic measure, one that has a 
decisive influence on production costs. Since it is essential that competition not take place at 
the expense of the personnel alone, the use of measures like the compliance with customary 
labor conditions and collective labor agreements seem to make sense: these measures give the 
parties room to negotiate and enable them to react to future developments. Although this leads 
to monitoring costs, as compliance must be kept under surveillance, those costs are not very 
high and can be understood as accompanying measures to the maintenance of fair labor 
conditions in the postal market. 
7.5. Summary of the Results 
The analysis shows that the transitions between different regulatory governance costs are not 
always very clear-cut. The same dimension can have its effect on different types of costs. 
Different combinations of institutional dimensions can also have various outcomes. While it 
is relatively easy to distinguish static-direct costs, static-indirect static costs in most cases do 
not only lead to direct costs in the short-term but also to dynamic costs in the long-term.  
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To conclude, the institutional dimensions have various effects and influence the degree of 
governance costs differently. Table 17 gives a final summary of the above appreciation of 
static and dynamic costs. We differentiate whether an institutional dimension has high, 
medium, low or no impact on regulatory governance costs. Resulting from the analysis 
provided in this chapter, the eight institutional dimensions with the greatest influence on 
regulatory governance costs are: (1) the number of involved regulatory actors, (2) the 
interaction of sector-specific regulation and competition law, (3) the stability of institutions, 
(4) the scope of the universal service obligation, (5) the degree of liberalization, (6) price 
regulation, (7) the access regime, and (8) labor conditions. A set of policy recommendations 
with the view of reducing regulatory governance costs is formulated in the next and final 
chapter.  
Table 17: Impacts of Institutional Dimensions on Regulatory Governance Costs 
Institutional 
Dimensions & Cost Drivers 
Impact on 
Static Costs Dynamic Costs 
Direct Indirect 
Number of Regulatory Actors 
 High 
Low Low 
Modalities and Subject of 
Information Exchange High 
Low No 
Interaction of Sector-Specific 
Regulation and Competition Law High 
Low High 
Regulatory Processes 
  High 
Low Medium 
Stability of Institutions (Org. 
Perspective) High High 
Medium 
Scope of Universal Service 
Obligation High 
Medium Medium 
Degree of Liberalization 
 
Medium High High 
Financing of the USO 
 
Medium Medium High 
US Price Regulation 
 High 
Medium High 
Access Regime 
 High High High 
Stability of Institutions 
(Policy Perspective) 
Low Medium High 
Norms and Standardization 
 
Low Low No 
Labor Conditions 
 
Medium High High 
Source: by author. 
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8. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This final chapter contains the overall conclusions and recommendation of the thesis. 
Beginning with a general summary of the content and the contributions of the thesis, the 
chapter then offers policy recommendations for the future regulation in the postal sector. The 
chapter concludes with a reflection on the limitations of the thesis and some recommendations 
for future research. 
8.1. Summary 
The distinction between economic, technical and socio-political reasons for regulation is 
particularly important in post. The socio-political regulation regarding universal services and 
minimum wages plays a significant role in the sector. In contrast to the other network 
industries, technological change has played so far a rather secondary role and only recently 
the postal sector faces the rather new phenomena of intermodal competition with other 
communication means. Yet, changing communication behavior within society and increasing 
E-substitution have had a considerable impact on the operator’s traditional business model 
and the further economic development of the whole sector. Consequently, the pressure on 
labor conditions and the necessity for process optimizations in order to cut costs is on the 
increase. Moreover, the former logistics operators start to cope with new technologies and are 
often forced to cannibalize their own physical products with new hybrid or E-products. In 
order to allow postal operators to cope with these challenges, regulatory institutions need to 
evolve coherently with developments in the market place and the society. One of the findings 
of this thesis is that in many cases current regulatory institutions do not respond adequately 
and in a timely fashion to changes in consumer preferences or technologies. The observed 
development in the UK illustrates clearly how the regulatory regime has failed to adapt early 
enough and how the delay in the adaption of the regulatory institutions has influenced the 
development of competition as well as the market structure. The impact on the commercial 
situation of the designated universal service provider Royal Mail and the postal network has 
been considerable as well.  
Existing literature on regulation in the postal market has mainly addressed single institutional 
dimensions (e.g., the access regime or the universal service). In this thesis, we give a broader 
overview of how different institutional dimensions and their characteristics can act as drivers 
of regulatory governance costs and influence not only the development of the market, but also 
individual operators. The literature on regulation in network industries is to a large extent 
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concerned with positive effects and desirable outcomes of regulation in the context of market 
failures. Based on the literature in new institutional economics (Chapter 3), regulatory 
governance (Chapter 4) and economic regulation (section 2.1.), we have defined a framework 
to appreciate the different institutional dimensions and potential effects of regulation. Hence, 
the main theoretical contribution of the thesis is the development of the framework of 
regulatory governance costs. The framework, aimed at analyzing the costs of regulatory 
governance in regulatory regimes, contains three different types of costs: static-direct costs, 
static-indirect costs and dynamic costs. The static-direct costs of regulatory governance refer 
to the interaction and transactions between the involved actors in the short term, and only 
marginally concern the overall market. These costs are: 
- Monitoring Costs which arise on the regulatory institution’s side because of 
informational asymmetry in the relationships of principals with their agents. 
- Compliance Costs which are the costs the industry faces in order to comply with 
regulatory requirements. 
- Coordination Costs which result from the fact that multiple institutional actors are 
involved in regulation, which have to be coordinated. 
The second type of regulatory governance costs, the static-indirect costs, pertains less to the 
individual actors than to the overall market. Static-indirect regulatory governance costs are 
the costs related to: 
- Quantities and Prices: Actions of regulators (or policy makers) that have effects on the 
regulated industries and the consumers in terms of supply and the development of 
prices. 
- Capacity and Technology Choice: Regulation may prevent the regulated operators 
from aligning their supply with the effective demand and affect investment.  
They also reduce the security on investment in the short-term. The third type of costs, the 
dynamic costs of regulatory governance, results in an inefficient level of product and process 
innovation. They occur mainly in combination with regulatory uncertainty that end in legal 
disputes and too rigid regulatory regimes that hinder the developments of markets. The 
dynamic costs reduce investment security in the long-term and encompass a more dynamic 
perspective than the static costs. The costs concern: 
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- Product Innovation: regulation may prevent operators from introducing new 
products/services because of excessive investment cost or limited gains from 
investment uncertainty. It may also result in a delay of time to market. 
- Process Innovation: regulation may result in suboptimal processes, either introducing 
process innovations or preventing operators from optimizing existing processes. 
The framework of regulatory governance costs was applied in three case studies in the postal 
market (see chapter 6). The analysis of the cases shows that the distinctions between the 
different regulatory governance costs are not always very clear-cut and sometimes hard to 
identify. While it is relatively easy to identify static-direct costs, static-indirect costs in most 
cases do not only lead to direct costs in the short-term but also to dynamic costs in the long-
term. Static-indirect costs might even result as a consequence of static-direct costs. Thus, 
there seems to be a causal link between the different types of regulatory costs. Furthermore, 
the analysis of the cases provides insights concerning the impact of the different institutional 
dimensions on the governance costs and the need for action in adapting current regulation. As 
a result, a set of policy recommendation is formulated in the next paragraph of this concluding 
chapter.  
Even if the costs of regulation are not operationalized in a quantitative manner, the analysis 
shows how governance costs impact the development of the regulated markets, the operators, 
and the consumers. Incumbent operators may well tend not to invest in new products and 
technologies because the costs and the corresponding risks are too high. Furthermore, the 
universal service definition and the implemented regulatory regime might incentivize the 
former monopolists to remain with the traditional postal services instead of adapting their 
business models and searching for innovative communication solutions in combination with 
their core business. Market entrants might struggle with their business models and drop out of 
the markets because of a lack of flexibility caused by regulation and market entry barriers that 
reduce the security on investment. As a result, the supply in the market does not align with 
consumer needs and the development of competition is hampered. 
The analysis of the cases illustrates which institutional dimensions influence the different 
governance costs and therefore impact the development of markets. According to the findings 
of the synthesis in chapter 7 and the summary in Table 17, the eight institutional dimensions 
with the greatest influence on regulatory governance costs are: (1) the number of involved 
regulatory actors, (2) the interaction of sector-specific regulation and competition law, (3) the 
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stability of institutions, (4) the scope of the universal service obligation, (5) the degree of 
liberalization, (6) price regulation, (7) the access regime and (8) labor conditions.  
As a starting point and to stimulate the discussion on how to develop future regulatory 
regimes, we formulate policy recommendations on how to adapt regulatory institutions in the 
postal sector in the next section. 
8.2. Critical Reflections on the Limitations of our Research 
The thesis is original since it provides a new approach for assessing present regulatory 
regimes and tries to bring in a static as well as a dynamic perspective when it comes to the 
analysis of regulatory institutions. Nonetheless, the chosen approach has some limitations as 
follows.  
First of all, the distinction between the different types of regulatory governance costs is not 
always clear. The definition of static-direct costs is quite distinctive and the category is the 
one that is most easily quantifiable, because the costs are related to distinct actions. 
Furthermore, we assume that the category of static-direct cost is applicable in all network 
industries. But, the other two types of costs are rather a consequence of different regulatory 
interventions and strongly depend upon the characteristics of the investigated network 
industry (e.g., the appearance of monopolistic bottlenecks). For instance, static-indirect and 
dynamic costs differ in postal and telecom regulation, because the characteristics of the 
networks are completely different.376 A cross-sectoral comparison of indirect and dynamic 
costs would therefore be interesting but has not yet been included in this thesis. 
When it comes to the discussion of transactions in regulatory regimes, we face some 
difficulties in defining the exact transactions in regulation. Even if we come up with our 
definition of regulatory governance costs, we do not provide an exact definition of what the 
transactions in regulation are. A more detailed discussion on the definition of the transactions 
would definitely help to better understand the causal connection between static observations 
of costs and the indirect or dynamic effects of the regulatory transactions. Therefore, an 
extension of the framework could be to take the indirect and dynamic costs as the outcome 
variable that is to explain. 
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Furthermore, we do so far not fully understand the causal link between the different cost 
categories. In chapter 5 we assume that the various institutional dimensions have different 
impacts on the cost categories (in terms of both time and outcome). The direct costs refer to 
the interaction between the involved actors and only marginally concern the overall markets. 
The indirect costs act less on the individual actors than on the overall market and actor’s 
investment decisions in the short term. The dynamic costs, on the other hand, influence the 
future situation of product and process innovation. The analysis of the cases shows 
illustratively that there is a certain interdependence. But, we are not yet able to draw a very 
clear distinction between the cost categories, their interactions and the impact regarding the 
evolution of regulated markets.  
Nevertheless, our framework of regulatory governance costs is certainly a first step and basis 
for future empirical studies and theoretical developments.  
8.3. Policy Recommendations: Reducing Regulatory Governance Costs in 
Postal Regulation 
In light of the findings about the different institutional dimensions and their impact on 
regulatory governance costs, we can formulate policy recommendations for the future design 
of institutions in postal regulation. Since not all dimensions are of equal importance, policy 
recommendations are given for those that have the greatest influence on regulatory 
governance costs. The following eight recommendations aim at reducing regulatory 
governance costs while preserving the overall positive effect of regulation on the postal 
sector. 
Recommendation 1 – The Number of Regulatory Actors:  
The examples of Germany and Switzerland show that regulatory authorities call for more (ex-
ante) competences in regulation. Furthermore, the objectives of different regulatory agencies 
might not be congruent. The more actors involved in regulation, the higher the information 
requirements for operators and the more information exchange is needed in the short term. 
The new Swiss Postal Act even raises the number of involved regulatory actors.  
In order to reduce the static costs of regulatory governance over time, the number of involved 
regulatory authorities should be kept as low as possible. To conclude, the more actors 
involved, the higher the static costs of regulatory governance. 
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Recommendation 2 – Interaction of Sector-Specific Regulation and Competition Law:  
The analysis shows that the division of roles in the postal sector has not been fully clarified. 
In the UK, the sector-specific regulator had extensive competences in competition or access 
regulation which might be reduced in the future. In Switzerland, the various regulators pursue 
different objectives when regulating the same enterprise. Competition authorities should 
exclusively perform tasks concerning the assessment of market power abuse. In this way 
uncertainties about responsibility are clarified and roles are clearly allocated. This lowers 
static-direct and results in a reduction of dynamic costs because of a decrease in uncertainty 
for operators. There is a strong need for a clarification of roles following the economic 
rationales of regulations. A phasing out of sector-specific regulation must be possible, if the 
cost of regulatory intervention exceed its benefit. The control of undesirable anti-competitive 
behavior (e.g., excessive pricing, price discrimination and foreclosure of access to the 
infrastructure) has been covered by ex-post instruments of competition law. 
Recommendation 3 – Stability of Institutions:  
Stable institutions are important to lowering direct regulatory costs in the short- and medium-
term that results in the reduction of indirect costs by ensuring investment security. However, 
the experience in the UK concerning the access regime and price control shows that a renewal 
of the regulatory regime was urgently required. Therefore, the regulatory rules will have to be 
reviewed on a regular basis. The following questions, among others, have to be answered: Do 
the rules correspond to the development of consumer needs? How did the market change (in 
terms of volumes, competition, new products or prices) since the last adjustment of the 
regulatory regime? What technological developments have taken place and have an impact on 
the market? Have the original goals of regulation been achieved?  
To conclude, even if stable institutions are very important to reduce the governance costs in 
the short- and mid-term, a periodical review of the regulatory framework is needed. Only an 
independent re-evaluation of the regulatory institutions (with transparent criteria) helps to 
determine if the present regulation is still justified and if regulatory governance costs can be 
reduced to a greater extent in the future.  
Recommendation 4 – The Scope of the Universal Service:  
The higher the number of products and the information requirements in the area of the 
universal service, the higher are the static costs of regulatory governance. The definitions as 
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well as the scope of universal services are quite far-reaching and rigid in all three of the 
presented case studies. As a consequence, the existing products that are no longer in demand 
cannot be adapted or taken from the market (dynamic costs). If letter volumes decline, this 
also has its implications for the postal universal service: the unit costs per delivered item 
increase. Moreover, the operation of a six-day delivery network is very costly. As it is the 
case in Switzerland, changes in communication behavior and technological developments 
must also be taken into account in the definition of the universal service. 
We come to the conclusion that only the most important products should be included in 
universal service (e.g., standard letters and parcels and corresponding services), as in the 
future, alternative forms of delivery and combinations with physical delivery must be possible 
and relevant for the definition of postal universal services. 
Recommendation 5 – The Degree of Liberalization:  
As shown in the analysis, the three postal markets covered by the case studies are in different 
stages of market reform. After the liberalization of the UK’s postal market in 2006, there was 
hardly any development of end-to-end competition. There is fierce up-stream competition 
however. In Germany, approximately 90 percent of mail volumes are processed by DP AG 
after a stepwise reduction of the reserved area and the full market opening in 2008. As shown 
in the case studies, competition develops slowly, and it is uncertain whether it will develop 
sustainably in the future. In addition, the sector faces strong intermodal competition. 
Regulatory conditions should be geared to promoting end-to-end competition, and entry 
barriers (e.g., VAT exemptions) should be abolished.  
The analysis shows that there is greater potential for innovations in end-to-end competition 
than in upstream access. Moreover, there must be a balance between the requirements in the 
universal service and the restrictions for market-dominating operators. The challenge consists 
in finding the balance between adequately regulating universal service and giving incumbents 
incentives to change into market-oriented enterprises. The regulation in liberalized markets 
must not be focused on the incumbents alone, because this would mean that they have to bear 
the entire regulatory governance costs. 
Recommendation 6 – Price Regulation:  
All three of the discussed regulatory regimes include some sort of a price regulation, and the 
approaches differ widely. In the UK, 80 percent of Royal Mail’s products are subject to price 
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control. But UK stamp prices have increased and doubled in the last ten years. In Switzerland, 
only the products in the reserved area are subject to authorization by the government 
(however, there is general price control). In Germany, prices for products under the license 
are part of price regulation. Prices for business customers with a minimum of 50 items are 
exempt from ex-post price control.  
At most, ex-ante price control should apply to the standard products in the universal service 
only. The control must allow for cost-covering and market-oriented prices. Due to strong 
intermodal competition (E-Substitution) and the decline of delivered mail volumes, the 
sector-specific ex-ante price control will have to be reconsidered in principle. Given that 
competition with alternative means is high, postal operators are incentivized to set their prices 
at the efficient level. Otherwise, the physical products would be even more substituted and no 
longer in demand. Competition authorities guarantee ex-post price control. 
Recommendation 7 – Access Regime 
The example of the UK shows that far-reaching access regime does not lead to the promotion 
of end-to-end competition and results in undesired outcomes. In addition, no innovation 
incentives are set: Royal Mail worked inefficiently, and hardly any product innovation was 
introduced. The business models of entrants rely heavily on the business model of Royal 
Mail. In Germany, where a more moderate access regime with no ex-ante components was 
chosen, end-to-end competition developed.   
The conclusion drawn from the case study analysis is that there is no need for ex-ante 
regulation of access conditions. The access regulation is not to be extended, and where it 
exists, it is to be abolished. This is not economically legitimated and access regulation should 
be limited to the non-discrimination between customer groups and ex-post control. The ex-
post control should be implemented by the competition authorities. As result all three types of 
governance costs will decline. 
Recommendation 8 – Labor Conditions: 
Labor conditions and especially costs are important cost drivers in the business models of 
postal operators. The example of the intended introduction of minimum wage in Germany 
caused a considerable impact on the development of the market and therefore on indirect and 
dynamic costs.  
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The fixing of a minimum wage must not endanger the business model of competitors and 
market entrants. At the same time, competition must not take place exclusively through labor 
costs, thus discriminating against the incumbents. Flanking measures such as customary labor 
conditions in the sector and the obligation to negotiate collective labor agreements are 
potential solutions.   
The recommendations aim at supporting policy makers and practitioners involved in postal 
regulation and in shaping future regulatory regimes, as well as reducing regulatory 
governance costs in the postal sector.  
8.4. Recommendations for Future Research 
As a result of the discussion in section 8.2, we formulate a number of  recommendations for 
future research in the following.  
Firstly, the framework of regulatory governance costs in its presented form does not allow for 
a quantification of the costs in the governance regimes and at this stage the analysis comes 
only on a qualitative level. The appreciation of the different dimensions of regulatory 
institutions and the impact on governance costs is difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, the 
present framework helps to identify where the different costs occur and enables statements on 
the degree of the costs in a qualitative way. Future research regarding the quantitative impact 
of regulatory institutions would be of value for improving the validity and the comparability 
of the different outcomes in different regimes. Therefore, other researchers may take the 
framework as a starting point and develop models in order to support the findings with 
figures. 
Secondly, an issue that has not been addressed in this study is the “accountability” for 
regulatory governance costs. We exclude the question of who is accountable for the different 
costs in a regime. In some cases, such as the direct costs, it is clearly evident that compliance 
costs are borne by the industry and the government mainly bears monitoring costs. This is 
considerably more difficult when it comes to the accountability for the indirect or dynamic 
cost. Is the German government, for example, accountable for the impact of the minimum 
wage dispute on the development of the market? Or is the former British regulator Postcomm 
accountable for the regulatory failure of the price control regime and the corresponding loss 
of Royal Mail? Therefore, we call for more research to better understand the accountability 
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for the direct and the dynamic costs of regulatory governance costs or more generally for 
regulatory failure.  
Thirdly, the exact definition of the transaction in regulatory regime remains open in this 
thesis. An interdisciplinary discussion on such a definition would be helpful in order to better 
understand the origin of costs in regulatory regimes. This would allow for a more distinctive 
categorization of governance costs than in the present framework. 
Fourthly, since the framework of regulatory governance costs could be considered a 
preliminary one and the results of the case studies apply to the postal sector only, a number of 
possible future studies using the same experimental set up are apparent. What is needed now 
are studies involving other network industries like telecommunications, railways or 
electricity. This should help to prove whether the present framework is generic enough to be 
applied to other sectors and to understand the causality of the different types of governance 
costs. The overall goal of future research should be to develop a generic framework with a 
clear distinction of cost categories in that enables the comparison of regulatory principles and 
thus the identification of best practices in regulation. This would then engender sound 
recommendations for the design of effective and efficient regulatory regimes in the 
infrastructures. 
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APPENDIX I: Interview / Discussion Guideline 
Interview Guideline: Regulatory Institutions and Governance Costs in the Postal Sector. 
Duration of interview: min 1,5h 
1. Background and Introduction 
− Market opening and intermodal competition put traditional postal business models at 
risk.  
− Regulatory institutions are intended to remedy market failure and reduce transaction 
costs. 
− But, they also cause governance costs.  
− Literature on Governance Costs:  
Maegli et al. 2010 (Governance Costs) 
Armstrong / Sappington 2008 (Regulated Industries) 
Friederizick et al. 2008 (Investment in Telecom) 
Jaag 2007 (Innovation in the Swiss Postal Sector) 
Dietl et al. 2008 (Process and product innovation in post)  
− Hardly any discussion about consequences of regulation on innovation in the postal 
sector. 
 
2. The Framework 2010: Regulatory Governance Costs  
− Governance costs are determined by: 
(1) The institutional design and the alignment of competences (rules and actors) 
(2) The behavior of actors 
(3) The choice of regulatory instruments 
− Regulatory governance costs are the costs of establishing, maintaining and 
coordinating, evaluating and adjusting a regulatory arrangement.  
− Governance costs are related to tasks performed  
(1) to sustain competitive but fair markets,  
(2) to set incentives for involved actors to provide a certain level of public 
service, and  
(3) to coordinate public authorities involved in regulation.  
 
3. Direct Costs of Regularory Governance  
− Monitoring costs arise because of informational asymmetries in the relationships of 
principals with their agents. 
− Compliance costs are the costs the industry faces in order to comply with regulatory 
requirements. 
− Coordination costs result from multiple institutional actors involved in regulated 
industries which have to be coordinated. 
 
Examples: 
− Modalities of information exchange: Information exchange and processing 
 XXXIV 
− Price regulation: Approval process and control leads to costs in information exchange  
− Access regime: Control and  Monitoring of access conditions  
 
4. Indirect Costs of Regulatory Governance  
  Indirect regulatory governance costs are the costs related to: 
− Quantities and Prices: Actions of regulators (or policy makers) may distort market 
outcome; have negative effects on firms and/or consumers 
− Capacity and Technology Choice: Regulation may prevent the regulated operators 
from aligning their supply to demand and distort technology choice.  
 
Examples: 
− Degree of liberalization: Uncertainty about investment  
− Price regulation: Wrong signals about scarcity  
− Access regime: Suppressed end-to-end Competition  
 
5. Dynamic Costs of Regulatory Governance  
− Innovation: A form of investment that results in new or better products and services or 
in more cost-efficient processes. 
− The dynamic costs of regulatory governance result from distorted innovation and 
infrastructure investment incentives. 
− The dynamic costs are a consequence of direct and indirect costs of regulatory 
governance. 
 
Dynamic costs of regulatory governance result in an inefficient level of product and 
process innovation: 
− Product Innovation: Regulation may prevent operators from introducing new 
products/services because of uncertainty about their investment and pricing. It may 
also or result in a delay of time to market. 
− Process Innovation: Regulation may result in suboptimal processes and prevent 
operators from optimizing existing processes or introduce process innovations. 
 
Examples: 
− Scope of Universal Service: Existing processes / products cannot be replaced 
− Price regulation: New product may not be attractive for firms / consumers 
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Examples: Regulatory Institutions and Governance Costs  
The following table and shows the effect of institutional aspects of regulation on direct and 
indirect costs and subsequently dynamic costs. 
Table 1: Institutional Aspects and Regulatory Governance Costs 
Institutional 
Aspects & Cost 
Drivers 
 
Regulatory Governance Costs 
Direct Cost Indirect Cost 
Dynamic Cost 
Effect on Product 
Innovation 
Effect on Process 
Innovation 
Number of Regulatory 
Actors 
 
Unclear 
responsibilities, 
necessary 
coordination 
 Uncertainty reduces 
innovation payoff 
Uncertainty reduces 
innovation payoff 
Modalities of 
information exchange 
Information exchange 
and processing 
 Delayed introduction 
of innovative services  
Delayed introduction 
of process innovations 
Interaction of sector-
specific regulation and 
competition law 
Concurrent 
jurisdiction may lead 
to ambiguous 
responsibilities 
 Uncertainty reduces 
payoff 
Uncertainty reduces 
payoff 
Scope of Universal 
Service Obligation 
 
Rigid requirements 
need strong control 
 Existing products 
cannot be abandoned 
Existing processes 
cannot be replaced 
Degree of 
Liberalization 
 Uncertainty about 
investment 
More competitors 
→ higher pressure 
→ less volume per 
firm 
 More competitors 
→ higher pressure 
→ less volume per 
firm 
Financing of the USO 
 
Implementation and 
execution of 
compensation 
mechanisms 
 Possibly reduced 
innovation payoff 
 
US Price Regulation  Inefficient pricing New product may not 
be attractive for firm  
/ consumers 
Lower cost has to be 
passed on to 
consumers 
Process of Price 
Regulation 
 
Approval process and 
control leads to costs 
in information 
exchange  
 Approval process 
delays introduction of 
innovative services  
 
Access Regime Control and  
Monitoring of access 
conditions / arbitration 
process in case of 
disagreement between 
operators   
Affected market 
development and end to 
end competition 
 Uncertainty about 
economies of scale 
and prevention of 
process innovation 
Stability of Institutions  Certainty about 
investment payoff 
Certainty about 
innovation payoff 
Certainty about 
innovation payoff 
Norms and 
Standardization 
requirements 
Approval process and 
control mechanisms in 
order to be compliant 
  Increased cost of 
process innovation 
due to necessary 
compliance 
Labor Conditions Negotiations with 
unions and control of 
labor conditions 
  Innovation may result 
in capital replacing 
labor; innovation is 
itself labor intensive 
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Activities: 
 
− Guest Editor: Network Industries Quarterly in 2010 
− Member of the Organizing Committee and Jury since 2009: “Conference on Postal and 
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Other Publications 
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